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Foreword 
 
 
It is probably appropriate to explain here how I arrived at a topic as “exotic” 
as ethnic Chinese conglomerates. In Chinese culture luck (hoki) plays an 
important role. I was steeped in luck in the form of several miracles, which 
have put me firmly on the track of the Salim Group.  
 
Let me start at the beginning. Part of this thesis is about opposing poles of a 
dilemma. Say, the dilemma between being a university administrator and an 
academic. If you move towards one pole, the opposite pole becomes more 
and more attractive. The result of these opposing forces may be that your 
strategy sways between the two. I started my academic career being an 
administrator while being appointed in an academic role. The more the 
administrative career progressed, the more I felt the need to develop my 
academic career, which meant first and foremost to obtain my PhD. The time 
horizons of these two poles do not exactly match. While both require hard 
work, a PhD requires contemplation, attention to detailed work, and 
conceptual thinking. Being the director of an MBA programme on the other 
hand requires one to find solutions for students’ problems - preferably 
immediately. So I started my PhD swaying between urgent administrative 
problems and, when my schedule permitted, my research. This irregular 
oscillation worked for a while, but my research progress suffered. My first 
miracle was that I was fortunate enough to have an understanding 
employer, Jacob de Smit, who stimulated me to develop both sides, and 
when I threatened to be overwhelmed by non-academic work, he ensured 
that the conditions for a successful academic career were firmly in place. 
Thanks to Jacob, I was able to focus almost completely on being an academic 
during the last year. 
 
I was already interested in Southeast Asia and a former professor, Victor 
Limlingan, “infected” me with enthusiasm for the topic of Chinese business 
in Southeast Asia. Because he taught me such a fantastic course in Manila, I 
decided to take that up as a topic for my PhD. As part of some early 
preparations, I had gathered some material on the Salim Group, an 
Indonesian-Chinese large business group run by the Salim family. A small 
grant was advertised and I proposed to make a teaching case on the Salim 
Group thinking that – if I would not get access – I could always write it 
based on secondary data. Because one of my friends decided to get married 
in Bali, I spent some extra days in Jakarta trying to meet people from 
Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates.  I wanted to see how far I would get. 
Surprisingly I was able to meet fantastic people, among them Mr. Utomo 
Josodirdjo (miracle two), who was able to introduce me to the Salim Group. 
Upon returning, I heard the news that LUF/Gratama Foundation had 
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awarded me the grant (miracle three), which would finance two more trips 
to Indonesia to gather data. It turned out that Anthony Salim, leader of the 
Salim Group was a very amicable and intelligent person who spent two 
whole hours of his precious time talking to me, for which I want to cordially 
thank him.  
 
People ask me why I want to go through all the trouble of doing my research 
in a corrupt country like Indonesia. And above all why I chose such a 
controversial and complex company as my topic. I have never seen this as a 
problem, on the contrary. I really liked doing research in Indonesia, and the 
sensitive political, social, business and cultural issues surrounding the Salim 
Group were fun to dive into. I fully enjoyed having to use all of my 
creativity to survive in a strange new country. Dealing with a new 
environment forces you to develop yourself in new ways. I was astonished 
to see how many high-level people were willing to be interviewed for this 
study. As I promised my respondents anonymity, I unfortunately cannot 
name all those people who opened their minds and occasionally their hearts. 
But without willing respondents this PhD could not have been written. 
Thank you for your information and support. 
 
Thinking back, the common theme in my academic journey has been 
crossing borders. Geographical borders were by far the easiest to cross. 
Cultural and disciplinary borders were more difficult but Indonesia taught 
me that with determination, preparation and the right contacts everything is 
possible. Wladimir Sachs has dedicated much of his time to training me as a 
rigorous social scientist, one that is able to cross borders. To work with an 
open-minded yet tough academic at times created great anxiety, but was 
mostly fun and always productive.  
 
PhD studies are long-term projects, and in the process many people help out 
in one way or another. My colleagues at LUSM were very supportive: Judith 
de Wilde, Marielle van Es, Kirsten Visman, Marta Rodriguez, and Hans 
Borgman all helped me in their own ways. Leonard Blussé has been a great 
support when I encountered difficult times. Outside Leiden University my 
cooperation with Peter Post and Sikko Visscher was stimulating, and 
enabled me to broaden my horizon. When doing research in Indonesia, I 
often stayed with my friends Unggul and Tuti, who offered me a home and 
a supportive environment in Jakarta. Thee Kian Wie, for whom I have great 
respect, has often offered valuable advice and introductions. Joy Kearney 
has done a great job of editing this book, for which I want to thank her. 
Janneke and Judith have helped me out with the preparation of this 
manuscript for publication. My partner Thorvald has undoubtedly suffered 
most from the process, so I would like to thank him for bearing with me.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for supporting me in this 
adventure. 
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Both Indonesian and Chinese names can be written in different ways. In this 
thesis I have chosen to use the most prevalent spelling within the context of 
this research, and mention other spelling methods if relevant.  
 
I would like to offer a last word of clarification to the readers of this book. 
Some of you, especially those familiar with ethnic Chinese business in 
Indonesia, may think it might be about corruption. It is not – and I gladly 
leave this topic to forensic accountants and to political economists. Instead 
this book is about the strategy of a family business in a complex and 
changing environment.    
 
 
 
Marleen Dieleman, December 2006. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
This in-depth, longitudinal case study aims at unravelling the strategy of the 
Salim Group, an ethnic Chinese family business group from Indonesia. The 
Salim Group was founded by Liem Sioe Liong, and grew to be the largest 
diversified business group in Southeast Asia, with close relationships with 
former President Suharto. Through triangulation of interviews, corporate 
reports, media sources and secondary sources, a time-series analysis of the 
Salim Group strategy within the context was made. 
 
The extant literature on ethnic Chinese family business groups can be 
categorised in three streams. First, the cultural perspective considers the 
“Chineseness” of businessmen a factor underlying their corporate strategy. 
Second, the minority perspective focuses on the networking behaviour of 
diaspora Chinese, including on the one hand ethnic and on the other crony 
networks. And finally the institutional perspective to strategy in emerging 
markets focuses on how strategy evolves in weak institutional settings. It is 
argued that these three perspectives can be combined when one 
distinguishes between small, medium-sized and large firms. Depending on 
the phase of development, the strategy of an ethnic Chinese family business 
group could be explained by different streams. In order to explore strategy 
development over time in conjunction with the firm’s environment, we 
make use of the coevolution concept, which enables one to study 
interdependent processes of mutual adaptation between firm and 
environment.  
 
The study of the Salim Group strategy contributes to our understanding 
through rich, multi-faceted information as well as to theory development in 
the following ways. First, we argue that contrary to popular theory the Salim 
Group focused on a consistent local-for-local business model rather than 
adapting continuously to its changing environment. Second, the Salim 
Group’s business networks have undergone substantial changes. While 
ethnic and political connections were important in the early days, currently 
foreign partners are more prevalent. The Salim Group has consciously built 
different types of social capital: bonding capital with their own ethnic group 
and bridging capital across social strata. Third, the Salim Group has 
diversified extensively, not only for traditional reasons but also as a result of 
their networks. Therefore, next to traditional economies of scope and 
institutional reasons behind diversification, we can in this case speak of 
“economies of connectedness”, referring to the advantages of diversification 
resulting from sharable relationships. Fourth, while institutional theories 
focus on the influence of the context on the firm, the Salim Group shows that 
internal factors matter as well. The transition to the second generation 
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leadership marked a shift to a new corporate strategy. Fifth, both qualitative 
and quantitative techniques show how the strategy of the Group moved 
over time from a relationship-based strategy to a market-based strategy, 
supporting institutional theories. However, the strategy development is not 
linear but oscillates frequently between the two opposing poles. Sixth, this 
study shows how a firm may take on passive, reactive and also proactive 
roles with regard to their environment. The Salim Group was not only 
influenced by political regimes, during the Suharto regime it was able to 
proactively influence policies, a unique situation for a single company. Thus, 
this study has revealed coevolutionary patterns of interaction between 
company and institutions. Last, through the unique position of power the 
Salim Group had in Indonesia, and its close alignment with Suharto, it 
became a symbol of the Suharto regime. Although theory often assumes an 
implicit distinction between company and environment, this study has 
shown how a single large player may morph into an institution itself. 
  
The study has shown the weaknesses of the cultural and networking 
perspectives. While both were valuable in explaining the early development 
of the Salim Group, neither of them is able to explain recent developments. 
The institutional perspective can best explain how strategy evolves for large 
business groups in an emerging market with weak institutions. External 
factors, in particular regime changes, influence strategy. However, this 
perspective needs to be complemented with an important notion from the 
family business literature: the fact that generational changes lead to a new 
direction for the firm. All in all, there is very little “Chinese” about the 
strategy development of this Group. It appears that, if compared with family 
business groups in other emerging markets, the Salim Group is not unique. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Ethnic Chinese Family Business Groups 
 
Despite the fact that ethnic Chinese make up only a very small minority of 
the populations of most Southeast Asian countries, they tend to contribute a 
disproportional share to economic activity in the region. This phenomenon 
can be observed in countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and most prominently in Indonesia. Many of the large businesses in 
Southeast Asia are started and managed by families of Chinese descent. The 
majority of these family empires are organized in a cluster of separate 
companies, hence the term business group.  
 
Given the importance of ethnic Chinese minorities in business in Southeast 
Asia, understanding ethnic Chinese family groups has been a key question 
in several academic fields, such as economics, political economy, 
anthropology, management and sociology. In the last fifteen years the 
literature on ethnic Chinese business in Asia has seen a rapid development1. 
Researchers have asked themselves whether and how ethnic Chinese family 
business groups are different from other firms in the region2. What business 
strategies do they employ, and are those strategies more successful than 
those employed by indigenous or Western firms? The knowledge that has 
been developed on ethnic Chinese business strategy to date remains highly 
fragmented. Many, often contradictory, explanations have been proposed 
for the behaviour of ethnic Chinese family business groups.  
 
The extant literature relates the success of ethnic Chinese businessmen in 
Southeast Asia to (combinations of) the following factors: their particular 
culture; their status as migrants; their domestic and international networks; 
particular political and economic circumstances in Southeast Asian 
countries; and business strategies informed by specific institutional context. 
Three different academic approaches are particularly relevant: 1. Chinese 
                                                 
1 Earlier works often used the term Overseas Chinese. However the term “ethnic 
Chinese” is now considered more appropriate as “Overseas Chinese” is a term taking 
mainland China as a central geographical point of reference. After all, it is from a 
mainland China perspective that people were “over seas”. It also suggests that the 
‘overseas’ Chinese will at some point in time return, and this is not necessarily the case 
with Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. The discussion on what terms to use partly 
stems from translations of Chinese characters, but it is beyond the scope of this study to 
deal with the linguistic roots and use of different Chinese terms for ethnic Chinese 
migrants in Southeast Asia. In this study I use the term ethnic Chinese rather than 
Overseas Chinese. 
2 For example Hamilton (1991), Redding (1990), Weidenbaum (1996). 
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family business; 2. diaspora approaches; 3. the study of business groups in 
emerging markets. These perspectives are very briefly reviewed here, whilst 
a more elaborate analysis is provided in Chapter Two.  
 
First, there are theories regarding what is seen as a more or less stable form 
of management in ethnic Chinese firms. This is often termed the “Chinese 
Family Business”, or, taking a broader perspective, “Chinese Capitalism”. 
The terms already indicate that the “Chineseness” of this particular type of 
business was the focal point. Researchers have argued that the specific 
qualities of businessmen stemming from their Chinese culture matter with 
regard to the type of businesses they create. The theoretical approaches in 
this category range from a broad analysis of social systems down to specific 
business strategies. Many of the most relevant contributions tend to 
emphasize Confucian values, particularly those related to forming social 
relationships3. Relatively stable cultural traits are, in this perspective, an 
explanation for the specific types of businesses ethnic Chinese created in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
Second, a related body of literature starts from the specific situation of 
minority groups and argues that their success stems from developing 
excellent social capital. This concept is used to denote advantages from 
personal or business connections4. Some researchers emphasize closely-knit 
personal relations and networks among diaspora Chinese in Asia5 and argue 
that these links may be the key ingredient of a successful business strategy. 
Closely-knit groups may offer business advantages because deviant business 
behaviour carries penalties, thus ensuring a higher level of trust and lower 
transaction costs among group members doing business with each other. 
Researchers believe that ethnic Chinese minorities show similarities to other 
economically successful minorities such as Jews in Europe or Lebanese in 
Africa6. An essential aspect of this ethnic networking is the global character 
of the networks, as diaspora groups keep in contact with fellow ethnic 
businessmen in other countries. Global ethnic networks are argued to 
facilitate international trade and cross-border investments7. In the case of the 
Chinese diaspora, the home country is argued to play a role as many ethnic 
Chinese firms have invested in China. Another approach focuses on a 
different type of social capital: crony connections with power-holders. 
Several large ethnic Chinese businessmen have linked up with dictators and 
                                                 
3 For example Redding (1990), Haley (1997; 1998), Haley et al., (1998) and Sunaryo and 
Cone (2005) 
4 The concept was invented by Bourdieu (1984) and has also been used within the 
discipline of management (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
5 Such as Redding (1990) and Backman (2001). 
6 For example Chirot and Reid (1997). 
7 See for example Rauch (2001). 
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government officials, in particular in Indonesia. Political economists often 
relate the economic success of ethnic Chinese businessmen to the capacity to 
create and maintain corrupt relationships with local political powers. By 
establishing and using these connections some ethnic Chinese businessmen 
got access to scarce resources including raw materials, technology and 
capital on favourable terms, which gave them a substantial advantage in 
business. The corrupt official also earned his share without the Chinese 
partner becoming a political threat. This approach is also known as rent-
seeking or crony capitalism8.  
 
The “Chinese family business” and the “diaspora” approaches are 
sometimes combined. But a third kind of approach takes a radically different 
stand and focuses not on the businessmen themselves, but on their business 
environment. The institutional perspective argues that large diversified 
conglomerates, often held by families or coalitions of families, are perfectly 
normal types of economic organisation, particularly in emerging economies 
with weak economic institutions9. The types of strategies and organisations 
ethnic Chinese businessmen create – family business groups - exist in Chile, 
Mexico, Turkey and many more countries. Diversification into a group and 
the formation of close-knit networks of trusted trading partners is, in this 
perspective, a response to imperfect environments with high transaction 
costs, and creates a competitive advantage that is hard to imitate for rivals. 
There is, in the perspective of institutional economists or strategic 
management researchers, nothing “Chinese” about this, the type of strategy 
and structure is simply the most effective response to a weak institutional 
environment. Researchers taking an institutional perspective assume that if 
emerging economies “modernize” and increasingly resemble Western 
economies, the companies operating in those environments will converge 
towards Western firms in terms of strategy and structure. The three 
perspectives are summarised in Table 1.1.  
 
It is clear that the three approaches described above have distinct 
assumptions. While the strategic management approach attempts to explain 
ethnic Chinese business group strategy by looking at contextual factors 
(termed the institutional environment), the cultural approach finds 
explanations from within the businessmen themselves. The minority 
approach combines internal and external factors, arguing that minority 
groups create competitive advantages by developing different types of social 
capital. How they do this is informed by their values and dependent on the 
context. Recently the cultural and minority perspectives have been criticised 
and researchers increasingly feel that larger ethnic Chinese companies are 
                                                 
8 For example Robison (1986) or Yoshihara (1988). 
9 See for example Khanna and Palepu (1999). 
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undergoing fundamental changes that have hitherto received very little 
attention by scholars.  
 
Table 1.1 Classification of Relevant Literature 
Approach Academic 
Disciplines 
Main Issues Addressed 
Ethnic Chinese 
Family 
Business  
Sociology, 
Business, 
Anthropology 
Management 
What are the characteristics and strategies of a 
Chinese family business?  
What is the influence of culture on 
management and strategy?  
Is there a specific type of capitalism among 
ethnic Chinese? 
How does generational change impact the 
family business? 
Diaspora 
Advantages  
Sociology, 
History, 
Political 
Economics, 
Management 
What is the reason behind the business success 
of some immigrant groups?  
Why do some immigrants form crony 
alliances?  
Why do immigrants form intra-ethnic 
networks?  
What is the link between the diaspora and the 
home country? 
Strategic 
Management 
in Emerging 
Economies   
Economics, 
Strategic 
Management 
Why are business groups formed?  
What is the role of the institutional context?  
Why do business groups diversify?  
What competitive advantages do business 
groups develop? 
 
The above approaches, and the criticism of them, all offer a partial 
understanding of the strategy of ethnic Chinese family business groups, but 
taken together may offer a more complete picture. I argue that an essential 
first step to be able to combine the approaches above is to introduce a time-
element and look at the evolution of such business groups over time. Doing 
this enables one to distinguish between large and small firms and to address 
changes within ethnic Chinese businesses over time. A one-person trading 
business may be dissimilar to a multinational business operating in different 
countries and industries. If one considers subsequent phases of business 
development, from the first small one-person firm to the medium sized 
family enterprise, to a large multinational conglomerate run by the next 
generations of family leaders, one is able to see that some theories offer 
explanations for corporate strategy in one phase of their development, but 
not necessarily in another. Cultural values, for example, may play an 
important role for the first generation migrant Chinese entrepreneur, while 
the second generation may have lost affinity with China since he or she grew 
up in Southeast Asia and perhaps received an MBA from an American 
university.  
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Taking a second look at the existing literature reveals two salient aspects. 
First, there is an abundance of research on small and medium sized ethnic 
Chinese family business and, second, there is a paucity of research taking a 
longitudinal perspective. Studies taking a strategic management perspective 
have mainly focused on smaller companies at a particular point in time10. 
Although several management researchers have reported on larger ethnic 
Chinese firms, these accounts were often based on anecdotal evidence rather 
than in-depth empirical research11.  Few researchers have been able to study 
companies over longer periods of time, partly because of the challenges such 
a study poses. Large ethnic Chinese business groups are often elaborate, 
complex, dynamic, opaque and often secretive in nature, all of which makes 
rigorous study difficult and time-consuming. Thus, in order to advance and 
integrate the various theories on ethnic Chinese business groups, a 
longitudinal, in-depth study of a company that developed from a migrant 
entrepreneur into a large multinational offers a promising research 
direction. 
 
 
1.2 Case Study Selection 
 
The purpose of this study is to clarify how the strategy of an ethnic Chinese 
business group changes over time, what may influence this process, and 
what patterns arise. In view of the paucity of empirical material on the 
strategy evolution in large ethnic Chinese family businesses, the previous 
section argued that an in-depth longitudinal case study could enrich the 
extant research.  
 
Case study researchers often recommend selecting an “extreme” case, firstly 
because the phenomenon of interest may be better observable, and secondly 
because rigorous investigation of such cases may lead to theoretical 
advancement12. Since Indonesia displayed the phenomenon of interest most 
clearly, it was decided to focus on this country. Sato13 has published a list of 
the 30 largest conglomerates in Indonesia prior to the Asian Crisis, of which 
23 groups were owned by ethnic Chinese14. It was assumed that the more 
prominent the group, the more information would be available for study. 
                                                 
10 For example Redding (1990). 
11 Such as Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) or Haley (1997). There are also exceptions 
to this, for example Sato (1993) and Robison (1986) both of whom have done detailed 
empirical research on large Indonesian Chinese business groups and their development 
over time. Despite this Gomez and Hsiao (2001) have argued for more empirical 
research on ethnic Chinese business groups. 
12 See for example Eisenhardt (1989). 
13 See Sato (2004). 
14 In Indonesia the word conglomerate is often used instead of business group in 
everyday parlance, and some researchers prefer to use this term.  
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Many of these groups are not known for transparency, and it was expected 
that aspects of their strategy would remain in the dark. A prominent group 
was thought to be more “in the picture” and easier to analyse than a smaller 
and less publicised business group. Aside from size and prominence, 
openness to research was another criterion for case study selection. The 
number one on the list was the Salim Group, by far the largest ethnic 
Chinese business group in Indonesia prior to the crisis. With some 
preparation, but most of all networking and luck, an entry into the Salim 
Group leadership was achieved, and given the relative openness of this 
group it was decided to focus this study on the corporate strategy of the 
Salim Group.   
 
Until today the Salim Group embodies the typical ethnic Chinese business 
for many Indonesians, and it is routinely mentioned in most academic works 
on ethnic Chinese business. It was the most prominent and largest ethnic 
Chinese business group in Southeast Asia - and had close relations with 
former president Suharto15. Even if many Indonesians tend to think of the 
Salim Group as a “typical” ethnic Chinese group, in many ways the Salim 
Group was not typical but rather “extreme”: extremely large, visible, 
professional, well-connected, powerful, international, etc.  
 
Its extraordinary size contributed to the Salim family being perceived as a 
symbol of ethnic Chinese businesses, thus making it a politically sensitive 
topic during the Suharto regime. Moreover, their long term alliance with 
Suharto made them a well-known and despised “crony capitalist”. Some 
popular and academic works even go as far as considering the Salim Group 
as part of the Suharto family business empire16. Whereas the Salim Group 
case cannot be considered representative of a larger population, its 
prominence and size may contribute to empirical results that facilitate the 
development of new theories.   
 
 
1.3 Introduction to the Salim Group 
 
The Salim Group consists of a large number of private as well as public 
companies – estimates are around 300-500 - placed under the common 
umbrella of the Salim family and a few trusted people. Their portfolio of 
companies ranged from industries like banking, insurance, food, cement, to 
automotive and chemicals. In 1996, the group had a turnover of over USD 20 
billion and around 200,000 employees, which made it by far the largest 
privately owned group in Indonesia. Although the Salim Group operates in 
                                                 
15 Argued by Sato (1993). 
16 A proponent of this view is activist/academic George Aditjondro (Business World, 
1999). 
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a number of mainly Asian countries, most of the business is currently in 
Indonesia.  
 
The founder of the group was Liem Sioe Liong, a Chinese from Fujian 
province in South-China who immigrated to Java before the Pacific War. He 
initially started a small trading business with family and clan members, 
which gradually expanded and diversified while supplying goods to the 
local army after the war. During this period Liem met Suharto, who was 
later to become president. His contacts with the army enabled him to grow 
and start small scale manufacturing activities. Rapid growth occurred under 
the presidency of Suharto (1966-1998), who was able to achieve 
unprecedented economic growth in Indonesia for several decades (an 
average of 7% annually). Suharto offered friendly capitalists favourable 
business conditions, which he considered a strategy to build a modern, 
industrialised economy. The Salim Group benefited from this policy 
environment enormously and in the 1970s it started or expanded activities in 
cement, flour milling, car manufacturing, banking and textiles. A decade 
later it had bypassed all its peers and became the largest domestic group 
with close relations to Suharto.  
 
As of the 1970s, Anthony Salim, who would become the second generation 
leader, entered the business after having studied in the UK. His vision was 
to modernize the family business and make it less dependent on the 
government. In the 1990s he started to take over control of the group from 
his father, as the business reorganised into divisions, increasingly under the 
control of professional managers. Several companies were now listed on 
stock exchanges in Indonesia or other countries. Numerous new ventures 
were started, and the group also invested substantially in Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and the Philippines, and had businesses in the Netherlands and the 
US. 
 
Before the Asian Crisis, the future looked bright for the Salim Group. It 
consisted of hundreds of separate companies, in a variety of countries. The 
group had experienced strong growth, diversification and 
internationalisation. Around May 1998 however, the outlook for the group 
changed completely. Having been a close friend of the Suharto family, the 
Salim Group lost its favourable political connections during the Asian Crisis 
when Suharto stepped down. All Indonesian business was severely hit by 
the crisis, but the Salim Group faced both an economic and a political crisis. 
Having been the richest business family in Indonesia; being ethnically 
Chinese; and being close to Suharto, they came to symbolise the old corrupt 
regime in the eyes of the Indonesian people. When violence against the 
Chinese minority raged in Jakarta, mobs set fire to the Salim family house, 
people demonstrated in the streets carrying Liem’s portrait and their Bank 
Central Asia (BCA), the biggest commercial bank in Indonesia with two of 
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Suharto’s children on the supervisory board, fell victim to a bank run. Along 
with many other Indonesian banks, it had to be rescued and recapitalised by 
the new Indonesian government. Many believed this was the end of the 
Salim Group, but the group proved to be resilient to regime changes. 
 
The founder, Liem Sioe Liong, withdrew completely from the business, and 
Anthony Salim was put in charge of facing the crisis. The new Indonesian 
government required a payment for recapitalising BCA, augmented with a 
fine for irregularities discovered in the bank’s lending policy. In this way, 
the Salim Group suddenly faced a USD 5 billion debt to the new government 
in addition to rising corporate debt levels as a result of the depreciated 
rupiah. The new government pressured the group to cooperate and, to the 
surprise of many, the Salim family handed over 107 companies to the new 
Indonesian government to pay off their debts, being the first at that time to 
seriously try to repay the company’s debts to the authorities of Indonesia. In 
fact, the Salim Group was to a large extent nationalised by the government 
as a result of these events. A few of their most precious companies, notably 
Indofood, were “rescued” by smart financial manoeuvring.  
 
In the period after the Asian Crisis it took years to bring corporate debt back 
to acceptable levels. It was not until 2001 that the Salim Group first started to 
invest again, in property in China and in agribusiness in Australia. It tried to 
regain its former strength and focused on the business opportunities 
available in the East Asian region, while divesting its US and European 
businesses. Some of the former businesses in Indonesia were bought back, 
and new investments were made in Australia, China and other Asian 
countries.  
 
In a nutshell, this paragraph described a few aspects of the fascinating 
corporate history of the Salim Group, which will be elaborated upon and 
analysed further in this study.  
 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
Aside from taking the Salim Group as the unit of analysis, the scope of the 
research was further delimited by taking a strategic management 
perspective. Furthermore, it was decided to focus on the recent decade of 
development of the group and its context since there is relatively little 
knowledge relating to this period. The history of the group and its 
development until the early nineties was studied and documented in an 
excellent way so I decided to focus the empirical study primarily on the 
period 1994-200317. I have no intention to repeat earlier work - on the 
                                                 
17 For example by Robison (1986) and by Sato (1993). 
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contrary, the purpose is to build on these studies and take them further into 
a new era. For the earlier period I relied more heavily on secondary sources.  
 
Case research typically starts with a broad topic, which is then refined at a 
later stage. When defining the central question for this research, it was 
important to formulate a problem definition that was sufficiently broad to 
enable understanding of how the Salim Group functioned, yet it needed to 
provide a sense of direction when doing field research. The initial research 
question was an inquiry into the corporate strategy process over time: how 
can we understand and explain the development of the Salim Group from a strategic 
management perspective?  
 
After an initial and broad literature study, as well as the first trip to Jakarta 
which enabled a more thorough understanding of available sources and 
research limitations, a data-gathering strategy was designed, emphasising 
the following topics:  
• The development of the group within the Indonesian and regional 
context (the institutional context); 
• The overall corporate strategy for the group;  
• The organisational structure and ownership structure; 
• Management and leadership. 
 
From the outset the research strategy was to combine different sources of 
data. During the period 2003-2006 several visits to Jakarta and Singapore 
have enabled the accumulation of documents and the carrying out of 
interviews with relevant people. The sources of information used in this 
study are:  
• 56 interviews with Salim Group managers and stakeholders (Annex 3); 
• 69 annual reports (Annex 1) and other corporate documents; 
• Media sources including articles in newspapers and magazines (Annex 
2); 
• Other secondary sources such as brochures, reports, books (References). 
 
Semi-structured interviews were held with Salim Group top managers 
(including the CEO, Anthony Salim) as well as a range of stakeholders, 
which was unique given the political sensitivity around this group. As most 
respondents did not wish to become known they will remain anonymous. 
Corporate documentation included 69 annual reports in the period 1994-
2003 as well as brochures; articles of association; and official documents 
related to the Salim Group. A systematic analysis of newspaper articles was 
carried out in order to obtain information from yet another source. Elaborate 
searches of academic literature resulted in a number of articles and several 
books with information on the Salim Group.  
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During and after the data-gathering phase information was processed and 
combined using qualitative and quantitative techniques. The methodology 
used in this study, including the case study design, data gathering, and 
analysis is described in detail in Chapter Three.  
 
 
1.5 Findings 
 
The results of this study are first a contribution to understanding the Salim 
Group and secondly a contribution to extending existing academic theories.  
 
Creating a more in-depth understanding of the Salim Group is particularly 
interesting for a number of reasons. First, the group has been a dominant 
player in various parts of the Indonesian economy for years, yet little is 
known about it from a strategic management perspective. There is no study 
available on how this group was structured and managed from 1994-2003, a 
particularly turbulent period for the Salim Group. Second, the Salim Group 
is known to be closed, and it is therefore a unique opportunity to have been 
able to interview the top-management of the group for this study. The 
information available to date was mostly based on secondary sources. 
 
The research makes at least four contributions to existing academic 
knowledge.  First, it provides deep and multi-faceted information about one 
of the most influential business groups in Southeast Asia. The information 
was gathered through external sources as well as through access to the 
group, the latter being rare. In that sense, the research borrows from 
research traditions of history and anthropology. It provides original data 
that can support the creation of generalised theories through comparison of 
similar studies.  
 
Second, through rigorous analysis it shows that existing theoretical 
frameworks are only partially applicable to this case and argues that some 
are too limited to account for the complexity of an individual case. The 
cultural perspective is argued to be unable to explain the strategy of the 
Salim Group. Although perhaps in its early phases the Group met some of 
the characteristics of the typical “Chinese family business” it does not match 
these criteria today. The diaspora and social capital perspective is valid, but 
this study also shows how business networks change over time, 
incorporating less ethnic and political ties and more Western and Japanese 
business connections. Emerging market theories offer a promising research 
strategy to explain the evolution of the Salim Group over time. Institutional 
factors play an important role in defining the business model of the group, 
which is deeply rooted in the Indonesian post-Sukarno business context. 
Internal factors, such as generation change also play a role in strategic 
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changes. As such, the study validates some and invalidates other theories. It 
shows, from one example, that some scientific theories need modification.  
 
Third, the study develops a model for understanding ethnic Chinese 
business groups at different stages of their development and as such 
integrates the above mentioned theoretical perspectives on this topic. It 
differentiates between the entrepreneurial start-up, the medium-sized firm, 
the large firm and the very large multinational, and argues that different 
theoretical approaches apply to different stages.  
 
Fourth, the study develops a method for studying complex and intertwined 
patterns of corporate strategy. It shows the co-evolutionary patterns of 
strategy with internal and institutional factors over time and visualises these 
in a new type of oscillogram that enables the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative data. The results of this exercise show that corporate strategy 
is not a linear but rather an irregular and oscillatory process. The strategy of 
the Salim Group can be understood as oscillating between two opposite 
poles: a “relationship-based” strategy and a “market-based” strategy. It also 
shows how a single business group interacts with Indonesian institutions, 
influencing them as well as being influenced by them. The close proximity of 
the Group to the Suharto regime results in an interaction between company 
and environment, a phenomenon that can rarely be observed because most 
companies are too small to influence the national environment.  
 
 
1.6 Organisation of this Book 
 
This book first starts with an overview of the literature, the methodology, 
then presents the case study, an analysis and ends with conclusions.  
 
Chapter Two provides an in-depth and broad literature review, focusing on 
management literature, but also covering insights from other academic 
disciplines. It argues that hitherto one perspective, the so-called culturalist 
perspective, has received most attention in the literature. However, this 
body of knowledge has recently been criticised. This chapter argues that 
although the cultural perspective may have offered a useful framework for 
understanding ethnic Chinese conglomerates in earlier periods, it cannot 
sufficiently explain recent developments in large ethnic Chinese firms. 
Instead, institutional theories of strategic management seem more useful for 
understanding how corporate strategy of large ethnic Chinese 
conglomerates changes over time.  
 
Chapter Three is dedicated to methodology. In this chapter, the case study 
design, refined problem definition and analytic strategy is described. The 
chapter develops two methods for studying strategic change over time, 
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making use of the coevolution framework. This framework allows one to 
study how corporate strategy evolves over time while influencing and being 
influenced by the institutional context. First, an interpretative method is 
presented to evaluate corporate strategy over time. Secondly, where 
possible, a method is developed to translate qualitative data into 
quantitative data, and to measure corporate strategy over time using a set of 
variables. The chapter finally develops a visual model to “map” corporate 
strategy over time within the institutional context.   
 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven are dedicated to the case narrative of the 
Salim Group. The case study of the Salim Group is related based on an 
analysis of the data gathered during the field research. The case study 
section starts with a chapter that presents an overview of the history of the 
Salim Group from its start until 1994. The next chapters look into the group’s 
development from 1994 until the Asian Crisis, during the Asian Crisis and 
the period after the Asian crisis.  
 
Chapter Eight places the previous four chapters in a long term perspective 
and analyses the corporate strategy over time; and the factors influencing 
strategy change at different stages of the Salim Group development.  
 
Finally, Chapter Nine presents conclusions.  
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Chapter 2: On Families, Minorities and Strategies 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Ethnic Chinese business groups have been the topic of research in a number 
of different academic disciplines, each with a different focus. Even though a 
substantial body of literature now exists, the insights are fragmented. In this 
study I attempt to bring various approaches together in a new framework. 
This chapter first discusses a number of relevant approaches for 
understanding the strategy of the Salim Group, including family business 
perspectives, diaspora entrepreneurship research, and institutional theories.  
 
After giving a brief overview of each stream of literature, the question ‘how 
can this literature explain strategy and strategic change?’ is discussed. The 
different bodies of literature are subsequently combined in a single 
conceptual framework which distinguishes between different firm sizes, 
from the entrepreneurial start-up to the multinational business group. The 
theories can be integrated as they all offer factors influencing strategy in 
ethnic Chinese family business groups, but in different phases of the 
development of the ethnic Chinese family business. In using such a 
conceptual framework I argue that ethnic Chinese business groups change 
substantially over time due to internal and external circumstances.  
 
In order to describe and analyse the importance of strategic change over 
time, it is argued that a model which can map both internal and external 
factors, influencing change to evolve over time, would be helpful. The co-
evolution concept, which originated in biology but has recently been 
introduced in strategy research, can serve as an umbrella concept to clarify 
strategic change processes of firms over time, including the Salim Group 
strategy.   
 
 
2.2 Family Business Research: The Chinese Family Business 
 
There is a continuing debate about the definition of family firm, but a 
general definition of a family business is: ‘a business governed and/or 
managed on a sustainable, potentially cross-generational, basis to shape and 
perhaps pursue the formal or implicit vision of the business held by 
members of the same family or a small number of families’18. Recent 
research revealed not only that family control is ubiquitous in the world, but 
also that the larger business families in emerging markets are often 
                                                 
18 Taken from Chrisman et al. (2005, p. 2). 
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organised in corporate groups19. Family ownership of large business groups 
is particularly important in Asia20. Examples of family controlled groups are 
Samsung from Korea, the Tata Group from India, and also the Salim Group 
from Indonesia. The Salim Group is, from a legal perspective, not a single 
business but rather a collection of economic interests. For the purposes of 
this study I therefore broaden the definition of a family firm and combine it 
with the definition of a business group, which can be defined as ‘a collection 
of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways’21. Family 
business groups can then be considered a specific type of business group 
and defined as: collections of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal 
ways, controlled on a sustainable, potentially cross-generational basis to shape and 
perhaps pursue the formal or implicit vision of the business held by a family or 
coalition of families. 
 
Family firm research explicitly recognizes the special role of the controlling 
family, which often participates in the management of the firm22. In family 
business groups family interests, family dynamics and founding family 
values are incorporated into the formulation of the goals and strategy of the 
firm. If the owning family also holds the leadership of the firm, which is the 
case in the Salim Group, it creates a situation that is distinct from other firms 
or business groups. Relative to non-family firms, owner-managers of family 
firms possess high-powered incentives. If the ownership, control and 
leadership are combined, it allows a very powerful leadership role for one or 
more family members. Contrary to managerial firms, where the manager is 
not the owner, family firms do not have to align the interests between 
managers and shareholders (agency problem) since these roles are combined 
in one family23. Family leaders are often largely free from oversight, 
particularly if their firms are not listed on stock exchanges. The family 
leader, with his or her unique position of power, may profoundly influence 
the corporate strategy of the firm. In many Asian family firms, with a 
tradition of hierarchy and respect, family firm leaders are often patriarchs 
with strong control over all operations. Often this family leadership role 
                                                 
19 See for example La Porta et al. (1999) or Granovetter (1995). 
20 See Claessens et al. (1999). 
21 According to Granovetter (1995, p. 95). 
22 See Sharma et al. (1997). 
23 Agency theory assumes that in widely held firms the owners (shareholders) need to 
monitor managers to act in the best interest of the firm, rather than in their own self-
interest. This issue is widely known as the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Researchers have recently argued that in many emerging markets, businesses are not 
owned by dispersed shareholders, but rather by concentrated owners, such as families 
(La Porta, 1999). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) concentrated ownership leads 
to a different type of agency problem, namely the problem of aligning the interests of 
different shareholders. The controlling family, by virtue of their position as owner and 
manager may expropriate minority owners for their own benefit.    
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gives continuity to the firm since the leadership changes less regularly than 
in non-family firms, perhaps only with the passing of the generations.  
 
In view of the strong role of the family in strategic management, succession 
and change resulting from generational change is an important ingredient of 
family business research24.  As is the case in all family businesses, ethnic 
Chinese family firms are strongly influenced by internal dynamics in the 
family. Many ethnic Chinese firms are known to have fallen apart as a result 
of internal family conflicts, particularly with the arrival of a new 
generation25. Those who have successfully managed the generational 
transition have done so by adopting new strategic ideas and new challenges. 
As the self-made founder, himself strongly rooted in Chinese business 
culture, transfers the reins of power to the Western-educated younger 
generation, the corporate strategy tends to change as well, incorporating 
new insights and directions better informed by recent management theories 
and practices in a global business environment26. 
  
Given that in family businesses, the values and cultural behaviour of the 
owner/manager are essential for the strategy of the firm, it is not surprising 
that studies of culturally specific family firm practices have emerged. The 
idea that cultural values underpin capitalism can be traced back to Weber’s27 
work on Protestant ethics and have continued to influence studies of 
management across cultures28. There are numerous studies on the particular 
characteristics of ethnic Chinese family firms. This expanding body of 
literature has seen a rapid development, particularly in the 1990s, when 
some of these family businesses started by migrant Chinese in Asia grew 
into substantial international conglomerates and also started to show a 
certain degree of openness to the media and to academic study29. Scholars 
from different fields, such as sociology, economics, anthropology and 
management, were interested in Chinese business models as they emerged 
outside mainland China. The apparently disproportionate dominance of 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian business called for explanations for their 
success. 
 
Researchers interested in ethnic Chinese family firms outside mainland 
China have formed theories of what is seen as a more or less consistent form 
                                                 
24 See Chrisman et al. (2005). 
25 See Gomez and Hsiao (2001). 
26 See for example Kao (1993); Suehiro (2001) and Zheng (2002) 
27 See Weber (1958). 
28 E.g. Hampden-Turner (1993). 
29 For example Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Backman (1999); Chan (2000); Douw et al. 
(1999); East Asia Analytical Unit (1995); Gomez and Hsiao (2001); Hodder (1996); Kao 
(1993); Redding (1990); Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996); Whitley (1999) and Yeung 
(2006). 
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of management: the ethnic Chinese business model. This model is 
sometimes called the Chinese Family Business, or CFB30 or more broadly 
“Chinese Capitalism”31. The fact that it was called a Chinese model already 
indicates that researchers tended to look for intrinsic qualities in Chinese 
businessmen, stemming either from their Chinese culture and/or from their 
specific position as a culturally distinct migrant group in Southeast Asian 
societies.  
 
Many of these studies emphasised Confucian values, in particular the social 
norms for different types of relationships32. Hofstede and Bond describe four 
key principles in Confucian societies: 1. the stability of society is based on 
unequal relationships between people; 2. the family is the prototype of all 
social organisations; 3. virtuous behaviour is treating others as you would 
like to be treated; 4. Virtue with regard to one’s task in life consists of trying 
to acquire skills and education, working hard, not spending more than 
necessary, being patient and persevering33. The Confucian values are argued 
to play a central role for entrepreneurs of Chinese descent and guide them 
when doing business. Hence it is believed that the Chinese have a preference 
for patriarchal family businesses with a frugal mentality. Businessmen of 
Chinese descent are argued to value trust in relationships with others. A 
leading author lists 10 characteristics of the Chinese Family Business (Table 
2.1) and other authors have given similar accounts of what constitutes the 
Chinese Family Business34. 
 
Among scholars taking a cultural perspective a diversity of approaches 
exists. Some authors focus only on the private enterprises35, while others 
take into account the socio-economic environment in which these Chinese 
businesses operate36. There are those who argue that some strategic 
management models are typically Chinese, and superior in their specific 
context, such as a low cost-high volume strategy and a focus on trade in 
non-branded products37. Others note a development of Chinese firms from 
small traders towards national industrialists and claim the Chinese 
                                                 
30 See for example Davies and Ma (2003) or Weidenbaum (1996). 
31 See for example Redding (1990); Douw, Huang and Godley (1999); Crawford (2000); 
and Jomo and Folk (2003). 
32 See for example Redding (1990); Haley et al. (1998); Li, et al. (2000); Wah (2001) and 
Westwood (1997). 
33 See Hofstede and Bond (1988, p.8). 
34 For example Davies and Ma (2003) or Yu (2001). 
35 Such as Limlingan (1986). 
36 Such as Whitley (1999) and Hamilton (1991) who argue that one can speak of a 
distinct type of Chinese capitalism, embedded in a system of social, cultural and 
economic factors. 
37 See Haley et al. (1998). 
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businessmen were successful as a result of a sequence of superior business 
strategies in various stages of their development38.  
 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Chinese Family Business 
 Characteristics 
1 Small scale; relatively simple organisational structuring. 
2 Normally focused on one product or market. 
3 Centralised decision-making, with heavy reliance on one dominant CEO. 
4 Family ownership and control. 
5 A paternalistic organisational climate. 
6 Linked via strong personal networks to other key organisations such as 
suppliers, customers, sources of finance, etc. 
7 Normally very cost conscious and financially efficient. 
8 Relatively weak in terms of creating large-scale market recognition for own 
brands, especially internationally. 
9 Subject to limitations of growth and organisational complexity due to a 
discouraging context for the employment of professional managers. (There are 
now some exceptions to this). 
10 A high degree of strategic adaptability, due to a dominant decision maker. 
Source: Redding (1995, p. 64) 
 
The “Chinese culture” argument has been very important in studies of ethnic 
Chinese business. As Ruth McVey39 puts it: ‘The arguments explaining the 
Chinese’ continued centrality to the region’s economy, while they may take 
note of historical and economic factors, tend to find the principal reason in 
culture: roughly, that Southeast Asia’s Chinese have a value system which 
elevates business success and promotes business-like behaviour, while the 
indigenous populations do not’. There is now increasing criticism of this 
“cultural” model of Chinese family businesses. One limitation of these 
approaches is that many, especially the studies dating from the early 1990s, 
focused on relatively small traditional family businesses40. Only a few 
studies have focused on large and multinational ethnic Chinese family 
conglomerates in Southeast Asia embedded in the context of global 
business41. Moreover, by linking the Chinese Family Business to a more or 
less stable set of cultural characteristics, inherited from a distant Confucian 
past, many authors tended to pay less attention to the rapid changes that 
occurred within ethnic Chinese firms, especially within those family 
businesses that were successful and grew substantially.  
 
Critics of the cultural perspective argue that in recent years Southeast Asian 
conglomerates have been part and parcel of the globalisation processes: they 
                                                 
38 See Limlingan (1986). 
39 As argued by McVey (1992, p. 18). 
40 Such as Davies and Ma (2003); Menkhoff (1993) and Redding (1990, 1995).  
41 Exceptions are Yeung (2000); Suehiro (2001) and Ip, Lever-Tracey and Tracey (2000). 
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formed joint ventures and alliances with Japanese and Western businesses, 
which required them to comply with certain rules and enabled them to take 
on new strategies and management practices. Many of the conglomerates are 
now managed by the second generation, usually well educated and familiar 
with Western business practices, and as a consequence they undergo a 
certain degree of transformation. Those ethnic Chinese family business 
groups that were successful faced impressive growth and diversification 
over a number of decades, thus increasing the complexities of running the 
family business and calling for new and more sophisticated management 
strategies42.  With increased size, these businesses moved away from the 
simple structures and one-product firms that earlier authors focusing on 
“traditional” Chinese family business described43. With the rapid growth of 
the business, founders were forced to hire professional non-family members 
as managers and use the stock exchange to satisfy increasing capital 
requirements for expansion44.  
 
Although many authors subscribing to a cultural perspective tended to focus 
on characteristics of Chinese family business that remained the same, 
authors comparing family business around the world noticed different 
patterns. Empirical studies reveal that larger business groups are often 
organised in the form of a pyramid, particularly if the group is controlled by 
a family or coalition of families45. A pyramidal ownership structure occurs 
for example when a family holds 51% of firm A, which in turn holds 51% of 
firm B, which in turn holds 51% of firm C, and so on. The effect of this is, in 
this example, that the family has full control over firm C (since it owns 51% 
of the voting rights) but is entitled to only 13% of the cash flow rights. Using 
a firm it already owns (A) to set up a new firm (B) as illustrated above is 
considered a vertical chain of ownership. A family can also decide to set up 
a new firm X independently from other firms, in which case the literature 
refers to a horizontal ownership structure. A possible reason for pyramid 
structures, as suggested in the literature, is to achieve managerial control by 
a key shareholder with limited capital. Large Chinese family businesses 
grew quickly which made full control of their companies costly, so they 
sought to limit their ownership in the firm without limiting their control 
through pyramid structures.  
 
Also, it is often argued that pyramids would offer families incentives to 
divert capital away from minority shareholders for their private benefits. 
Returning to our example, tunneling could occur if the family would try to 
move assets from C towards A or debts from A towards C. In both cases the 
                                                 
42 See Li et al. (1997). 
43 See for example Redding (1995). 
44 For example Weidenbaum (1996) or Tsui-Auch (2004). 
45 See Claessens et al. (1998); Chang (2003) and Morck and Yeung (2003). 
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minority shareholders now own shares in a less valuable firm. This practice 
of transferring money or assets out of a firm for private benefits is often 
called tunnelling. The reverse, majority owners inserting their private 
money into the firm is called propping. Propping often occurs in times of 
crisis46. Using the pyramid structure as a way to steal from minority 
shareholders could be a strategy to maintain the powerful position of the 
family while also reaping the advantages of more complicated and modern 
organisation structures. Although some businesses sold majority stakes of 
their companies to the investing public, many ethnic Chinese families keep 
control over their groups through pyramid ownership structures that ensure 
majority control rights, although not always substantial rights to the 
economic fruits of the business47. With expansion, which forced new 
management approaches and organisational structures, usually came 
internationalisation, which added another layer of complexity to the family 
business48. 
 
The recent Asian Crisis shook the foundations of many Asian family 
business groups. It exposed tunneling practices and accelerated the strategic 
restructuring process. It forced conglomerates to make sudden transitions in 
strategy. For example, Suehiro49 identifies two types of family groups in 
Thailand after the Asian Crisis: the authoritarian type and the innovative 
type, where the former is believed to be passive and the latter active in 
adequately adapting its post-crisis strategy to the new rules of the game. In 
Indonesia, the institutional change after the crisis was not only economic, 
but also political as it resulted in a violent regime change, where old family 
businesses perished or adapted; and new ones arose. Domestic political and 
economic turbulence tends to further accelerate the management transition 
process clearly showing that not only cultural values, but also the domestic 
macro-context has an important influence on corporate strategy. In addition, 
worldwide trends such as globalisation processes50 and the rise of the 
Chinese economy51 also exercise a strong influence on strategy of ethnic 
Chinese family business.  
 
Although all ethnic Chinese firms started out as small businesses, those that 
are now substantial have listed (part of) their companies on stock exchanges, 
are bound by the rules of the game dictated by the WTO, IMF and the World 
Bank, and thereby moving to a business model with characteristics that 
                                                 
46 See Friedman et al. (2003). 
47 See Weidenbaum  (1996). 
48 Most of the critics of the cultural perspective point to recent changes but some 
historians studying colonial ethnic Chinese firms also find little use for the culturalist 
approach (Lian and Koh, 2004) 
49 See Suehiro (2001). 
50 See for example Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Yeung (2000). 
51 For example Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996); Brown (1998). 
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comes to resemble more the “normal” Western business model. It appears 
that what looked in early stages like a fairly homogenous management 
model influenced by cultural traits is now exhibiting a much larger degree of 
variety. In the words of Gomez and Hsiao52 ‘a small number of scholars have 
also begun to challenge popular notions of a dynamic form of “Chinese 
Capitalism” and of mushrooming intra-ethnic corporate ties by arguing that 
there is a heterogeneity of styles of business organisation and management 
among members of the Chinese business community’. The question thus 
arises whether traditional approaches to the CFB, which characterises it as 
based on paternalism, family ownership, control, personal networks, 
adaptability and simple organisational structures, are still relevant as the 
business has passed into the hands of the next generations. Furthermore, 
those theories of the Chinese Family Business pointing only to relatively 
stable cultural factors tend to ignore the possibility of strategic change and 
tend to downplay the importance of contextual change. 
 
The most important body of literature on ethnic Chinese business, the 
research that finds explanations for business behaviour in Chinese culture, 
has recently been under pressure. The cultural perspective seems too limited 
to explain the behaviour of larger businesses which have undergone changes 
from inside, through generational change, and from outside, through 
globalisation and institutional changes. Although small ethnic Chinese 
family businesses may have been informed by cultural values, larger ones 
exhibit larger variety and more complexity in business behaviour. Recent 
studies suggest the existence of more sophisticated structures, ownership 
patterns and professional management in an international context – all of 
which depart from what has been described as characteristic for ethnic 
Chinese family firms. If one takes Chinese culture to be a static set of values 
and norms, it is clear that these cannot explain recent dynamics. But even if 
one assumes that culture is dynamic and appropriated by individuals to 
their own advantage, it is not an easy undertaking to explain recent business 
behaviour merely by using cultural factors.  
 
 
2.3 The Migrant Entrepreneur: Diaspora Advantages 
 
A related body of literature focuses not on the cultural or family-specific 
aspects of business, but on how ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs took 
advantage of opportunities their situation offered them. The migrant status 
of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia is argued to make a difference53. First, 
some argue that migration is a selection process in which only the most risk-
taking people engage – which then increases the prevalence of 
                                                 
52 See Gomez and Hsiao (2001, p. 4). 
53 Bonacich, 1973. 
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entrepreneurship among such groups. The role of the Chinese in economic 
development of South-East Asia is seen by some as essentially similar to that 
of other well-off minorities such as Indians in the British Empire, Jews in 
Europe or Protestants in Catholic Europe54. Migrants often face difficult and 
hostile host contexts, and often deal with official or unofficial discrimination. 
In theories related to migration “being Chinese” is equivalent to not being 
Indonesian, Filipino, Malaysian, etc55. Chinese migrants in Indonesia have 
since colonial times occupied important economic positions, for example as 
intermediaries, and have continued to do so after the independence of 
Indonesia and throughout subsequent regime changes. The favourable 
economic position of the Chinese migrants (compared to the indigenous 
population) created tension among Indonesians, and it does until today, and 
is known as “the Chinese problem”56. Several seminal works, by historians, 
economists and sociologists, have described the peculiar position of the 
Chinese minority in Indonesian business and raised questions on why this 
situation has arisen57.  
 
Thee58 described the economic policies that have been implemented in 
Indonesia with regard to the ethnic Chinese since Indonesia’s independence 
and argued these were fragmented and have failed to stop the economic 
dominance of this minority. After independence, the Indonesian economy 
was still dominated by Dutch businesses, which were eventually 
nationalised in the late 1950s. Because the Chinese had the skills and capital 
to fill the gap that emerged, they soon became the most important economic 
group in Indonesia. The government, as a reaction to this, implemented both 
policies stimulating indigenous businessmen and restricting Chinese 
business interests, but in Indonesia these policies were fragmented and 
generally ineffective. During the so-called “New Order” of Suharto, a more 
pragmatic posture was taken, recognizing that the Chinese minority was 
essential for economic growth. Panglaykim59 wrote:  
 
                                                 
54 Comparisons have been made by Chirot and Reid (1997), Davis et al. (2001) and 
Kotkin (1992). One must note the difference between migrants and minorities. Minorities 
are not necessarily migrants nor are migrants necessarily minorities, but in the case of the 
first generation ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia both terms are applicable.    
55 For a more thorough discussion on “being Chinese” see: Suryadinata (1997); Godley 
and Lloyd (2001) or Ong and Nonini (1997). 
56 The fact that ethnic Chinese are better off than the indigenous populations is a 
statement informed by statistics and averages. Not all Chinese are rich, and not all 
indigenous are poor. Of the top-50 of the largest businesses in Indonesia however, the 
majority is controlled by Chinese businessmen. This is unusual given the fact that ethnic 
Chinese are a minority.  
57 e.g. Mackie (1976); McVey (1992); Robison (1986); Suryadinata (1997); Thee (2006). 
58 Thee, 2006. 
59 See Panglaykim (1968, p. 83). 
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‘It is quite obvious that Indonesia cannot at present dispense with 
their [Chinese business community] capital, skill, experience and 
connections in almost every branch of domestic and foreign trade. 
The new Government fully recognizes this.’ 
 
Many ethnic Chinese businesses, and especially those close to Suharto, 
thrived during the New Order, which brought impressive economic growth. 
During as well as at the end of the Suharto era, however, anti-Chinese 
sentiments erupted and Suharto eventually attempted to transfer wealth 
from ethnic Chinese to indigenous businesses. In the post-Suharto era, 
despite 32 years of impressive economic development, the economy still 
depends on ethnic Chinese capital and business skills. Panglaykim’s words 
could easily have been written today.   
 
How has the Chinese minority in Indonesia been able to create and maintain 
its economic dominance? If one were to see the development of capitalism in 
Asia essentially as a struggle for power over politico-economic resources, 
ethnic Chinese capitalists are a minority group that has been successful in 
this struggle for economic control, particularly in various Southeast Asian 
countries such as Indonesia60. Several authors ascribe the disproportionate 
economic success of Chinese businessmen (compared to indigenous 
businessmen) in terms of the ability of some Chinese businessmen to form 
alliances with local political power and gain preferential access to scarce 
resources such as raw materials, technology and capital – an approach that is 
often termed rent-seeking or crony capitalism61. In Indonesia the term cukong 
is used for a Chinese businessman linking up with an official. The allocation 
of certain advantages due to connections is usually seen as either corruption 
or crony capitalism. Corruption involves bureaucratic behaviour that 
deviates from the norm and that results in private gains by bureaucrats62, 
but is not necessarily based on continued relationships. Cronyism is 
sometimes seen as a special type of corruption, and is often related to social 
exchange theory, which deals with interactions between people or groups of 
people. Cronyism can be defined as ‘a reciprocal exchange transaction where 
party A shows favour to party B based on shared membership in a social 
network at the expense of party C’s equal or superior claim to the valued 
resource’63. Exchange theory, which was amongst other aspects developed 
by Emerson64, specifically emphasizes the reciprocal aspect of actor relations. 
In crony type relations, at the outset it may not be clear how and when the 
favour will be reciprocated.  
                                                 
60 See Robison (1986). 
61 For example Yoshihara (1988). 
62 See Luo (2002). 
63 According to Khatri et al. (2006). 
64 See Emerson (1972a,b). 
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Local political figures, particularly in Indonesia, were keen to establish 
crony links with Chinese businessmen because they could derive economic 
benefits from this alliance without the other partner forming a threat to 
political power and because they could more easily be kept at bay65. The fact 
that a leader like Suharto linked up with various ethnic Chinese 
businessmen is understood in this manner66. Elson, in his biography of 
Suharto, noted his unusual ”fundraising abilities”67, and in his 
autobiography Suharto himself describes how he made use of the Chinese 
businessmen to achieve his objectives for the Indonesian nation68. This 
model worked for the elites, the Chinese businessmen and for the economy 
in general and there was (and is) little incentive to change the system from 
inside69. This situation meant that companies were generally faced with an 
environment where relationships with those in power were a key factor to 
business success. This specific context of crony relations was particularly 
developed in Indonesia and less so in other Asian countries, although 
cronyism has also been noted in countries like the Philippines. Cronyism 
between officials and vulnerable minorities is by no means only an Asian 
phenomenon. Writing about Eastern Europe, Karady70 notes: ‘Jewish 
entrepreneurs could never achieve political power or public prestige that 
paralleled their economic success. (..) Such status incongruity was eased, in 
some cases, when Jewish entrepreneurs entered into class alliances with 
Gentile elites, as they did in pre-Trianon – that is, pre-1918 liberal - Hungary, 
nineteenth-century German Prague, and interwar Czechoslovakia.’    
 
Political economists also go a step further and claim that the ethnic Chinese 
businesses in Indonesia, through their crony relations, have managed to 
actively mobilize their resources to influence their business environment 
successfully. By creating and subsequently actively maintaining politico-
business alliances they ensured alignment between political and economic 
elite to the benefit of both71. This situation is not unique to Indonesia. In 
Korea some business groups, known as chaebols, have grown to be dominant 
factors in the economy, to such an extent that they easily influence economic 
policies. Chibber argues that rather than the state controlling business, a 
more subtle mutual process between state and business interests led to 
Korea’s successful economic development72. Others argue more strongly that 
Korea was troubled by an entrenched system of government-business 
                                                 
65 See Lim (2000). 
66 For example Kang (2002). 
67 See Elson (2001). 
68 See Dwipayana and Ramadhan (1989). 
69 For example Robison and Hadiz (2004). 
70 See Karady (1997, p. 126). 
71 For example Rosser (2003); Robison and Hadiz (2004). 
72 See Chibber (1999). 
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relationships73 or use the concept “mutual hostages” to describe 
coordination between business and state74. In Indonesia the mutual 
dependence of business and state was perhaps even more pronounced. 
Schwartz claims that  
 
‘Indonesia’s policy-makers are hostage to the ethnic Chinese, whose 
firms produce a sizeable share of output. [..] Thus the group [of 
ethnic Chinese] has usually been able to fend off measures that 
would hinder business operations’75.  
 
Others focus less on crony relations with officials, but instead emphasise the 
embedding in personal networks between diaspora Chinese in Asia, based 
on common surnames, clans or dialect groups76. One author wrote about 
Chinese migrants: ‘They didn’t so much as pour into any one location, but 
fanned out across Asia. One clansman from a particular village in China 
would migrate to, say, Bangkok, and another would settle in Singapore. The 
way the Chinese settled across Asia ensured that they had a ready-made 
international network of connections within which they could trade and 
raise capital’77. Although a topic of debate, some researchers argue that 
networks based on dialect groups of ethnic Chinese continue to be an 
important factor influencing their business networks. A study on Hong 
Kong concluded recently that ‘the great mobility of the Chinese diaspora 
from Hong Kong, and the diasporic landscape they have created, have been 
effectively shaped by their place-based ethno-linguistic identity’78. Chinese 
migrants have set up voluntary organisations, often based on dialect groups, 
to fulfil functions such as preserving culture, providing mutual assistance 
and creating regional trade networks, and these organisations continue to 
flourish79. Some authors argue that the intra-ethnic Chinese networks are 
instrumental in overcoming trade barriers, and as such offer a competitive 
advantage80. The intra-ethnic networks, according to these authors, cross 
borders and facilitate internationalisation. Anecdotal evidence of business 
connections between large ethnic Chinese tycoons are given in many semi-
popular books, for example in Weidenbaum and Hughes’ book “The 
Bamboo Network”, the title of which refers to the flexible networks of ethnic 
Chinese in Asia81.  
                                                 
73 See Amsden (1989); Lee (2000) or Park (2002). 
74 According to Kang (2002). 
75 See Schwarz (1997, p. 129). 
76 See for example Granovetter (1992); Kotkin (1992); Lever-Tracey (2002) and 
Backman (2001). 
77 According to Backman (2001, p. 195). 
78 According to Lin (2002, p. 87). 
79 See Liu (1998). 
80 For example Rauch and Trindade (2002). 
81 Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996. 
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Cross-border minority group networking would also explain why so many 
ethnic Chinese tycoons have invested in China, usually also in their places of 
birth. Provinces with many migrants in southeast China, such as Fujian and 
Guangdong have received an enormous amount of foreign direct investment 
in recent decades. The ties with one’s place of birth are termed qiaoxiang ties, 
referring to a sojourner’s village or hometown and have been the subject of 
analysis in a number of books and research projects82. Researchers 
emphasising the intra-ethnic networking skills often see ethnic Chinese 
family businesses as a transnational form of management, which is not 
necessarily linked to or rooted in a nation83. Several anthropological works 
have provided interesting information on Chinese “transnationalism” and 
the recent cultural and spatial changes in ethnic Chinese networks84. Some 
researchers focus on ethnographies of the changes in business strategies and 
organisation patterns, arguing that a new and alternative Chinese modernity 
is coming about which is more flexible and transnational85. 
 
The basis of such intra-ethnic ties is often linked to Chinese culture. In 
Chinese society personal networks extending from the individual exist, and 
each type of relationship is regulated according to social conventions86. In 
this way the relationship between a father and son requires a different 
behaviour than the relationship with a cousin. Chinese networks are 
commonly termed guanxi. Guanxi refers to personal, particularistic 
relationships between two individuals. The relationship implies a long-term 
process of exchanging favours. The term itself is hard to translate and 
should be seen as a distinct Chinese cultural phenomenon. The word is 
composed of two characters: guan and xi. Guan means “to link” or “to relate 
to” and xi means “in relation to”, or “to tie up”. Together, guanxi means 
connections, or two individuals being connected87. The basis for guanxi can 
be a shared experience, for example the same place of birth or the same 
school, the same clan, the same surname, the same family, and so on. As 
such, it is easier for Chinese people amongst themselves to develop guanxi 
than for Chinese with people of other nationalities. Guanxi has to be 
maintained by giving favours and for this reason it is often associated with 
bribes, especially in Indonesia88. A shared culture of guanxi is often argued 
to be a prerequisite for success in Confucian societies89. The importance of 
guanxi can also explain the frequent business interactions between ethnic 
                                                 
82 For example Douw et al. (1999). 
83 For example Ong and Nonini (1997) or Yeung (1997). 
84 For example Dahles (2005). 
85 For example Ong and Nonini (1997). 
86 Fei, 1992. 
87 See Chen and Chen (2004) and Xin and Pearce (1996). 
88 For example Sunarjo and Cone (2005). 
89 See for example Yeung and Tung (1996).  
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Chinese firms in Asia. Guanxi has also been linked to social exchange theory, 
but is understood as a culturally specific form of social exchange.  
 
Placing the literature on crony connections and intra-ethnic network of 
minority Chinese in a broader perspective, it appears that social capital, or 
the ability to use networks as a business resource, is an essential aspect of 
ethnic Chinese business. The term “social capital” was coined by Bourdieu 
to describe the value of social networks90. There is now substantial 
agreement that social capital facilitates individual, organisational, and 
collective action and thereby creates value91. Although social capital is useful 
in every context as a basis for competitive advantage, entrepreneurs 
operating in hostile environments, such as minorities in a corrupt host 
country, or in an emerging market with poor investor protection, could 
specifically benefit from long-lasting connections92. Although most research 
on the role of particularistic relationships treats these as a homogeneous 
category, recent research has emphasized that different types of social 
capital offer different (dis)avantages93. It is useful to distinguish between 
bonding and bridging forms of social capital, where bonding is building 
connections within the own social group and bridging means networking 
across social categories94. Crony capitalism theories have argued that 
bridging capital is the basis for business success of (some) ethnic Chinese 
firms whereas diaspora theories focus on bonding capital between ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs. Relations of entrepreneurs are known to influence 
business decisions, and the composition and influence of the business 
network may evolve over time95. Some authors have criticised the attribution 
of omnipotent powers to networking, and have argued that, as the business 
grows and its environment develops, guanxi and networking with political 
figures is not as important as in early stages96.  
 
This body of literature shows us that a precarious position in a society, that 
of an ethnic minority, may offer opportunities in a hostile environment, in 
particular if the migrant group is able to form a stable network of 
relationships for support and protection, both within and outside their peer 
group. As the business group evolves, it may use its political connections for 
protection and influence the domestic context, while it can use its ethnic 
network to invest either abroad or in China. This perspective combines the 
                                                 
90 See Bourdieu (1984). 
91 For example Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998); Oh et al. (2004) and Uzzi (1997). 
92 See for example Lim (2000); Liu (2001)or Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). Blyler 
and Coff (2003) note that social capital is not necessarily used to benefit the firm, 
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93 Luo and Chung, 2005. 
94 See for example Putnam (2000); Adler and Kwon (2002). 
95 See for example Hite (2005); Keister (2001). 
96 See for example Chung (2005) and Peng (2003). 
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influence of external factors on the ethnic Chinese migrant with cultural 
networking strategies rooted in the Chinese concept of guanxi. Recent 
studies suggest that networking ties may decrease in importance over time. 
 
 
2.4 Institutions and Strategy in Emerging Economies 
 
The “Chinese Family Business” and the “Diaspora” approaches are 
sometimes integrated into one comprehensive argument and sometimes 
referred to as the “relationship based model”97. But a third kind of approach 
takes a radically different perspective. It argues that large diversified 
conglomerates, often held by families or coalitions of families, are prevalent 
forms of economic organisation in many countries, particularly in emerging 
economies with weak economic institutions98, and that they have certain 
advantages over other types of organisations99. There is, in this view, no 
particular reason to assume that “Chinese” or “minority” has anything to do 
with this business model.  
 
Three perspectives are important for research on emerging market business 
groups100. The first is institutional theory, which argues that institutions are 
an important factor in shaping organisations101. It is now well established 
that the business context has a strong influence on corporations, especially in 
developing countries, and influences strategic choice102. The fact that 
business groups are more prevalent in emerging markets than elsewhere has 
spurred a body of literature linking the existence of business groups to 
attributes of the institutional environment where (lack of) formal 
institutions, relationships, or norms, values and networks create advantages 
for developing diversified business groups103. It is argued that in “weak” 
institutional environments it is hard for firms to acquire inputs such as 
capital, human resources or raw materials because financial, labour and 
product markets are not well developed. In such cases where intermediary 
functions are underdeveloped a diversified business group may offer 
advantages because production factors can be internally sourced at lower 
cost104. Others attribute a role to the state or state policies in stimulating the 
                                                 
97 For example Peng (2003). 
98 See Khanna and Palepu (1999). 
99 For example Guillén (2000). 
100 See Hoskisson et al. (2000) 
101 Prominent scholars are Scott (1995) and North (1990). 
102 See for example Carney (2004); Hoskisson et al. (2000); Khanna and Palepu (2000); 
Kim et al. (2004); Peng (2002); Peng and Heath (1996) and Wright et al. (2005). 
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Guillén (2001) and Peng (2003). 
104 See for example Khanna and Palepu (2000). 
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development of business groups, such as in Japan105 or Korea106 while others 
point to a more abstract ‘institutional environment’ as a conditioning factor 
for business107. The institutional environment is a composite concept and 
refers to formal and informal constraints on organisational behaviour, where 
formal constraints refer to rules and regulations and informal constraints to 
norms, values and networks108.   
 
The second perspective is the transaction economics approach, initially 
formulated by Williamson109. This theory uses a contractual lens as a starting 
point. The transaction cost approach focuses on the firm, while assuming 
that the environment affects the firm’s success and structure. It argues that 
given a set of circumstances influencing the firms’ transaction costs, certain 
corporate behaviours are more or less effective. The choice to implement a 
transaction with a market party or in an internal hierarchy is assumed to be 
rational.  Hence, if the environment displays large levels of uncertainty and 
transactions costs are high, such as is the case in many emerging markets, 
the transaction cost approach assumes that firms internalise transactions and 
implement diversified structures. The best way to gain control over key 
resources in the absence of a dependable legal system is to rely on family 
and trusted parties – or, in other terms, to form social networks which are 
reflected in the corporate strategy110. In emerging countries, market failures 
(i.e. very high transaction costs) and strong influence of the state on business 
may offer an incentive for companies to diversify. Diversification has been 
an issue of considerable theoretical significance111. In Western economies it 
used to be a trend in the 1970s and 1980s, but more recently companies tend 
to focus on core businesses. In emerging economies there is a significant 
continued presence and success of diversified firms, and that has spurred 
researchers to formulate theories of diversification. The transaction cost 
approach offers one theory, which points to situations where the market or 
the organisation is more efficient, depending on the cost of the transaction. 
High transaction costs are an explanation for diversified business groups. 
Next to the transaction cost approach, another complementary theory is 
useful to explain why business groups arise: economies of scope. In the late 
1970s the concept of economies of scope was introduced to describe a 
condition where it is less costly to combine two or more product lines in one 
firm than to produce them separately. Economies of scope are generally 
                                                 
105 For example Lincoln et al. (1998). 
106 For example Park (2002). 
107 For example Kim et al. (2004). 
108 According to Scott (1995). 
109 Williamson (1985).  
110 See for example Butler et al. (2003); Carney (2005); Casella (1999); Hitt, et al. 
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linked to sharable production inputs112. Examples of such “sharable 
production inputs” are production capacity, human resources, capital, 
materials, or technology.  Thus, if there are advantages in combining 
different products, and transaction costs to acquire resources outside the 
firm are high, diversification could be beneficial. 
 
The institutional perspective and the transaction cost perspective leave little 
room for managers to make strategic choices. They assume that an optimal 
strategic behaviour exists given a set of circumstances. As a consequence 
these theories can hardly explain why two very different firms can excel in 
the same environment, or why similar firms excel in different environments. 
A third perspective complements the above mentioned institutional and 
transaction cost approaches. The resource-based perspective, finally, argues 
that firms create competitive advantages through a unique combination of 
resources built up, such as connections, access to capital etc113. While 
institutional theory argues that the company is to a large extent influenced 
by external factors, the resource based approach opens up room for 
companies to design different strategies and take on an active role. This type 
of approach can explain why organisations in the same context differ, or 
why similar organisations differ over time, and gives a more active role to 
strategy formulation114. Guillén has combined the ‘economies of scope’ and 
‘institutional’ views and argued for a resource-based theory of business 
groups by assuming that ‘entrepreneurs and firms in emerging economies 
create business groups if political-economic conditions allow them to 
acquire and maintain the capability of combining foreign and domestic 
resources [..] to repeatedly enter new industries’ 115.  
 
These perspectives drawn from strategic management theories all offer 
explanations for the existence of diversified business groups, although they 
attribute different weight to the influence of corporate strategy versus 
conditioning by environmental factors. In order for business groups to build 
a substantial competitive advantage, they need to adopt strategies that 
provide a “strategic fit” with an environment characterised by weak 
institutions and high transaction costs.  
 
If conglomeration and use of networks of trusted partners are responses to 
imperfect institutional environments, then as institutions modernize one 
                                                 
112 The concept economies of scope was developed by Panzar and Willig (1981) and 
further elaborated upon by Chandler (1990) and more recently by Helfat and Eisenhardt 
(2004). 
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would expect a move towards market-based strategies116, and eventually 
perhaps a convergence with Western management models. Extending this 
line of work, Peng and Zhou117 argue further that this move towards market-
based strategies is not a sudden transition. In the face of institutional 
changes, business strategy in emerging markets moves from a network-
based strategy through an intermediate phase of weakening network ties 
before eventually evolving into a market-based strategy. This deterministic 
model of Asian business groups is supported by some researchers on Korean 
business groups118.  
 
Summarizing, this body of literature points to the importance of external 
factors in business strategy that are independent of cultural or minority 
perspectives. These external factors are combined under the umbrella 
concept “institutions” which takes on the meaning of the business context of 
a firm. It discusses the possibility that the strategy of large ethnic Chinese 
family business groups could be a competitive advantage in a weak 
institutional context and suggests that with changes in the institutional 
context, the corporate strategy will also change.  
 
 
2.5 A First Step Towards Integration 
 
The literature review clearly points at the importance of exogenous and 
endogenous factors that influence corporate strategy over time. While 
institutional theories place more emphasis on external changes in the 
business context as a factor in explaining strategy, cultural and family 
business approaches look primarily at factors within the firm, such as the 
value systems of the founding family or the generational changes in 
leadership. Diaspora approaches combine external factors, such as the 
economic position of a minority, with entrepreneurial responses. How do 
these internal and external factors influencing corporate strategy work out 
over time? Which factors are important in which stage of development?  
 
Although the three approaches described above (cultural, diaspora and 
institutional/strategy) are rather different in their assumptions, scope and 
conclusions, each offers useful insights for understanding strategic models 
of Asian conglomerates, especially when one considers different stages of 
their development:   
• The origins, or the genesis -- the immigration of the founder and the 
establishment of the first small business -- is certainly strongly 
influenced by the Chinese tradition of mutual help and clan solidarity, 
                                                 
116 See for example Peng (2003); or Peng, Lee and Wang (2005) 
117 See Peng and Zhou (2005). 
118 Such as Kim et al. (2004). 
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which in turn is informed by an elaborate value system. While the 
recently arrived immigrant is poor and vulnerable, a support group is 
essential, and the first opportunities are often found in partnership with 
other ethnic Chinese migrants.  
• Once the businessman has built up a modest company and developed 
entrepreneurial skills, he has evolved into an interesting partner for local 
officials in a corrupt environment, such as local governments or military 
entities, who can, in turn, offer protection, a market, or resources. The 
establishment of the first business partnership with a local politician or 
strongman can be viewed in terms of the peculiar social vulnerability of 
an immigrant within a corrupt host-country, who nevertheless displays 
entrepreneurial skills and can be considered a valuable and 
simultaneously vulnerable partner. 
• Dependence on a local strongman is risky and can fuel the desire for 
diversification, and once conglomerates grow they may use their ethnic 
networks for internationalisation in Asia. While the ethnic Chinese 
businessman becomes wealthier, there may be a desire to play a more 
prominent role in ethnic Chinese networks, and to make investments in 
mainland China either alone or with fellow tycoons from the same 
dialect group.  
• To explain why only a few of the thousands of Chinese immigrants have 
succeeded in transforming their budding enterprises into flourishing 
mega-conglomerates one must consider the broader dynamics of 
development and ascribe individual achievement in part to luck, but 
largely to superior business acumen and competence in building and 
managing modern industrial and trading concerns in a context of 
imperfect market conditions.  
• If the conglomerate is an extremely large player, it may in turn be able to 
influence local politics, and create a situation of mutual dependence 
between a political and business leader. 
• The entry of the second generation into the business marks a period of 
strategic change. Traditional Chinese values and simple structures are 
not sufficient any more to run the business, but a more sophisticated 
structure with professional management and a variety of business 
models in different industries and countries is necessary to control the 
expanding international empire. Rapid growth of already large 
businesses may tie up too much capital within the firm, and families 
may consider listing one or more of their enterprises on a stock 
exchange, in which case they need to comply with requirements of 
transparency and protection of minority shareholders. 
• In the context of a liberalizing economic environment, the very large 
ethnic Chinese firms may be forced to move slowly from a strategy of 
relying on ethnic and political connections, towards a market-based 
strategy informed by Western management theories and practices. 
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Democratisation replacing of long lasting dictatorships may make 
political alliances less stable, which may encourage the firm to either 
focus on one business or spread its risks across countries and industries. 
Very big conglomerates may outgrow ethnic and local political networks 
and do business on a global level playing field. 
 
Once the above mentioned theoretical approaches are placed in a conceptual 
model distinguishing between the different phases in corporate 
development, they substantially increase our understanding of how 
corporate strategy evolves in an ethnic Chinese family business (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Conceptual Model of Ethnic Chinese Family Firm Development 
Corporate 
Size 
Strategy Relevant Frameworks 
Small Small Scale Trading Chinese Family Business, Ethnic Networks 
Medium Diversification and 
Growth 
Crony and Ethnic Networks, Chinese 
Family Business 
Large Internationalisation, 
Professionalisation, 
Generation Change 
Institutional Theory, Strategic 
Management, Crony and Ethnic Networks 
Very 
Large 
Multi-national 
strategy, domestic 
market power 
Institutional & Strategic Management 
Approaches, Business Groups in Emerging 
Markets 
 
The idea that as companies grow into multinationals they are influenced by 
different factors is a well-known fact in management, but has been 
surprisingly absent from the literature on ethnic Chinese business so far. An 
analogy with a present day large family business could illustrate this point. 
The current strategy of a company like Philips is these days interpreted in 
terms of their innovations, global positioning, global efficiency, and 
profitability. It would be rather strange to interpret the current strategy of 
Philips in terms of the values of the founding family – even if the Philips 
brothers had a profound influence on early Philips and instilled in it a sense 
of direction and basic values that continue to be of some importance up to 
today. The pre-war Philips is simply not the same as the present-day 
multinational. The founding family saw the opportunity to grow by making 
light bulbs, but when we think of Philips today we see the company in a 
completely different light, namely as a highly professional, high-tech global 
enterprise. Although it may continue to have several “typically” Dutch 
values, these values are rarely mentioned as a key element in – say - the 
reports of stock market analysts when they recommend their clients to buy 
or sell shares. The point here is not that history or culture do not matter at 
all, but rather that other factors will become more important over time when 
it comes to corporate strategy. 
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It is not very surprising that, as a company grows, founding entrepreneur 
values are relatively less important and the corporate strategy could be also 
interpreted in terms of current global opportunities, and strategic choices. 
Yet this basic insight has gained very little acceptance when it comes to 
ethnic Chinese firms. Even if we are talking about multinational companies, 
whose turnover is in billions of dollars, many researchers continue to look at 
the cultural values and network strategies of the founder which occurred 
fifty years ago. New management patterns, the decline of old networks and 
the rise of new networks are often ignored as a result of this bias. In this 
study the strategy of an ethnic Chinese business over time is seen as a 
response to both internal factors, such as family values, culture, corporate 
growth and generational changes; and to external changes affecting the 
business from outside, for example state policies, corrupt host culture, 
economic modernisation or regime change.  
 
 
2.6 Strategic Choice  
 
When discussing the difference between the institutional approach to 
corporate strategy and resource-based perspective we have briefly touched 
upon a topic that is essential in corporate strategy: the degree of freedom a 
manager has to shape strategy. Is a company victim to environmental factors 
as is the focus of institutional theory? Or can it exercise strategic choice and 
adapt to or even influence its environment as the resource-based view 
argues?  
 
The literature takes diverging directions attributing various degrees of 
freedom for management to influence their own strategy and their 
environment over time119. Since this debate is relevant for all businesses, 
researchers of ethnic Chinese firms have also voiced divergent views on 
strategic choice. On the one end of the debate it is argued that ethnic Chinese 
businesses are specifically good at adapting to their environment and are 
known for their resilience and strategic “fit” with the business context of 
their time120. Even in a hostile context they found ways to succeed in 
business. This adaptability is argued to be a central feature of ethnic Chinese 
business, and is reflected in the organisational culture. Scholars described 
ethnic Chinese family businesses as having a flat organisational structure 
with a strong leader, an agile organisational form. The patriarchal leader is 
embedded in strong networks, which enable information flows, alliances 
                                                 
119 Prominent authors in this field are Beckert (1999); Child (1997); Child and Tsai 
(2005) and Oliver (1991). 
120 See for example Limlingan (1986) or Williams (1952). 
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and facilitate cross-border trade121. Other researchers have argued that, on 
the contrary, ethnic Chinese businesses were unable to adapt successfully to 
new circumstances because of limitations inherent in their initial physical 
and cultural set-up – sometimes called administrative heritage122. Others 
refer to the fact that history matters for present-day strategy choices as 
“path-dependence”123. Initial conditions present in the business from its 
founding period limit the ability to change the business, although studies 
suggest that there is always an element of choice124. Some authors refer to 
the two perspectives described above (company strategy being either 
flexible or unable to adapt to the environment) as attributing a reactive 
and/or passive role to human agency125. 
 
The passive and reactive roles described apply to the development of ethnic 
Chinese business groups. Many ethnic Chinese business groups in East Asia 
that started in the post-colonial period show a very similar pattern. They 
first started in trading, then basic industries (food, cement), coinciding with 
policies of import substitution industrialisation, then a move to more capital-
intensive industrialisation such as chemicals in a policy environment of 
export promotion; internationalisation, and - to a limited extent – a recent 
move into more high-tech industries and services such as 
telecommunications126. The sequence of strategies clearly shows that the 
context strongly influenced corporate strategy. For the Salim Group the push 
of the context was even more direct: in many cases it started businesses after 
receiving instructions to do so from Suharto. In the case of the very large 
conglomerates, such as the Salim Group, the behaviour of the conglomerate 
also exercises a significant influence on the evolution of the domestic 
institutional environment. This can be referred to as a proactive role127. 
 
Although literature points at different internal and external changes 
influencing corporate strategy, how these factors interact in the context of a 
single company and how and when they exercise passive, reactive and 
proactive roles, is not clear and would need further investigation. When 
studying complex phenomena, it is more useful to speak of producer-
product relationships rather than of causal relationships. In producer-
product relationships, A can be necessary to produce B, but not sufficient. 
                                                 
121 For example Hamilton (1991); Kotkin (1992); Lever-Tracy (2002); Redding (1990) 
and Yu (2001). 
122 See Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Bruton et al. (2003); Carney (1998); Carney and 
Gedajlovic (2003). 
123 See Garud and Karnoe (2001). 
124 For example Carney and Gedajlovic (2003); Davies and Ma (2003). 
125 See Child and Tsai (2005). 
126 See Limlingan (1986), Sato (1993) or Suehiro (2001). 
127 See Child and Tsai (2005) and Ackoff (1974). Oliver (1991) speaks of manipulative 
strategies to influence the environment.  
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Other environmental factors are likely to play a role as well and causality 
can only explain part of the reality128. Rather than simply being influenced 
by their internal and external environment, this research points to the idea 
that transitions in large business group strategy and their internal and 
institutional environments are interdependent processes. Instead of a 
unidirectional causal relation between institutional environment and 
corporate strategy, there is a process of co-evolution (or co-production) of 
internal organisational dynamics, corporate strategy and the institutional 
context.  
 
The case of the Salim Group, the largest Indonesian business group with a 
close proximity to the Suharto regime, presents a unique opportunity to 
study processes of mutual influence of the business group and its 
institutional environment over a period covering half a century.  In addition, 
for thirty years this coincided with the period of the young Salim gradually 
taking over the reins of power from his father, offering thus the opportunity 
to observe the interplay between strategy and generational transition.   
 
 
2.7 The Case for Coevolution 
 
The coevolution theory emerged in ecology to describe situations where two 
or more species influence each other’s evolution129. The fundamental insight 
of coevolution is that context shapes the evolution of a species by 
recognizing that species sharing a habitat are part of each others’ 
environment, and therefore they may exercise an influence on each others’ 
evolution.  
 
Since the way each species evolves influences the evolution of the other, this 
gives rise to complex longitudinal patterns of intertwined relationships and 
unravelling the mutual adaptation mechanisms is the object of research by 
coevolutionary theoreticians.  Another basic insight is that geographic areas 
inhabited by various species are seldom identical, and therefore coevolution 
happens only where the species live together. Thus most coevolutionary 
phenomena are location-specific, in some extreme cases leading to formation 
of sub-species that are dependent on the presence in their habitat of other 
species.  Coevolutionary theorists speak of the “geographic mosaic of 
coevolution”130 and much of their work is dedicated to creating a descriptive 
cartography of such phenomena. This approach may lead to theorising on 
some profound mechanisms of evolution, but has little chance of resulting in 
generalisations applying to the species as a whole, because coevolution will 
                                                 
128 See for a more elaborate explanation of these concepts Ackoff and Emery (1972). 
129 See for example Ehrlich and Raven (1964); Nitecki (1983) or Thompson (2005). 
130 Such as Thompson (2005). 
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work differently in different habitats, depending in part on which other 
species are present. This is worth keeping in mind when considering 
whether results derived from the observation of the Salim Group can be 
generalised to all ethnic Chinese family business groups. Detailed results 
that can be generalised across ethnic Chinese family firms are unlikely, but it 
is possible to unearth some patterns that may apply to other cases.    
 
The metaphor of coevolution has recently been applied to the organisational 
sciences field131. Coevolution theory has been instrumental in reconciling 
various theoretical debates in organisational science, in particular the above 
mentioned debate on the role of the institutional environment versus the 
role of human agency. Institutional theory has mostly focused on contextual 
variables that influence business behaviour132. As a result of organisations 
adapting to the environment reactively, organisations reflect past 
institutional contexts, i.e. they lag behind. Path dependency claims that as 
organisations develop, their options to exercise strategic choice are more 
limited in view of being stuck in old routines. Institutional theory and path 
dependency tend to focus on what we have earlier called passive or reactive 
roles for firms. The strategic choice theory however, assumes that 
organizations can meaningfully exercise purpose and that strategy is not 
solely the outcome of contextual variables133. The advantage of coevolution 
theory is that it allows one to study the importance of these theoretical 
notions in a longitudinal case, and in addition investigate their 
interdependency. Academics using coevolution approaches are not only 
interested in factors increasing or decreasing managerial purpose, but also in 
the question how this process takes place over time.  
 
Most empirical cases using the coevolution framework have confirmed that 
firms may exercise strategic choice, but that this is at the same time limited 
because of internal and external factors. The amount of empirical 
coevolution studies is still relatively modest. The reason for this may be the 
considerable effort required to engage in longitudinal, context-specific 
studies on multiple levels. The majority of existing empirical studies have 
taken a class of companies in a certain national or regional industry context 
as their focus of study134. Only a few such studies are specific to Asian 
family business groups. The author is aware of only one coevolutionary 
                                                 
131 For example Lewin and Volberda (1999); McKelvey (1997 and 2002);  Murmann et 
al. (2003); Röttmer and Katzy (2005); Tan and Tan (2005); and Volberda and Lewin 
(2003). 
132 For example Scott (1995). 
133 The literature on strategic intent has been summarized in a recent article (Child, 
1997). In addition, earlier scientists subscribing to a pragmatist view have also explored 
the idea of organizations as purposeful systems (Ackoff and Emery, 1972). 
134 E.g. Djelic and Ainamo (1999); Haveman and Rao (1997); Jones (2001); Lampel and 
Shamsie (2003). 
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study of the development of ethnic Chinese family businesses in Southeast 
Asia, which examines the development of such organisations as a cluster in 
the institutional context in a longitudinal perspective135.  
 
Only a limited set of empirical studies is concerned with studying one firm 
(on a micro-level) and its institutional environment (on the macro-level). 
Very few of those studies, however, are situated in an emerging market 
context, where the particular institutional context is theorised to lead to 
specific strategic choices of diversification and pyramid ownership 
structures. A notable exception is the study of a Brazilian regional 
telecommunication company136. In this study, the institutional context, 
industry- and firm-level processes are combined. The results indicated that 
emerging market environments give rise to different types of coevolution 
patterns. Although institutional restrictions may limit strategic choice, 
companies may increase their freedom to influence corporate strategy by 
immersing in political networks. As far as the author knows, this is the first 
study of company in an emerging market that was large and powerful 
enough to directly influence its institutional context as well as being 
influenced by it. As such, the Salim Group, with its close relationship with 
Suharto, offers a unique case to study processes of mutual influencing 
between company and environment. 
 
Bringing corporate strategy and the factors influencing it together in a co-
evolutionary framework helps one understand strategic development of a 
company over time. Especially when such studies are set in an emerging 
market context, hitherto unexplored patterns of passive, active and pro-
active strategy formulation can be analyzed. 
 
 
2.8 Emerging Framework 
 
This research started with a broad research question, namely how to 
interpret the corporate strategy of the Salim Group over time. The literature 
overview has contributed to a more in-depth understanding of possible 
factors influencing corporate strategy, which can be categorised in internal 
and external factors.  
 
Family business literature gives rise to the following observations: 
• Cultural values of the entrepreneurs matter, in particular in the early 
stages or the business development; 
• Although small Chinese family businesses were initially seen as a 
consistent form of management, larger and older firms do not display all 
                                                 
135 See Carney and Gedajlovic (2002). 
136 See Rodrigues and Child (2003). 
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the traditional characteristics, but have also added more recent and 
more sophisticated management models; 
• Generational changes give rise to a new strategy. 
 
Diaspora literature gives rise to the following observations: 
• For vulnerable migrants, forming stable support networks can lead to 
success; 
• Building crony networks with officials can offer advantages and 
protection in a corrupt host culture; 
• Intra-ethnic networking practices can be a response to a weak 
institutional context and can lead to internationalisation; 
• Over time, networking skills may decrease in importance. 
 
The Institutional/Strategy literature gives rise to the following observations: 
• The institutional environment influences business strategy; 
• Diversified family business groups may be a response to, or a 
competitive advantage in, a weak institutional environment with high 
transaction costs; 
• As institutions modernize, corporate strategy will also change from a 
relationship-based strategy towards a rule-based strategy. 
 
Researchers studying strategic management see the cultural and migrant 
approaches as a way of dealing with weak institutional contexts and 
sometimes refer to it as a relationship-based strategy. Following Peng137 it is 
possible to make a distinction between (1) the relationship-based business 
model (where business opportunities arise as a result of personal ties with 
other Chinese business families and political powers) and (2) the market-
based model (where economic logic independent of personalities prevails). 
The relationship-based versus the market-based model can be understood as 
a dilemma of two opposing choices. The relationship-based model is 
associated with highly personal, value based, networks, special favours for 
both parties, opaque transactions within and between companies, groups of 
individuals, and institutions. The market-based model is associated with 
competition based on choosing superior business strategies, on rational 
allocation of resources, and on adherence to certain internationally accepted 
rules. Overall, based on this literature review, one would expect companies 
to show a movement from a relationship-based to a market-based model as 
emerging markets develop and adopt more liberal market economies.  
 
Based on this literature review, we expect that generational change is likely 
to be a factor influencing the change in strategic posture, as is internal 
growth and increased size and complexity of the firm. External factors are 
                                                 
137 Peng (2003). 
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also likely to make a difference, in particular the changing institutional 
context with elements such as economic growth, policy changes and regime 
changes. Internal and external factors co-evolve with strategy. 
 
It is likely that a relationship-based and market-based strategy does not 
appear in a pure form among Asian conglomerates because cultural values 
and networked strategies continue to be important in several ways. A 
company may maintain close business relations with clan-members while 
also having joint ventures with Western multinationals and a close 
connection with a politician.  These businesses may operate on different 
principles. In fact, depending on the situation and the strategic choices 
available, companies may oscillate between these models at an irregular 
rate, which at times is so fast as to create the impression of a simultaneous 
pursuit of both. We propose to view this oscillatory pattern as a mechanism 
for dealing with a strategic dilemma: the pull of seemingly incompatible 
relationship- and market-based models.  
 
Strategic dilemmas have been a staple of management literature, especially 
since the publication of March’s seminal paper on the dilemma that firms 
face in properly balancing the requirements for exploitation and 
exploration138. Some authors seek to dissolve the dilemma by suggesting 
alternative organisational forms that can simultaneously pursue two 
opposing strategies139, but most seek to establish, empirically or 
prescriptively, an “optimal balance” between the two140. 
 
A recent paper proposes a novel approach to strategic choices, in particular 
the exploitation-exploration dilemma141. Based on a ten year case study of an 
international cosmetic company they detect irregular oscillatory dynamics, 
whereas the firm continually shifts over the spectrum delimited by the two 
opposing poles, depending on objective factors influencing the business 
environment but also personality of top managers. The concept of oscillatory 
dynamics is imported by the authors from anthropological studies of 
traditional Hindu societies142. These findings are in line with other 
theoretical work within the field of management on vacillation patterns in 
organisations143. Oscillations happen at different time intervals because 
external factors and internal adjustments give irregularly timed stimuli.  
 
                                                 
138 See March (1991). 
139 For example Miles et al. (1999). 
140 For example Bradach (1997); Brown and Eisenhardt (1997); March (1999), Tushman 
and O’Reilly (1996); Tushman and Smith (2002) and Warglien (2002). 
141 See Thomas, Kaminska-Labbé and McKelvey (2005). 
142 See Dumont (1966). 
143 See Nickerson and Zenger (2002). 
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In this study we explore whether the notion of oscillatory dynamics can be 
applied to describe the dialectic between the relationship-based and the 
market-based drivers of Salim Group strategy. Based on the theory review, it 
is expected that evolution from a networked model to a modern market-
based strategy is not linear, and that oscillatory patterns are likely. 
 
Summarizing, this literature review suggests that the strategy of a company 
like the Salim Group may change over time as a result of internal and 
external factors, which are interdependent and irregular. These factors can 
be understood and clarified with the use of an umbrella concept such as 
coevolution. Based on the literature, key elements of the strategic model are 
argued to become more or less important over time.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Although various studies have addressed ethnic Chinese business groups in 
a comparative manner using quantitative analysis of publicly available 
financial data144 there are few in-depth longitudinal studies of specific ethnic 
Chinese business groups. As a result, we have almost no detailed 
information on how strategy in an ethnic Chinese business groups evolves 
over time, what influences it and what patterns arise. This single case study 
research fills a part of that gap.  
 
Case research as a method is common throughout the social sciences and a 
variety of research approaches and practices have been developed over the 
last decades. The following section of this chapter describes what type of 
case methodology is used and which research strategies have been chosen. 
The third section combines these with the extra requirements for case 
studies using the coevolution approach. The fourth section then combines 
these and spells out the case study design and approach chosen for the Salim 
Group case. In the fifth section a detailed description of the different sources 
used is given. The sixth section deals with the first stage of the case analysis: 
emerging themes. In this section three themes that emerged from the data 
after a first analysis are presented. The seventh section then addresses 
analytical methods to further dissect the themes by doing different types of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. In the eighth section we focus in detail 
on two research strategies to address the themes in this study: data coding 
using a quantitative time-series approach and a qualitative time-series 
approach. These two approaches are described in detail. The last section of 
this chapter deals with how the results of applying these methodologies will 
be presented in the chapters that follow.  
 
 
3.2 Case Research: Varieties and Choices 
 
A general definition of a case study is given by Yin in his seminal work on 
case research methodology:  
 
‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
                                                 
144 For example Claessens et al. (1999). 
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when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident’145.  
 
This section outlines the case selection process and the type of case 
methodology chosen. Four case study dimensions are discussed: single 
versus multiple case studies; statistical versus theoretical sampling; 
positivist versus classical cases; and qualitative versus quantitative research. 
 
Multiple cases allow comparison across different companies, and may lead 
to identification of patterns that apply beyond a single occurrence. Single 
case studies can never be representative for a larger population, but they can 
unearth patterns and phenomena that are not unique to the case and can be 
validated or applied elsewhere. Given a similar time frame multiple studies 
can be characterised as giving a broader picture of a phenomenon, while 
single cases can illustrate the research topic in an in-depth manner. This 
research focuses on a single, albeit elaborate and complex case study. The 
reason for preferring a single case over multiple cases is the possibility to do 
an in-depth longitudinal study which also encompasses the context of a 
firm. 
 
How does one select the most suitable firm for a single case study? In 
multiple case studies one may use statistical sampling, which is trying to 
select those cases from a population which may be representative. Within 
single case research however theoretical sampling is used, which refers to 
the idea that one selects a case that can most appropriately and clearly show 
the phenomena of interest. As the primary interest was to study the strategy 
development of a large ethnic Chinese family business group over time, a 
list of the 23 largest ethnic Chinese conglomerates in Indonesia was used to 
make an initial selection146. The Salim Group was by far the largest group on 
that list. The Salim Group is not only the largest but also a unique case in the 
sense that it was the largest business group in Southeast Asia and that it was 
in a unique position of power in the Indonesian context. What makes this 
case particularly interesting is that, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
existing theories (on Chinese family business, diaspora business networks 
and on emerging market strategy) seem collectively insufficient to explain 
the development of the strategy of the Salim Group, especially when one 
takes a long-term perspective. A certain degree of openness to study and 
cooperation on the part of the company was another selection criterion. 
Getting access to the top management of an ethnic Chinese group is not 
                                                 
145 See Yin (2003, p. 13). 
146 These 23 firms are taken from the list of top-30 largest groups in Indonesia. Of the 30 
on the list 23 groups were owned by people or families of Chinese descent. The list was 
developed by Sato (2004). 
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easy, and the fact that interviews with the leaders of the Salim Group were 
possible was a lucky coincidence.  
 
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, the Salim Group, by virtue of 
its prominent role in the Indonesian economy and politics, can be seen as a 
polar or extreme case. It is not an average company but the most successful, 
most prominent and largest in the country with the most intimate 
connections to Suharto. None of the other groups has these “extreme” 
features. The Salim Group is, in the eyes of many Indonesians, the 
embodiment of everything that is positive and negative about an ethnic 
Chinese business. The advantage of such extreme or polar cases is not that 
they are representative for a larger group, but that they may, due to their 
unique characteristics, lead to the development of new or different 
theories147. 
 
There are different varieties of case studies. One way of looking at case 
studies is to distinguish between positivist and classical case studies. An 
interesting discussion emerged within the field of management about the 
pros and cons of case studies as a research method. Eisenhardt wrote a 
seminal article on the importance of case study research in the field of 
management and the merits of this method in order to develop new 
theories148.  It contained a roadmap of how to build theory from case 
research. Opponents claimed that it was not essential to focus on developing 
new concepts, but the merits of a case study were in doing in-depth 
research, grasping the phenomenon in its specific context, and telling a good 
story149. The first position was later referred to as the “positivist” approach 
to case studies, whereas the latter was addressed as the “classical” approach 
to case research.  The “classical” authors admitted that telling stories in 
journal articles was almost impossible due to space restrictions and they 
argued that books are more suitable for narrating the results of classical case 
research. This study does not have the kind of space restrictions journals 
pose, and it can therefore do both. It tells an elaborate story about the 
strategy development of a company and analyses it, but it also applies 
qualitative and quantitative techniques to develop novel theoretical concepts 
that emerge from the case narrative.   
 
Another distinction within case studies is often made between qualitative 
and quantitative studies. For many academics case study research is almost 
synonymous with qualitative information, but this is not necessarily so150. 
An a priori choice has not been made in this study. The principle used here 
                                                 
147 See for example Eisenhardt (1989). 
148 See Eisenhardt (1989). 
149 See Dyer and Wilkins (1991) 
150 See for example Yin (2003). 
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is to rely on relevant evidence to understand corporate strategy, some of 
which may be quantitative while other evidence may be of a qualitative 
nature. The case analysis similarly relies on qualitative and statistical 
techniques, where appropriate and possible, to demonstrate the coevolution 
of strategy with its environment.    
 
 
3.3 Framework for Coevolution Studies 
 
Many coevolution studies are case studies, as this offers a good research 
strategy for evaluating complex, longitudinal strategic change processes in 
its specific context. Coevolution cases have to comply with extra 
requirements in order for the results to reveal coevolutionary dynamics. 
Two authors have described a framework for research on coevolution, 
outlining minimum requirements for studies taking the coevolutionary 
perspective151. Below is a list of characteristics for studies on organisational 
adaptations according to this framework. These are subsequently explained 
in the following paragraphs:  
• Be longitudinal;  
• In a historical context;  
• Involve multidirectional causalities;  
• Incorporate mutual, simultaneous, lagged and nested effects;  
• Consider path dependence;  
• Incorporate changes occurring at the level of different institutional 
systems; 
• Accommodate economic, social and political macro-variables.  
 
Most research on the evolution of corporate strategy involves short term 
adaptation or selection studies152 but in order to show corporate evolution in 
tandem with its context a long term perspective is necessary. Studying the 
complex evolution of strategy in a longitudinal manner requires an in-depth 
study. Lewin and Volberda recommend using a time series approach where 
changes can be observed or measured by monitoring certain variables over a 
longer period. The analysis also needs to incorporate contextual factors, 
including history, but also other contextual factors such as political, social or 
economic factors. Adaptation of a firm to its environment is enabled and 
simultaneously restricted by the firms’ history - often referred to as path 
dependence. As an organisation develops it acquires resources and creates 
routines, which together make subsequent changes more difficult. A 
company’s degree of freedom to choose its strategy is therefore limited by its 
historical development. When studying how corporate strategy evolves over 
                                                 
151 See Lewin and Volberda (1999, p. 527-528). 
152 See Lewin and Volberda (1999). 
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time in conjunction with the environment the restrictions to adaptation and 
change have to be taken into account as well as the factors encouraging it.  
 
Changes within a firm and outside a firm, and perhaps in a regional or 
global context are interrelated, and therefore coevolution studies investigate 
changes on different levels. McKelvey argues that one should carry out 
coevolution studies at various levels, namely the micro-, meso- and macro-
level153. In the case of the Salim Group, the businesses are in so many 
industries that meso level changes cannot be incorporated in detail, but the 
group is large enough to show interactions directly between macro 
(institutions) and micro (corporate strategy).  
 
In order to show how a company evolved over time and in turn influenced 
its environment the research design needs to be such that mutual responses 
(or causality) can be demonstrated. These causalities can involve the 
company adapting to a new environment, but it can also involve the reverse 
direction. The evolution of corporate strategy is per definition irregular if 
one understands it as responding to and influencing the internal corporate 
and external institutional environment. Changes in company and 
environment are therefore often irregular and of a complex nature. Some 
factors causing changes are simultaneous or they act together (mutual); the 
effects may occur later (lagged); or the effect of an event is hidden in or 
mixed with another effect (nested effects). Single case studies taking a 
coevolution approach investigate multi-level corporate change processes 
within their context, over a longer period with a specific focus on complex 
mutual causalities.  
 
Irrespective of the type of case study, all case research strategies ideally 
follow logic of design, data collection and analysis. For case study design, 
data gathering and analysis clear procedures and best practices have been 
established over the years and throughout the social sciences154. The Salim 
Group research project has been designed with this coevolution framework 
and the prevailing best practices for case research in mind. 
 
 
3.4 Case Study Approach & Design 
 
After making basic choices on the type of case study that is preferred, a more 
detailed case approach was designed. This research was carried out in 
several intertwined phases:  
 
                                                 
153 See McKelvey (1997). 
154 E.g. Boyatzis (1998); Eisenhardt (1989); Glaser and Strauss (1967); Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) and Yin (2003). 
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1. Review of relevant literature and background information; 
2. Case study design and preparation; 
3. Data-gathering, mostly conducted in Indonesia;  
4. Analysis; 
5. Writing up results.  
 
At the first stage, the existing literature was summarised and a list of 
characteristics of ethnic Chinese family business strategy was developed. 
This list was the basis for the preparation for interviews and it served as a 
general guideline in the data-collection phase. Also, a broad study of the 
political and economic development of Indonesia was conducted. Because of 
developing research propositions over time emerging from the literature155, 
a clear idea of what information should be gathered in interviews, what type 
of documents would be necessary and what additional information was 
needed from other expert sources. The research focus on strategy evolution 
guided the choice of data and limited the data collection to those sources 
that would be relevant to corporate strategy within the specific context. 
 
Because four trips to Indonesia were made in the period 2003-2005, it was 
possible to develop and test emerging themes gradually, going back and 
forth from data to theory. Case studies typically have some overlap between 
the analysis and the data-gathering, some authors even consider this highly 
desirable156. Going back and forth also enabled me to see which sources 
were missing or how certain emerging themes could be strengthened. In the 
words of Eisenhardt:  
 
‘Overlapping data analysis with data collection not only gives the 
researcher a head start in analysis but, more importantly, allows 
researchers to take advantage of flexible data collection. Indeed, a 
key feature of theory building case research is the freedom to make 
adjustments during the data collection process’157. 
 
One of the reasons that relatively few in-depth case studies of ethnic Chinese 
business groups exist is connected to the difficulties associated with such a 
study. Many business groups shy publicity and are not open for study. 
Those that are relatively open, such as the Salim Group, are still not known 
for their transparency. In a corrupt country like Indonesia, an opaque 
strategy, practiced by many conglomerates, may be more sensible than being 
transparent. A large amount of information however is public, and thus 
accessible for research, but not all this information is compatible, useful, or 
even reliable. In order to overcome the limitations of each type of data, a 
                                                 
155 A recommended research strategy according to Yin (2003). 
156 Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
157 See Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539). 
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variety of data have been used in this study in order to obtain more 
confidence through triangulation.  
 
‘The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as 
another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis’158.  
 
The starting point was to investigate the corporate strategy of the Salim 
Group over time by compiling evidence from various sources, namely 
interviews, corporate documents, news analysis and other secondary 
material such as books. The various short trips to Indonesia (usually 2-3 
weeks) with at least 6 months in between allowed for reflection and 
preparation of each trip. In the Indonesian context interview appointments 
are generally made on very short notice, and I usually spent my first day in 
Jakarta on the phone, the following days going around for meetings. When I 
had no meetings I visited libraries, the Jakarta Stock Exchange or the state 
printer in order to obtain relevant documents. Not all interviews took place 
in Indonesia, some took place in Singapore, The Netherlands; one in 
Belgium, one was carried out by phone with a European respondent.  
 
Prior to finishing this study, various academic papers have explored aspects 
of the Salim Group strategy development, some of which have been 
accepted for publication in academic journals159 or have been presented at 
academic conferences. Insights from reviewers, editors and audience have 
fine-tuned the ideas presented in this study. 
 
 
3.5 Data Gathering & Sources 
 
Case research usually is grounded in multiple sources. Within Indonesia 
reliable written sources are scarce, so interviews were deemed important. 
Although companies like the Salim Group are reluctant to make corporate 
information public, there are laws requiring the disclosure of information on 
public and – to a lesser extent – privately held companies. These corporate 
sources were also used. To complement this, specialised and general media 
were also used as information sources on the Salim Group strategy and the 
Indonesian business environment. Lastly, a broad survey of political and 
economic development of Indonesia was carried out mainly using academic 
books and articles. Thus, the data gathered for this thesis can be grouped in 
                                                 
158 See Yin (2003, p. 131). 
159 For example Dieleman (2006) and Dieleman and Sachs (2006). 
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three types of sources, namely corporate documents (Annex 1); media 
sources (Annex 2) and interviews (Annex 3). In addition to the three 
empirical sources secondary data (books, academic articles) have also been 
used. Each of the data sources will be briefly described and limitations will 
be discussed (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1 Main Sources Used in this Research 
Category of 
Sources 
Specific Sources Used Number 
Interviews Salim Group managers 
Academic Experts 
IBRA executives 
Former Ministers 
Financial Analysts 
Journalists 
Managers of other Conglomerates 
Foreign Partners   
Others 
16 
7 
9 
4 
2 
4 
5 
3 
6 
Corporate 
Information 
Annual reports 
Articles of Association 
Corporate Information (DNB database) 
69 
14 
122 
Media Sources News Articles (Lexis Nexis database) 
Background articles 
6349 
(See references) 
Secondary 
Sources 
Books 
Reports 
Academic Articles 
(See references) 
 
Interviews can take different forms ranging from structured to unstructured. 
Structured interviews define questions in advance whereas unstructured 
interviews allow for a conversation-type information exchange. The 
interviews for this thesis were undertaken in a semi-structured, open-ended 
manner. Yin writes: 
 
‘Most commonly, case study interviews are of an open-ended nature, 
in which you can ask key respondents about the facts of a matter as 
well as their opinions about events’160.  
 
The interview topics were prepared in advance and covered the strategy, 
structure, ownership and leadership of the Salim Group and its specific 
context. On the other hand, there was freedom for interviewer and 
respondent to pick up related topics and develop new insights outside the 
prepared questions. Once the first interview with Salim Group leader 
Anthony Salim had taken place, other managers were also open to 
interviews. Thus, several board members of key Salim Group companies 
                                                 
160 See Yin (2003, p. 90, original emphasis). 
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were approached and interviewed (e.g. Indomobil, Indofood, and UIC). 
Apart from Salim managers, it was possible to interview a wide range of 
experts in Indonesia, varying from ministers, consultants, journalists, 
economists, competitors, partners, bankers and stock-market analysts. These 
experts were also interviewed using a semi-structured interview method, 
but the interviews usually focused on the topic of expertise of the person 
interviewed. Several people were interviewed more than once, in order to 
develop a relationship or discuss topics in more depth. Interview reports 
were written for every interview conducted, usually on the day of the 
interview so that the information was not overly distorted by human 
memory processes. Interviews with CEO Anthony Salim and Deputy Benny 
Santoso were considered very important and these have been recorded and 
transcribed. An overview of interviews, by categories of respondents, is 
available in Annex 3.  
 
A first limitation of the interview results was connected to ethical issues. 
Since the Salim Group was a sensitive topic, most of these sources preferred 
“speaking off the record” and did not want the interview results to appear in 
print with their name linked to it. As a result of this, ethical issues around 
protecting the identity of respondents became important. In an access 
database all interview information (respondent, date of interview, location, 
time of interview) was stored, and an arbitrary code was assigned to all 
respondents. The information from these expert interviews will not be 
linked to any specific person (except the interview with Anthony Salim, 
whose identity has not been concealed as he is the key person in the Salim 
Group161). All interviews have been summarised, and the anonymity 
principle required leaving out certain information that could reveal the 
identity of the respondent. As a second step, a number of interviews that the 
author judged sensitive were sent to a respondent and an academic, both 
familiar with the Indonesian situation and sensitivities, in order to double-
check whether they could not guess the identity of the respondents. In 
addition, one of the respondents from the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency, who expressed concern about revealing his identity, has also been 
sent his summary as well as summaries of a number of similar respondents. 
None of them was able to relate stories to people, although the respondents 
recognised their own stories. The interviews are partly available in this 
study in the form of numerous quotes. 
 
Another limitation of interview data was the possible bias of the person 
interviewed. This problem was aggravated by the political sensitivities 
around the Salim Group. People generally had very strong opinions on the 
Salim Group. Theoretical sampling of respondents across a range of 
                                                 
161 A section of the interview with Anthony Salim was qualified by him as off the record, 
and this has been omitted from the transcription. 
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categories (from Salim managers to politicians to foreign partners) was one 
of the ways to address to possible interview bias. A related limitation could 
be the way in which respondents were selected, namely through a chain of 
connections. In Indonesian culture it is almost impossible to knock on the 
door of a secretary and get an appointment with someone at a relatively 
high level in society or business. Connections are important to open doors. 
Once you have interviewed someone, you usually receive advice as to 
whom to interview next, and usually the person is willing to provide an 
introduction. This strategy has the implicit danger of ending up with a 
number of likely-minded respondents. This problem potentially exists, but it 
should be noted that the respondents do not form one single chain of 
contacts. Starting points were made through various connections, ranging 
from people in academia to people in business. For example: one of my 
academic contacts knew a well-known economist in Indonesia, who had a 
cousin in business, who had another cousin in business who was very senior 
and knew the Salim Group well, which was how I arrived in Anthony 
Salim’s office. One of my former MBA classmates happened to work at the 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, which greatly facilitated contacts 
there, and one of my friends, a London-based hedge fund manager, 
introduced me to an analyst in Jakarta, who connected me to another Salim 
Group company, etc. 
 
The second data source is corporate documents. The Salim Group has a very 
clear PR policy, which is to stay away from media as much as possible. As a 
result of this policy limited written corporate sources are available on the 
group as a whole. The last group brochure, for example, dates from 1996.  
Because of limited legal obligations to provide information on private 
companies, I was not able to get a good insight into privately held 
companies belonging to the Salim Group, and relied on such limited sources 
as articles of association, a Dun & Bradstreet company database and media 
sources. Companies listed on the stock-exchange however, are obliged to 
publish annual reports, and I have studied eight listed Salim companies over 
a longer period (1994-2003, if available). An overview of the annual reports 
used in this study is available in Annex 1. In addition to annual reports and 
a brochure, rather elaborate information on some Salim Group companies 
has been published by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). 
During the Asian Crisis the Indonesian Banking system rapidly 
disintegrated and failed, and the government set up IBRA to deal with ailing 
banks. Many banks, including the Salim Group bank BCA, collapsed and the 
government decided to recapitalize the best banks. As a compensation for 
the capital injection with public funds, the government demanded 
repayment from the owners either in cash or by transferring companies. The 
Salim Group transferred 107 companies to IBRA which subsequently sold 
them to interested buyers. As part of that sales process IBRA published 
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elaborate information bulletins on the former Salim companies. These IBRA 
documents have also been used as a source of information162.  
 
A possible limitation of sources such as annual reports is that the 
information in it is drafted according to prevailing regulations, and thus 
only gives a partial picture of some of the companies belonging to the Salim 
Group. If the public company has businesses in a variety of sectors it can 
sometimes be difficult to interpret the aggregate financial information and 
distil from it information about corporate strategy. The annual report of a 
company such as Indofood will be a rich source of information, but as such 
reveals little about the overall Salim Group strategy. Only when annual 
reports are compared over a longer period and across companies will 
evolutionary patterns within the Salim group become apparent.    
 
The third source of information was reports in the media on the Salim 
Group or on Salim Group companies. A structured review of major 
newspapers and magazines – both local and international - has been carried 
out through archives and electronic databases, in particular the lexis nexis 
international news database. The news analysis covers reports from all over 
the world in general or specialised media. This included generalist news 
media such as the Economist, the Financial Times and Business Week, but also 
local papers such as the Jakarta Post and specialised media sources such as 
Chemical Week. Structured searches were carried out with Liem Sioe Liong 
and/or Salim Group as keywords, and in addition specific database searches 
were done on separate companies such as Indocement or Indomobil as well 
as on a list of about 300 private Salim companies. In total 6349 articles were 
selected, which covered thousands of pages. The procedure followed is 
described in Annex 2. 
 
There are serious limitations to studying media sources. The first possible 
distortion is the policy towards media in Indonesia. During the Suharto 
period a number of topics were taboo and dangerous for the media to report 
on. These included controversial issues such as Indonesia’s military strategy 
for East Timor, but also the Suharto family and crony businesses, which 
included the Salim Group. This provides a serious limitation, and prior to 
1998 most information on the Salim Group is found in Australian, Japanese 
or international news media. An international news review, rather than a 
narrow focus on Indonesia, therefore partially mitigates this shortcoming. 
After the Asian Crisis, the media policy changed, and newspapers and 
magazines freely wrote about the Salim Group.   
 
                                                 
162 These included 45 monthly newsletters, a strategic plan for IBRA, two IBRA annual 
reports and two Holdiko Memorandums. These sources are listed under the reference 
section at the end of this study.  
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The second limitation is that news reports appear in “waves”. A topic such 
as “ethnic Chinese dominance in Asian business” appears every now and 
then, and if it appears, many newspapers start to cover it, even though the 
actual news value of such reporting may be limited. The internationally 
operating topical waves in media should be considered when interpreting 
such material.  
 
A third caution is that newspapers do not reveal sources. The Economist, for 
example, has repeatedly reported that the Salim Group has smuggled arms 
between Singapore and Indonesia in its early days. It is not clear from these 
reports however what the source of this information is. Checking media 
sources against other sources is an important way to minimize some of the 
limitations of media analysis. 
 
The secondary materials used in this study included books, reports or 
articles on the Salim Group or related topics, which are listed in the 
references. Using secondary data has the limitation that it contains the 
interpretations or biases of the author or researcher who reported on the 
Salim Group.  Yet, for the period prior to 1994, secondary materials have 
been used to analyze early Salim Group history. 
 
For a Dutch person, doing any academic research in Indonesia is a challenge, 
and doing research on the Salim Group, widely known to be very closed, is a 
rather big challenge. Not surprisingly, the researcher was confronted with 
several of the limitations described above. The limitations came down to a 
general shortage of relevant written sources and the ample availability of 
oral, often biased, sources. On the other hand, the researcher was also lucky 
enough to find several people in Indonesia who provided me with excellent 
introductions and who were willing to support me. They opened up new 
data and resources for me.  Since academic studies are rarely based on the 
Jakarta-grapevine - where interesting information circulates - it was 
necessary to cross-check my information and use multiple sources. The 
limitations associated with each type of data used in this study are partially 
mitigated by the fact that a combination of data is used (triangulation 
principle). The triangulation principle implies that sources need to converge 
before one can interpret a trend in the data. In this light, when coming to a 
line of argumentation later in this book, a variety or combination of sources 
is used to support the conclusions. An example of applying the triangulation 
is the coding methodology, which will be explained later in this chapter. But 
in general, throughout this book, one will find arguments supported by 
multiple sources. 
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3.6 Thematic Analysis 
 
The data gathering phase resulted in an enormous amount of data, usually 
fragmented pieces of information. The first step in the analysis was to 
internalize the material and pinpoint emerging themes. Thematic analysis 
focuses on emerging patterns in the data, and on procedures for addressing 
these. Thematic analysis can either be based on prior theory or research or 
can emerge from the data itself or a combination of those163. After carefully 
studying all the material gathered, three themes were formed over time 
while reflecting on theories and data.   
 
The first theme identified was business networks. It was clear from the 
beginning that the Salim Group worked with a large number of partners. 
From the outset this made the concept “Salim Group” problematic. How can 
one define the borders of a conglomerate? What was in and what out? 
Theory also placed emphasis on networks, but was not clear regarding 
whether ethnic, professional or crony networks may have been the basis for 
the success of the Salim Group. From the material gathered it was evident 
that the Salim Group engaged in various partnerships of many kinds, but it 
was not immediately clear what types, how important which partners were, 
and how the network changed over time.  Thus, it was decided that the 
networks of the Salim Group needed to be researched in detail in order to 
understand how they evolved.  
 
The second theme was an apparent discrepancy between this “networked” 
model and a more independent professional business model. During the 
study it became evident that there was a strong dichotomy in views on the 
Salim Group. On the one hand there was the view that the Salim Group was 
an unethical, corrupt and opaque conglomerate known for its unhealthy 
crony relationships with former president Suharto, which forms the basis of 
their success. On the other hand there is a more positive appreciation of the 
professional competencies of the Salim Group and the view that the Salim 
Group is the best corporate group within Indonesia, employing the best 
corporate practices and capable of operating in different environments164. 
The dichotomy was initially puzzling because the two pictures did not seem 
to match. Because it was such an evident aspect of the initial data review, it 
was clear that this diversity showed different “voices” that needed to be 
preserved in the analysis. The dichotomy supported one aspect of the 
                                                 
163 See Boyatzis (1998). 
164 To appreciate the completely opposite extremes represented here I note that more than 
one respondent in favor of the “cronies” position insisted that my research was so 
dangerous that I should fear being murdered by the Salim Group; while at the other end 
of the spectrum a board member of a European multinational stated that the Salim Group 
was their best Asian partner, and its leadership personal friends.    
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literature, namely the idea of the existence of a dichotomy between 
relationship-based strategy (expressed in the first theme) and a market-
based strategy as articulated by scholars such as Peng165 and discussed in 
Chapter Two. Once the data was placed in this context, the dichotomy was 
visible clearly in my interviews, but also in newspaper articles and 
documents/studies on the Salim Group.  
 
In interviews Anthony Salim literally said that he wanted to move away 
from connections and become more market-based. This was very similar to 
the theoretical notion described in the previous chapter that the Salim Group 
strategy could be understood as moving from a relationship-based model to 
a market-based model166. To further analyse and understand this dichotomy 
however, a more careful analysis was necessary. 
 
The third theme was the flexibility and adaptability of the Salim Group. On 
the one hand interviews with the Salim Group indicated that the strategy 
was highly opportunistic, and it “grabbed” business opportunities as they 
came. This is consistent with the culturalist approach which states that one 
of the characteristics of Chinese family business is its flexibility. On the other 
hand, Anthony Salim claims that he steered and designed the Salim Group – 
his leadership mattered, and he implemented a market-based strategy. To 
what extent can the strategy of the Salim Group be explained as a reaction to 
the institutional environment? How much did the group adapt to 
circumstances, and how much “choice” did they have to influence their own 
strategy, and perhaps their environment?  
 
The three themes that emerged from the first analysis provided clear 
questions. The subsequent rigorous case analysis aimed at investigating the 
three themes further and possibly answering the questions through 
quantitative or qualitative methods which are the focus of the next two 
sections.  
 
 
3.7 Analytical Framework 
 
After addressing emerging themes, the next logical step was to reorganize 
the data in such a way that emerging themes could be analysed. Three 
phases can be identified in the analysis of case data: data reduction 
(selection, simplification, abstraction of case data); display (charts, tables, 
etc); and drawing conclusions by building a chain of evidence167. The 
                                                 
165 See Peng (2003). 
166 For example Peng (2003) and Peng and Zhou (2005). 
167 See Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 21-23). 
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methods employed to reorganize, simplify, display and interpret the case 
results are described in this section.  
  
In the first stage of the analysis process several sources were reorganised 
and combined: 
• Based on the annual reports, a database with all board positions of listed 
Salim Group companies was made, which gave an indication of who 
could be considered the leadership of the group, how this differed over 
time, how control was divided among family members and what was 
the role of professional management versus family management over a 
period of 10 years.  
• Also based on the annual reports, financial trends and analyses were 
made, which give an indication of the size, growth and composition of 
the Salim Group over time. For all listed Salim companies the strategy 
development and corporate structure was analyzed. 
• Based on World Bank reports, economic indicators by the Asian 
Development Bank, and updates in the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies168, a survey of the business context was conducted showing 
policy changes over a longer period and giving insight in the Indonesian 
economic context and institutions.  
 
How can one “map” the strategy of the Salim Group and subsequently 
investigate the influence of different factors or events on the strategic pattern 
over time? First, it is reasonable to assume that corporate strategy of the 
Salim Group is reflected by the combination of all its strategic decisions over 
time, and is composed of a set of separate individual business events169. Each 
of these business events can be studied separately and their characteristics 
can be assessed. Combining those characteristics over time would then 
reveal a development in corporate strategy.  
 
In order to be able to “see” strategy development chronologically, the raw 
data were completely reorganised into a list of new business events. A new 
business event is anything of importance outside continuing the existing 
businesses, and can include such things as starting a new venture, acquiring 
or disposing of a firm, starting a joint venture or expanding or reorganizing 
existing businesses. In line with the triangulation principle, all sources were 
                                                 
168 The Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies is an academic journal which publishes 
articles on the Indonesian economy, including quarterly updates on the status of the 
economy and economic policies implemented. 
169 In this definition I assume corporate strategy to mean the actual direction a 
corporation. Within strategy research a distinction is sometimes made between strategy 
formulation and strategy implementation; or between strategy process (how strategies 
come about); strategy content (the product of a strategy process) and strategy context (set 
of circumstances). In this research I address corporate strategy content within its context. 
For a discussion on different approaches to strategy I refer to Meyer and de Wit (2004).    
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reviewed and if possible combined to create a chronological list of 277 
important business events for the Salim Group. Each event was displayed on 
one page. Figure 3.1 gives one example of such a business event and a full 
list is available in Annex 6.  
 
Figure 3.1 Example of Business Event 
 
Sources: Lexis Nexis database 
 
 
3.8 Time Series & Coding Procedure 
 
The analysis of the business events followed the chronological time series 
methodology170. Times series analysis is used to investigate whether there is 
a match between the data points and a theory or proposition. In this case I 
am interested in whether the corporate strategy of the Salim Group follows a 
specific trend. In Chapter Two assumptions on the interplay among three 
separate phenomena over time were developed: the institutional context; 
internal dynamics within the Salim Group and the Salim Group strategy, 
                                                 
170 See Yin (2003). 
Business Event: Liem Sioe Liong and Robert Kuok form sugar empire  
Date: April 13, 1994 
Short Description: Liem Sioe Liong and Robert Kuok merge sugar interests in 
Indonesia 
Context: Robert Kuok is an ethnic Chinese from Malaysia 
 
Source 1: South China Morning Post, April 13, 1994 
Indonesia’s Liem Sioe Liong and Malaysia's Robert Kuok plan to create one of 
the largest sugar empires in the world by merging their sugar interests in 
Indonesia. According to a Business Times Singapore report, the two tycoons plan 
to set up a new holding company and invest more than US$ 1 billion on seven 
projects in south Sumatra. Each of the projects, costing about $ 130 million, will 
cover some 25,000 hectares and will have a factory capable of crushing 10,000 
tonnes of cane a day to produce about 120,000 tonnes of sugar a year. 
 
Source 2: The Financial Times, April 20, 1994 
Two of south-east Asia's wealthiest businessmen, Mr Robert Kuok and Mr Liem 
Sioe Liong, are teaming up to develop a series of sugar plantations and refining 
operations in the south of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Mr Kuok, a 
Malaysian Chinese, controls a global business empire with interests ranging from 
housing schemes and beach resorts to ownership of a controlling interest in Hong 
Kong's South China Morning Post newspaper group. Mr Liem, an Indonesian 
Chinese, is generally regarded as Indonesia's richest businessman with interests 
ranging from cement manufacturing to noodle making. The Salim group, Mr 
Liem's main company, had turnover of more than Dollars 9bn last year. The 
fortunes of both Mr Kuok and Mr Liem were founded on the commodities 
business. 
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where it is expected that strategy moves irregularly, but overall from a 
relationship-based model to a market-based model171.  
 
In order to do this the concepts relationship-based and market-based 
strategies should first be operationalised. Making the concepts “market-
based” and “relationship-based” strategies measurable is difficult in view of 
the need for an elaborate, consistent, set of data. As there is no commonly 
accepted indicator for a relationship or market model, I propose to base 
these concepts on several variables.  
 
In order to measure relationship-based and market-based strategies over 
time I developed four indicators and a coding strategy that allowed 
measuring the movement between a relationship- and market-based strategy 
over time. Two indicators were related to a relationship-based strategy and 
two to a market-based strategy. These indicators emerged from the theories 
in the previous chapter and are displayed in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Strategic Themes 
T Indicators Source 
T1 Ethnic Chinese Relations  Theories on the CFB and diaspora approaches 
T2 Political Connections  Theories on Crony Capitalism 
T3 Foreign Partners Institutional Approaches to Strategy in 
Emerging Markets 
T4 Market-Based 
Environment 
Institutional Approaches to Strategy in 
Emerging Markets 
 
Relationship-Based. According to one set of theories, ethnic Chinese 
businessmen prefer to do business with other ethnic Chinese rather than 
with foreigners. A first characteristic of a relationship-based strategy is 
therefore that Chinese form ethnically Chinese business networks. We 
would expect the percentage of new or continued business partnerships 
with other Chinese to diminish as the Salim Group evolves. Secondly, 
another set of theories suggests that ethnic Chinese family firms are 
characterised by crony relationships with powerful officials. We would 
therefore expect that the number of business deals where crony connections 
are clear or rumoured, decline as the group evolves. Together these network 
strategies represent the relationship-based strategy. 
 
Market-Based. Measuring market-based strategic models is not easy exercise 
as the literature gives little clues of what proxies we could use. Much of the 
literature on strategy in emerging economies focuses on conglomeration and 
diversification. The existence of weak institutions would encourage 
conglomeration whereas this strategy has become rare in Western 
                                                 
171 Following Peng (2003). 
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economies. Less diversification could therefore be an indicator of a more 
market-based strategy, and initially I tried to create a measurable variable by 
looking at the fit with the existing portfolio of each strategic business 
decision. The expected trend is that unrelated diversification will decrease 
over time. However, this variable, which should indicate the fit with the 
existing portfolio, was problematic. First, it is hard to assess, when one 
studies a large and elaborate conglomerate, whether a new business fits the 
portfolio. While it was clear for some events, other events led to confusion. 
Also, when a conglomerate is already large, almost every new activity 
represents a fit with the current portfolio, so this type of measurement was 
not considered useful. Secondly, the literature also suggests that ethnic 
Chinese family firms modernize and become more market-based once they 
are subject to globalisation trends. The degree of embeddedness in a global 
business context outside its own domestic and ethnic partners may therefore 
indicate that a company is moving towards a market model. This can be 
seen in the number and importance of foreign partners (non-Indonesian and 
non-Chinese), which is expected to increase over time. If a company 
extensively does business in market-based environments, such as in the 
United States, one can assume that this company avails of capabilities to 
operate in a market-based manner. Therefore, the number of new business 
deals in countries with “modern” or market-based institutions is another 
indicator. Following the literature on globalisation of ethnic Chinese firms, 
the expected pattern is that the percentage of new business deals that are in 
these contexts will increase. Together, these two proxies represent the 
market-based model. 
 
The four indicators were tested on a sample of the data by a second and a 
third researcher, both unfamiliar with the case material. The two 
independent coders were given eight business events and were asked to 
indicate the presence of four themes. The purpose of this test-phase was to 
see if the concepts were clear to an outsider and whether they could 
pinpoint the presence of those indicators in the data.  On the basis of this test 
it was decided not to work with an indicator for diversification because the 
test-coders found it confusing. Instead, a more straightforward indicator was 
chosen for the market-based model, as has been explained in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
After developing the indicators addressing the first two emerging themes, 
the business events were analyzed using a coding procedure. Coding is an 
analytical strategy that allows quantitative analysis of qualitative data. This 
requires a unit of coding, defined as: ‘the most basic segment, or element, of 
the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way 
regarding the phenomenon’172. The unit of coding taken in this study was a 
                                                 
172 See Boyatzis (1998, p. 63). 
 74 
new business event. A total of 277 events are in the database of which 266 
have been coded. The remaining 11 events happened prior to 1984. For the 
years prior to 1984 there was often only one event in the database, which 
was considered too little for a meaningful score. It was then decided to take 
the period 1984-2003 (20 years) as the period of analysis. 
 
The purpose of coding raw data is to allow different data to be compared 
and processed using quantitative techniques. In this research, the different 
themes together build a theoretical framework, in which case the process is 
called axial coding173. In theory, different quantification procedures can be 
applied, including a present/not present analysis; counting the number of 
occurrences of a theme; and measuring intensity (interval data) by assigning 
a score to an event. Although I am interested in this research in how 
corporate strategy moves on the relationship-based strategy to market-based 
strategy continuum over time (implying an intensity), I nevertheless opted 
for a very simple scale. Generally speaking the clearer the coding 
instructions are, the higher the reliability of the code, which is an important 
indicator for the quality of the research process. In order to maintain 
reliability of the data I opted for a simple scale in which events were coded 
on whether several characteristics (e.g. ethnic Chinese partners) were 
present or not. I used this presence-codification to plot business events on 
the relationship-market continuum over time. A coding technique has been 
applied to allow the different data to be compared where business events 
displaying characteristics of the relationship-strategy were given positive 
scores while the presence of market-based characteristics was rated using a 
negative score (Table 3.3).   
 
Table 3.3 Coding Strategy 
T Themes: Rating 
T1 Ethnic Chinese Relations  Present (1) / Not Present (0) 
T2 Political Connections  Present (1) / Not Present (0) 
T3 Foreign Partners Present (-1) / Not Present (0) 
T4 Market-Based Environment Present (-1) / Not Present (0) 
 
The different codes have been given a label; description; indicators; 
examples and exclusions or special conditions. These are available as a 
codebook in Annex 4174. A small sample of the results of this coding 
procedure is given in Table 3.4. In order to combine the codes into a single 
graph a scaling procedure was necessary. Scaling is combining scores into a 
single value. To enable a corporate strategy trend-line, the values of all 
scores were averaged per year and plotted on a chart.  
 
                                                 
173 Strauss and Corbin (1998). 
174 See Boyatzis (1998). 
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Table 3.4 Example of Coding Business Events 
Year Short title Et
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1993 
Jakarta Water Joint Venture with Suez Lyonnaise 
des Eaux  0 1 1 0 0 
1994 Salim Group invests in aerospace industry Batam 0 1 0 0 1 
1994 
Salim Group in pig farming with US agribusiness 
group Bunge 0 0 1 1 -2 
1994 
Salim Group in oil refining and polypropylene 
Philippines 0 0 1 0 -1 
1994 First Pacific sells company to Salim Group 0 0 0 1 -1 
1994 Salim Group sets up noodle company in Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 First Pacific sells interest in Internatio-Muller 0 0 0 1 -1 
1994 
Salim, Mazda, Tomen, local firm in automotive in 
Fuzhou 1 0 1 0 0 
 
The analysis of case data can suffer from biases of the researcher which 
unconsciously influence the actual coding. To control for this potential bias 
the reliability of the coding process is normally tested by using other 
people’s judgments and comparing these with the researcher’s judgments. 
This research worked with interrater reliability by measuring the percentage 
agreement on presence. The formula recommended for this type of 
presence/non presence scoring is175:  
 
2* (# times both coder A and coder B saw theme present)                                          
(# times coder A saw it present + # times coder B saw it present) 
 
With regard to the corporate strategy coding procedure, calculating 
reliability is normally done by means of double coding. An independent 
coder, unfamiliar to the research has coded all business events achieving 
interrater reliability of between 74% and 77% (scores over 70% are normally 
considered sufficient), displayed in Table 3.5.  
 
 
                                                 
175 According to Boyatzis (1998). 
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Table 3.5 Interrater Reliability 
T Indicators Reliability 
T1 Ethnic Chinese Relations  75% 
T2 Political Connections  77% 
T3 Foreign Partners 76% 
T4 Market-Based Environment 74% 
 
The relative importance of all the four indicators over time in itself will 
generate interesting information that can support the underlying theoretical 
notions (or reject them), and the results of this exercise will be interesting for 
each of the individual indicators. However my ambition is to combine the 
results into a new framework resulting in understanding the interplay of 
different factors influencing the Salim Group corporate strategy. Explaining 
the strategy of the Salim Group will also rely on interpretative methods, as 
not all factors can be captured with quantitative analysis. The third theme, 
which hints at the relative importance of passive, reactive and pro-active 
strategies for the Salim Group will rely mainly on interpretative methods. It 
is argued that the strategy of the Salim Group is influenced by internal as 
well as external factors, and it may therefore not necessarily follow a linear 
pattern. Strategy could also display an irregular oscillation. Using this 
coding strategy, one can visualise the data in a “map” which enables one to 
detect trends in corporate strategy development (Figure 3.2).  
 
Quantitative techniques, as described above are not enough. In addition to 
the statistical analysis the rich case data will also be summarised and 
analyzed using interpretative techniques. The interpretative analysis is used 
to build a chain of evidence showing why strategy changes occur, how 
strategy develops, and whether the development of the corporate strategy 
can be linked to internal or external factors. Interpretative analysis follows a 
similar pattern of data reduction, visualisation and building a chain of 
arguments, but in a qualitative manner. First, a chronological overview is 
made of the Salim Group strategy in different periods in time. After this, the 
strategy is interpreted in terms of “relationship-based” or “market-based” 
and expressed in a score on a scale from -5 (market-based) to +5 
(relationship-based). These scores are then plotted in a graph using time as 
the x-axis. In this way, the interpretative analysis will also lead to a 
visualisation as given in Figure 3.2. 
 
If 1.) the interpretative analysis and 2.) the results of the quantitative 
techniques both point in the same direction, the data offer clear patterns and 
one can draw conclusions that are supported using different analyses. If the 
results of the two different techniques are opposed, such strong conclusions 
are not possible given the mixed results.  
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Figure 3.2 Expected Corporate Strategy Pattern 
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3.9 Presentation of the Case Study Data and Conclusions 
 
The following chapters will first tell a rich and detailed story, full of 
interesting details, anecdotes and quotes. This story will then be analyzed 
and interpreted using the procedures described in this chapter. It will be 
broken down, reorganised, and interpreted in the light of different theories. 
Chapter Eight then brings the narrative and the different types of analysis 
together and evaluates the research results. Chapter Nine interprets the 
results, relates them to theories and formulates conclusions. 
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Chapter 4: The Birth of a Conglomerate 
 
 
 
‘Today, our companies are intimately involved  
in the day-to-day lives of millions of Indonesian families’  
Soedono Salim, Founder of the Salim Group,  
Source: Group brochure 1996 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Companies are started and built by people, and the company that is the 
focus of this study was founded by a Chinese immigrant in Indonesia. The 
first section of this chapter takes us back to southern China, just after the 
start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. From there we follow the young 
founder of the group – Liem Sioe Liong - to the Dutch East-Indies where he 
started his first small-scale trading activities.  
 
The struggle against colonialism and the establishment of the new nation 
state of Indonesia profoundly changed Liem’s chances. The young Liem 
took advantage of these developments, and engineered a spectacular growth 
of his Salim Group over more than half a century, while riding the waves of 
a favourable political and economic climate during the rule of President 
Suharto. We find that the history of the group was closely intertwined with 
the political and economic development of Indonesia.  
 
This chapter deals with the history of the group from its start until 1994 and 
serves as an introduction to the Salim Group. It also introduces some of the 
topics that will be elaborated upon in later chapters. Subsequent chapters 
will focus on the development of the Salim Group from 1994-July 1997; from 
July 1997-2000 and from 2001-2003.  
 
 
4.2 Liems on the Move 
 
The Salim Group was founded by a man named Liem Sioe Liong, who was 
born on July 16, 1916 in Fuqing, Fujian province in southeast China176. He 
was the second son of a rice-farmer and left China for the Dutch East Indies 
                                                 
176 See Sato (1993). Fuqing is sometimes spelled Futsing. 
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in 1938177. According to some sources, he had to leave local junior high 
school at the age of 15 due to poverty, which forced him to run a stall selling 
noodles178.  
 
The timing of his migration was intertwined with his family situation as well 
as the general the situation in Fujian at that time. His father apparently had 
died when Liem was young. His elder brother left to Java and Liem became 
head of the family at the age of 13. The Japanese occupying forces created 
anxiety among Chinese people. Within this context, Liem Sioe Liong left his 
native country, reportedly with little more than the clothes on his back. The 
family land, which he sold was reported to raise just enough momey for the 
trip. He arrived in Java and joined his brother and uncles in the small town 
of Kudus on Central Java (Figure 4.1)179.  
 
Liem’s migration was part of a long migrant tradition. Since the VOC, 
(Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or Dutch East Indies Company) set up its 
headquarters in Batavia on the island of Java in 1619, there has been a more 
substantial and organised Chinese community180.  
 
The Chinese migrant community was and still is divided into the peranakans 
(Chinese born locally) and the totoks (newly arrived Chinese)181. From 1740 
onward, the Dutch tended to separate ethnic groups, and the Chinese were 
assigned their own residential quarters in the cities182. Within the Chinese 
community, people were further divided into dialect groups (bangs) and 
subdivided in clans183. Dialect groups were historically specialised in certain 
professions184. To date associations based on dialect groups play an 
important role in ethnic Chinese business, especially among the totok 
Chinese.  
                                                 
177 Although some sources mention the year 1936 (e.g. Robison, 1986), two 
comprehensive studies of the Salim Group by Sato (1993) and Soetriyono (1989) 
both indicate that Liem left China in 1938. 
178 Suryadinata (1995, p. 139) reports that Liem ran a noodle shop. 
179 According to Soetriyono (1989). The Dutch colonial spelling is Koedoes. 
180 Although there has been Chinese migration since the third century B.C. (Wang, 
2000), it is generally believed that ‘the structure of the Chinese community in Indonesia 
today started to develop only after the advent of Dutch colonialism in the region’ 
(Onghokham, 1989, p.52).  
181 In fact the use of the words peranakan and totok is more complex. Sometimes totok is 
also used for people who were born in Indonesia but less assimilated and culturally 
closer to China. The word totok, which means newcomer, has also been used for Dutch 
newcomers to Indonesia, but in this thesis it refers to those Chinese migrants in 
Indonesia born in China. Another term used for new Chinese migrants is sinkeh. 
182 See Onghokham (1989). 
183 See Cheng (1986). 
184 This dialect group specialisation existed until around 1970 (Post, 1997)   
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Figure 4.1 Colonial Dutch Map of the Semarang-Kudus Area  
 
Source:  Library Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam 
 
Liem Sioe Liong, being from Fuqing, is a Chinese from the hokchia dialect 
group185. The hokchia were latecomers in migration, and were traditionally 
located in the rural areas, often active in money-lending. They were 
considered a relatively poor group among the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
before the war. The hokchia are known to be a close-knit group with a strong 
tendency for mutual assistance186.  
 
From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century the number 
of Chinese immigrants to Indonesia rose substantially187. Due to the wave of 
new immigrations, mainly between 1860 and 1930, the totok community 
expanded, both in size as well as in economic power in the period up to the 
Japanese occupation188.  
 
Throughout history, as a group, the Chinese have generally been better off 
than the Javanese peasants and masses, often acting as traders and 
                                                 
185 The hokchia dialect group is often analysed together with the xinghua group 
(sometimes spelled hengua), which comes from neighboring areas in Fujian Province in 
China.  
186 See for example Post (1997). 
187 See Coppel and Mackie (1976). 
188 As noted by Twang (1998). 
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middlemen. In 1930 according to one research, 58% of the Chinese in Java 
were engaged in trading activities189. The Dutch colonial rulers gave the 
Chinese the legal status of “foreign Orientals” which was economically higher 
than the indigenous population190. But they were also regarded with some 
suspicion by the Dutch rulers. This suspicion continued when Indonesia 
declared itself an independent nation state in 1945 and is present until this 
day191.  
 
When Liem Sioe Liong migrated to Central Java by the end of the 1930s, he 
certainly did not end up in a complete vacuum. As a newly arrived Chinese, 
a totok, he arrived in an existing and organised Chinese society, with family 
members that could accommodate him. His elder brother Liem Sioe Hie was 
already there for several years, as well as two uncles. They gave him the 
opportunity to join them in business (peanut oil trading) and gradually save 
money to start trading on his own account. Some sources indicate that he 
was a shop-assistant selling local produce before the Japanese occupation192. 
His younger brother Liem Sioe Kong followed him after several years and 
the three brothers jointly formed a small company trading food products193. 
Liem also offered credits to his customers, thus engaging not only in trading 
but also in money-lending. 
 
Since the three Liems ended up in Kudus, a place for the typical Indonesian 
kretek (clove cigarette) manufacturing, Liem Sioe Liong (hereafter: Liem) 
quickly became involved in clove trading as well194. Liem later changed his 
name to the Indonesian-sounding Soedono Salim, following the example of 
many Chinese Indonesians195. The Javanese meaning of this is the following: 
soe = good; dono = capital; sa = three (referring to three brothers) and lim 
refers to Liem196. Yet Liem is referred to by both his Chinese and Indonesian 
name to date, and the Indonesian media often call him Om (uncle) Liem. 
 
                                                 
189 See Coppel and Mackie (1976). 
190 See Lloyd (2001). 
191 The tensions arising from the fact that a small ethnic minority holds such an important 
economic position is often referred to as “the Chinese problem” or in bahasa Indonesia 
“masalah Cina”.   
192 See Twang (1998). 
193 According to Vlasblom (1993). Antons-Sutanto (2001) further notes that the totok 
family is more like a traditional Chinese family with a core of family members (usually 
father and sons) and a looser group of relatives around the core. The line between family 
and business is usually not clear among the totok. 
194 See Robison (1986). 
195 It is not completely clear when this name change happened, but my interview results 
show that this name change was probably in the 1960s. This is likely because in 1968 the 
Chinese were pressured to integrate into Indonesian society and adopt Indonesian names 
(Elson, 2001) 
196 According to Soetriyono (1989). 
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4.3 A Daring Danbangke 
 
In March 1942 the Japanese forces occupied the Netherlands-Indies, and 
trade became nationalised and strictly regulated. Shortages in textiles and 
food occurred as international trade was hampered during the war. The 
Japanese tried to promote self-sufficiency for Indonesia, albeit not very 
effectively. A result was that a black market thrived, which offered business 
opportunities in the field of trading.    
 
During the occupation the Japanese banned money-lending in rural areas, 
the traditional activity of the hokchia. An opportunity for overland trade 
(usually seen as smuggling) started to arise. The hokchia were among the 
most daring and risk-taking groups, and many of them started to be small 
traders or danbangke, personally transporting/smuggling goods with 
bicycles. Liem was one of those danbangke traders operating between Kudus 
and Semarang197. Liem later said that he was arrested by the Japanese, 
accused of illegal possession of arms and interrogated for a week198. 
 
Liem formed a family during the Japanese occupation and subsequently got 
several children of which two, Andree Halim and Anthony Salim were to 
play an important role in the family business later on. The literature is not 
very clear on what happened to Liem in the late 1940s, but Liem’s family 
business seems to have originated in this period. There are different 
accounts of how and when this happened. A Salim brochure from 1996 
claims that the group started in the late 1940s. Another source adds that 
Liem’s business suffered during the occupation and went bankrupt, forcing 
Liem to start all over again199. Liem himself said later: 
 
‘I had gunny bags filled with Japanese money, but the new 
government introduced new money, and the Japanese money 
became worthless. (..) You should not do business based on money, 
but based on goods’. (Liem Sioe Liong)200 
 
Yet another source indicates that Liem had a small local produce shop in 
Kudus with a clan member during the Japanese occupation. Later, when the 
partnership ended in the last month of the Japanese occupation, he 
established a partnership with his brother201. This happened in a context in 
                                                 
197 See Twang (1998). 
198 According to Soetriyono (1989). 
199 According to Vlasblom (1993). This not unlikely since the business environment for 
Chinese was difficult in those times. Mackie (1976) notes that sporadic attacks on 
Chinese happened during periods where the established authorities lost control, such as 
at the end of the Japanese occupation and from 1945-1949. 
200 Interviewed in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
201 See Twang (1998). 
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which the hokchia were gaining economic power, especially during and 
directly after the Japanese occupation. In certain areas including the Kudus-
Semerang area where Liem was located, the hokchia basically controlled the 
textile and kretek (clove cigarette) industry, the bicycle and spare parts trade, 
food distribution and started actively in manufacturing such as soap202.  
 
Although many peranakan Chinese left with the colonisers for the 
Netherlands, many totok stayed. So did Liem, who sided with the Indonesian 
nationalist movement. Some Chinese associations actively supported the 
soldiers of the Indonesian nationalists. At the time the Dutch army fought 
against the nationalists, and some of their leaders went into hiding. His 
biography describes that Liem was part of the organization Futsing Hwee, 
which was in turn part of the Chinese organization Siang Bu. Leaders of that 
organization chose Liem to house one of the fugitives of the uprising against 
the Dutch. Liem was chosen as he was known for his modesty, 
trustworthiness and quiet character. For a year Liem took care of his guest, 
reportedly without knowing who he was. This guest eventually turned out 
to be Hasan Din, leader of the organization named Muhammediyah, and 
also the father-in-law of Sukarno203.  
 
The Indonesian nationalists declared independence on August 17, 1945, 
although they were granted sovereignty only in 1949. Liem resumed his 
trading businesses, mainly in basic commodities like peanut oil, cloves and 
coffee. Through his connectioned with Hasan Din, he was introduced as a 
trustworthy supplier to the military. He supplied goods (medicine, food, 
and clothing) to the Diponegoro division of the Indonesian army during and 
after the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule204.  
 
Liem’s trade with the Diponegoro division continued to be facilitated by his 
excellent connections, including Hasan Din205. Hasan Din was later reported 
to be one of the co-founders of the Salim Group206 and he acted as director of 
several of Liem’s companies207. But Liem was reportedly also very apt in 
trading under difficult circumstances. At that time, Lt. Col. Suharto, who 
was also to become president and a key connection for Liem, played an 
important role in the Diponegoro division. Despite Liem’s role as a supplier 
                                                 
202 According to Post (1997, p. 148). 
203 See Soetriyono (1989). 
204 According to Robison (1986). Some sources (Bresnan, 1993) also speak of smuggling 
trade with Singapore, which was a widespread practice in those times. Robison notes that 
one source speaks of smuggling arms, but the author was unable to either track this 
source or confirm this. Soetriyono (1989) quotes Liem denying this. 
205 According to Elson (2001, p. 22). 
206 See CISI Rama Utama (1989). 
207 See Soetriyono (1989). 
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for the army division, it is not clear if they had already been introduced to 
each other at that time.  
 
 
4.4 All Businesses are Good 
 
After the struggle for independence Indonesia tried to build up its own 
economy, administration and private sector. Within this context, Sukarno 
emerged as the first strong national leader. From 1957 onward, President 
Sukarno implemented new policies that were radically different from those 
under Dutch colonial rule. The old colonial social and economic system was 
rejected by the new leadership. Foreign capital was now seen as a 
continuation of colonial oppression and most foreign businesses were 
nationalised208. Chinese capital came under scrutiny as well since some 
Chinese were seen as collaborators of the Dutch colonial regime209.  
 
After the initial period of independence, the government attempted to create 
an indigenous capitalist class as part of its nationalist policies. One of the 
measures taken to promote indigenous business was the so-called Benteng-
programme. This programme was initiated in 1950 and ended in 1957. 
Under Benteng (which means fortress), import licenses were awarded to 
indigenous businessmen (this excluded the Chinese, who were categorised 
as aliens at the time) under favourable conditions. This did not produce the 
desired economic power shift210. Instead ‘the economic vacuum created by 
the elimination of Dutch economic interests and the inefficiency of state 
enterprise was to a large extent filled by Chinese business’211. The Benteng 
programme - and other similar programmes that were implemented later - 
failed to diminish the economic dominance of the Chinese minority.   
 
Under Sukarno’s leadership Indonesia moved from a colonial capitalist 
system towards a policy of nationalism with a strong role for the state, 
which had detrimental effects on the economy. This period was called 
Guided Democracy. During this period, the business environment became 
                                                 
208 Dutch companies were nationalised in 1957/8 and later British, American and other 
foreign capital followed between 1963-1965. 
209 An example of the difficult business environment is the confiscation of the Indonesian 
assets of the largest Chinese-Indonesian conglomerate at the time, the Oei Tiong Ham 
concern, in 1961. 
210 Many of the importers received a license because of alliances with the political power, 
and many “importers” sold their license on to another person, often Chinese. Thus, ‘what 
was being consolidated was not an indigenous merchant bourgeoisie but a group of 
licence brokers and political fixers’ (Robison, 1986, p.45). An arrangement where an 
indigenous person (“ali”) acts as the frontman for a Chinese person (“baba”) to avoid or 
make use of certain regulations is often called the “ali-baba construction”.  
211 See Dick (2002, p. 185). 
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very difficult: private business was tolerated at best and the economic 
situation offered a problematic environment for doing business with high 
inflation, low growth and limited international trade.  
 
In the period following the independence of Indonesia, little is known about 
the founder of the group and his economic activities. Around 1956 Suharto 
was briefly posted at Semarang and Elson, author of a recent biography of 
Suharto, presumes that Suharto and Liem were probably introduced to each 
other around that year, but he found no evidence of a close relationship 
between the two men212. The Liem family moved to Jakarta in 1957 where 
the new government was beginning to gain influence. Jakarta also emerged 
as the new economic centre213. Liem seems to have mainly been active in 
textiles, trading activities and as supplier to the army, which gained in 
power during those times. It is important to place the economic alliance with 
army officers into the context of the position of the Indonesian army at the 
time. The army was building up its power in different areas of the society, 
including business (state enterprises as well as private business).  
 
’The Indonesian army had acquired a political orientation and 
political interests at the time of the revolution against the Dutch. 
Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army and 
other branches of the armed forces became deeply involved in 
politics, civil administration, and economic management with the 
result that the army became a key element in the government 
coalition under Guided Democracy’214. 
 
‘Indonesia has a history of links with power-holders and Chinese 
business, and Liem was one of the examples. All those division 
commanders like Suharto did the same. The Indonesian army was 
never self-sufficient in terms of budget. They got only 30% or so of 
their budget from the state, the rest of the funding they had to look 
for themselves. Even until now’. (Former Minister) 
 
The foundation of Liem’s business group most probably dates back to the 
late 1950s when Liem formed several business partnerships beyond his 
family circle. His long term partner is Djuhar Sutanto, a fellow hokchia from 
the same district in China with the same surname in Chinese. A study of the 
Liem Group in 1989 indicated that the business was a family-affair, 
complemented with a few other partners:   
                                                 
212 According to Elson (2001, p. 64). 
213 Until the Great Depression of the 1930s East and Central Java played a vital role in 
the colonial economy, but Dick (2002) argues that one impact of the depression was that 
Jakarta emerged as the economic center. 
214 Crouch, 1978, p. 22. 
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‘The group was established in the late 1950s by Mr Soedono Salim 
alias Liem Sioe Liong, his elder brother (the late) Mr. Liem Soehanda 
alias Liem Sioe Hie, Mr. Soedarmo Salim alias Liem Sioe Kong, Mr. 
Doni Pranoto alias Liem Sioe Djwan (both younger brothers of Mr. 
Soedono Salim), Mr Djuhar Sutanto alias Liem Oen Tjien and (the 
late) Mr. Hasan Din’215.  
 
According to Anthony Salim, son of Liem Sioe Liong, despite difficult 
circumstances in those early times, his father was successful and started to 
diversify and also become active in processed goods around 1953 following 
his belief that ‘all businesses are good’216. The Salim business ventures 
adapted to the often unpredictable environment and grew by taking the 
opportunities as they came, without a focused business strategy.  
 
‘Today we trade in this product and tomorrow there’s a new policy 
and the possibility exists that we trade in something else. The world 
of entrepreneurship has its own path and characteristics. Following 
this path is not easy, but mastering it is not impossible’. (Liem Sioe 
Liong)217 
 
‘The group evolved not by design, but by necessity. Whatever 
opportunity was good, we just grabbed’. (Anthony Salim) 
 
It is not completely clear whether the expansion of the business in the period 
directly after the independence of Indonesia was funded by organic growth, 
by capital brought by new partners, or whether Liem was able to tap into 
external sources of funds, for example from the Chinese community or from 
banks. 
 
Anthony Salim clarified that Liem already went into manufacturing under 
Sukarno: ‘some textile factories started operating as well as a soap factory’. 
Apart from diversifying into manufacturing, Liem also started Bank Windu 
Kencana (in 1954) and bought Bank Central Asia (BCA) in 1957. BCA was to 
become the largest private bank of Indonesia218. One author argues that the 
rise of Liem happened parallel to the rise of the hokchia group and can partly 
                                                 
215 See CISI Rama Utama (1989, p. 400). 
216 Quotes stem from the author’s interviews with Anthony Salim. All further quotes also 
stem from interviews unless indicated otherwise. 
217 Interview with Liem Sioe Liong and Anthony Salim in Tempo (1984). Author’s 
translation. 
218 According to the 2003 annual report of BCA bank, the bank was started in 1955 as a 
knitting company. The name changed several times, and the company started its banking 
operations in 1957, the year that Liem acquired the company. The company was renamed 
PT Bank Central Asia in 1974. 
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be explained by his alliances with fellow dialect members219. He initially 
expanded in those lines of business that the hokchia traditionally dominated. 
 
According to his son, the Liem businesses were already quite established by 
the time Sukarno was forced out of office – among the top 20-30. This is 
supported by another source:   
  
‘In addition to his trading activities in this period, Liem expanded 
into manufacture (textile, soap, nails, bicycle parts) and successfully 
established himself as a supplier of the Indonesian army. In the early 
1950s he established the Bank Windu Kencana and followed this in 
1957 with the purchase of the Bank Central Asia. When Suharto 
came to power in 1965, Liem already presided over an established 
and varied business group and had an established history of 
association with (..) Suharto himself’220.  
 
The claim that Liem’s business group was already quite established before 
Suharto came to power has to be placed in the context of business at that 
time. In the difficult economic environment virtually no large private 
businesses existed, most commercial activities occurred on a fairly small 
scale221. Liem’s businesses were not particularly large or very well known in 
this period. 
 
Thus, after an initial period of small-scale local trading, Liem was successful 
in a diverse set of business activities with an opportunistic strategy in a 
difficult business context. His hokchia background initially provided a good 
starting point, but was not advantageous only, since Chinese capital was 
under pressure. Liem was able to build a successful trading network outside 
the Chinese community, mainly with the Indonesian army, who gradually 
gained political power as well as economic influence. From trading he 
moved into manufacturing and banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 See Post (1997). 
220 See Robison (1986, p. 297). 
221 This is confirmed in several interviews with former policy-makers and researchers at 
the time. An exception being the Oei Tiong Ham concern, but this large company was 
nationalised in 1961.  
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4.5 Riding the Waves of Industrialisation 
 
By the time president Suharto took over, in the mid-1960s222, the economy 
was in a terrible condition with hyper-inflation (600% in the mid 1960s) and 
a huge state debt burden223. After President Suharto came to power, the 
business context changed and a new economic policy emerged in which 
industries slowly opened up for private investment. In 1967 the Foreign 
Investment Board was established followed by a 5-year plan that aimed at 
industrialisation of the country. This was the first policy of its kind in 
independent Indonesia. Following the establishment of Suharto’s New 
Order, Indonesia experienced a period of strong economic growth. From 
1967-1997 GDP grew on average 7% per annum.  During the New Order, 
several new economic policies were implemented that created a more 
favourable and stable business environment.  
 
According to Liem’s son: ‘my father started to see this new business 
environment as an opportunity’. Liem made good use of his connections and 
two members of the Suharto staff were appointed at the board of the Bank 
Windu Kencana224. Liem began to be among the circle of trusted ethnic 
Chinese businessmen with whom Suharto established close connections. 
Using a combination of business skills and political contacts, he acquired 
several export licences and held import monopolies on cloves. His main 
companies were P.T. Waringin225 (export of rubber and coffee) and P.T. 
Mega (import of cloves). The latter was one of the two companies that were 
allowed to import cloves by the government in 1968. Reports suggested that 
the licences and credit facilities these companies received were directly 
related to the close relationship with Suharto226. These trading businesses in 
basic commodities gave Liem annual revenues of USD 340,000 between 1968 
and 1970227.  
 
Around the end of the 1960s, Liem expanded his network of partnerships. 
Apart from Djuhar Sutanto, who also originated from Fujian; Ibrahim Risjad, 
                                                 
222 The power transition from Sukarno to Suharto started in 1965, when Suharto, then 
commander of the Kostrad (strategic army command), emerged as the strong leader 
(Dick, 2002). This happened through a coup of which the details remain somewhat 
unclear until this day. On March 11, 1966, Sukarno signed a decree giving Suharto 
considerable power, but Suharto was not officially acting president until 1967, and 
officially inaugurated as Indonesia’s second president in 1968 (Thee, 2002). 
223 According to Hofman et al. (2004). 
224 See Elson (2001, p. 162). 
225 The company was later renamed P.T. Waringin Kencana (Sato, 1993). In the period 
until the end of the 1980s Liem’s business group was also called the Waringin Kencana 
Group.  
226 See Crouch (1978) or Robison (1986). 
227 Argued by Sato (1993). 
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from Aceh; and Sudwikatmono, a cousin of Suharto228, also joined him229. 
These four, later complemented with the sons of Liem and Djuhar, are often 
called the Liem Investors or also the Gang of Four. The Liem Investors kept 
close relationships with Suharto throughout the decades to come.  
 
The army, now the leading political force, became very active in business-
related activities, which provided the army with additional funds230. Suharto 
and his close associates played a leading role in many of these activities.  
 
‘The general modus operandi was that the government provided 
credit facilities or privileged access to a certain market, in the 
expectation that members of the government (often sleeping 
partners in the arrangements) would be suitably paid for their 
cooperation. Amongst the key businessmen of the New Order was 
Liem Siu Liong, long a broker for army business schemes but now 
catapulted to new heights by the Army’s dominance’231.  
 
One of the army strategies was the use of special foundations (yayasan) for 
business purposes. These foundations were and remained big business until 
the end of Suharto’s regime. They included the Yayasan Dharma Putra 
Kostrad, established by Suharto in 1964, which co-founded the bank Windu 
Kencana with Liem and operated other companies as well232. Liem’s textile 
business, called PT Tarumatex, also reportedly received an order to supply 
military uniforms233. Another example is the Yayasan Harapan Kita, headed 
by Suharto’s wife, which was associated with Liem in his company Bogasari 
(flour milling)234.  
                                                 
228 In fact Sudwikatmono was almost a step-brother of Suharto as the latter had spent part 
of his formative years in Sudwikatmono’s family.  
229 A CISI study of business groups (1989) confirms that Sudwikatmono and Risjad 
joined the group in the late 1960s as new shareholders, but claims that Djuhar Sutanto 
had already joined the group earlier. 
230 These activities were very substantial. For example Pertamina, the oil company, was 
under direct army control and in fact run as a profit center for the army. Other 
institutions like Bulog (state logistics company) and Berdikari also provided the army 
with funds from economic activities. The army’s “fundraising” activities were more 
centralised by the end of the 1960s by establishing registered companies owned and 
controlled by the army. “Most of these military sponsored enterprises were in fact 
operated by Chinese businessmen, with the military partners ensuring that the necessary 
licenses and “ facilities” were available and providing “ protection” when illegal 
activities were involved.” (Crouch, 1978, p. 284). 
231 Elson, 2001, p. 192.  
232 According to Crouch (1978). Robison (1986, p. 163) writes that Bank Windu 
Kencana was owned by Liem and later transferred to the ownership of the Yayasan 
Dharma Putra in 1968, although reportedly still managed by Liem.  
233 See Elson (2001). 
234 See Crouch (1978). 
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Bogasari was owned by the Liem group and Sudwikatmono served as the 
president director. In 1970 it received a monopoly on milling in the western 
region of Indonesia from Bulog, the state logistics company. The articles of 
association of Bogasari stated that 26% of the profits should be set aside for 
“charitable” foundations like Harapan Kita and Dharma Putra235. The 
benefits of this milling arrangement for the Salim Group must have been 
substantial and the arrangement lasted for decades. A World Bank report of 
1987 said that ‘the profit margin of the flour millers was 25 percent, which is 
described as ‘high by international standards’ and “difficult to justify”’236. 
The milling activities of Bogasari were among many new initiatives in 
Indonesia which were set up to replace expensive imports.  
 
Suharto started to promote the industrialisation of Indonesia, and as a result 
of these policies, the structure of the economy changed rapidly. In 1965 only 
15% of the economy stemmed from industrial activities, whereas industrial 
activity contributed 41.7% to the economy in 1980237. The policy of import 
substitution industrialisation was common not only in Indonesia, but in 
several other emerging economies as well.  
 
In Indonesia the import substitution policy was carried out in various 
phases, of which the first was the ‘easy import substitution’ until 1975. This 
phase was concerned with industries that required relatively little capital 
and technology. Liem used his revenues from trading commodities to 
diversify into various industrial activities in the first phase of import 
substitution238. However, in view of the relatively small revenues in 
comparison with the cost of industrialisation, credit from state banks and 
probably also capital from partners must have played an important role as 
well.  
 
Liem was well-known for his instinct to select the right partners and the 
right business opportunities. A person who knows him well explained:  
 
‘An example of gut feeling is his move into automotive. The 
Japanese motor vehicles were the best at the time; European vehicles 
were not suitable for Indonesian conditions. Yamaha was already 
taken and Honda was part of Astra. Suzuki was part of a local 
company. Then Liem talked to the Suzuki sole agency holder in 
                                                 
235 See Robison (1986). 
236 According to Bresnan (1993, p. 127). 
237 See Hofman et al. (2004). 
238 According to Robison (1986) and Sato (1993). The annual revenues from P.T. Mega 
and P.T. Waringin Kencana grew to an annual average of USD 1.2 million between 1971 
and 1980 (Sato, 1993).   
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order to ask him to cooperate. He did not want to, but wanted to sell 
the business for a very high price. In terms of return on investment 
etc you would say it was too high. But Liem said no, I will buy it. It 
was very expensive, 50 million dollars or so at the time. And what 
did he do with it? Suzuki became number two in the market in 
Indonesia. Intuition is important for him’. (Person close to the 
Group) 
 
‘Gut feeling, Liem was very good at that. For example selecting 
Sudwikatmono as a partner was a brilliant choice; he is a pribumi, a 
cousin of Suharto and really a man who knows his limits’. (Person 
familiar with the Salim Group) 
 
According to Anthony Salim the group strategy was opportunistic:  
 
‘Actually, it was not planned, not by design but by necessity. And 
number two, it goes with the opportunity of the country’. (Anthony 
Salim)  
 
Apart from textiles and finance, the group set up activities in other sectors 
where opportunities arose: in flour milling around 1971-1972, cement in 1974 
and automotive industries in 1975239. In all these industries favourable 
conditions (such as access to credit and exclusive licenses) were created by 
the government in order to promote the industrialisation of Indonesia and 
Liem’s direct relationships with Suharto facilitated the process240. Overseas 
partners, mainly Japanese, helped the development of the Liem Group by 
providing technology and knowledge241.  
 
In 1972, Anthony Salim returned from his education in the UK and joined 
the business. While the Salim Group grew quickly several domestic Chinese 
                                                 
239 The start of operations are the years mentioned in an interview with Anthony Salim. 
When confronted with the fact that other sources sometimes show different years of 
establishment, the explanation by one of the leading Salim managers was that sometimes 
companies were set up a few years earlier than real operations started. According to 
another source that looked at the establishment of the companies (Sato, 1993) activities 
in flour milling started in 1969, cement in 1973, automobile in 1971.   
240 Crouch (1978) reports for example that the flour milling activities, which were 
associated with a foundation controlled by Mrs. Suharto, received credit approval from 
the Bank of Indonesia only 5 days after application.  
241 Partners in the automotive sector were Japanese companies like Hino, Mazda and 
Suzuki. Nihon Cement and Taiwan Cement were partners in Indocement, and US steel 
was a partner in the Krakatau Cold Rolling Steel venture (Robison, 1986). 
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partners and two of Suharto’s children also joined the group in the early 
1970s242:  
 
‘In the early 1970s the group was joined by several new partners, 
namely Mr. Mochtar Riady alias Lie Mo Tie, Mr. Sigit 
Haryoyudanto, Mrs. Siti Harjianti Hastuti Rukmana, Mr. Ciputra 
alias Tjie Siem Hoan, and others’243. 
 
‘It is impossible to manage all the companies alone. For this reason 
we need partners. For example in banking we partnered with 
Mochtar Riady. In real estate we have chosen for Ciputra. If we are 
talking about the big group, it consists of different partners’. 
(Anthony Salim)244 
  
‘I met Mochtar [Riady] when I happened to be in the same airplane, 
we went to Hong Kong. We then spoke about banks. He had just 
retired from his position as managing director of the Panin Bank, 
and was still considering what to do next. I proposed to him what 
do you think about managing my bank. He agreed and asked for 
25%. I wanted a bit less because I have many family members. I 
knew he got 23% at the Panin Bank. I offered him 15% and we 
finally agreed to 17.5%’. (Liem Sioe Liong)245 
 
The fact that Suharto’s partners (i.e. selected Chinese businessmen) benefited 
unequally from the industrialisation process did not go unnoticed. 
Complaints from students about corruption and the privileged position of 
Chinese businessmen erupted into violence on January 15, 1974, in an 
incident that became known as the Malari riots246. This incident forced 
Suharto to establish a commission to inquire into corruption. One of the four 
priority cases mentioned by the commission was Waringin, Liem’s trading 
company, although the case was never pursued247. 
 
                                                 
242 Mochtar Riady (also a hokchia) had been asked by Liem to take care of the 
management of the BCA which subsequently grew rapidly under his leadership. The two 
children of Suharto held a substantial number of shares in the BCA Bank. In 1998, when 
the bank collapsed, they jointly had 30% of the shares. Mochtar Riady established his 
own group called the Lippo Group and left BCA in 1990 (Sato, 1993). Ciputra, an 
Indonesian businessman, also has his own business group called Metropolitan Group. 
243 See CISI Rama Utama (1989, p. 400). 
244 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
245 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
246 The Malari riots occurred at the occasion of the visit of Japanese Prime Minister 
Tanaka in January 1974. 
247 See Bresnan (1993). 
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Thus, from the 1970s onward, the Salim Group became involved in 
industrial activities on a much larger scale. The Group set up a large number 
of companies in a variety of sectors, several benefiting from close 
cooperation with Suharto and his regime. The development of the group is 
intricately linked to the economic development of Indonesia, and most of the 
Salim companies produced products for the Indonesian masses. A pattern of 
diversification - where new companies were started for every new line of 
business - was apparent from the very beginning. In a favourable business 
environment with the right high-level political contacts, the Salim Group - as 
it is known by then - rapidly grows through diversification as well as normal 
business growth. 
 
 
4.6 Building Substance 
 
From 1974 – 1981 Indonesia experienced an oil boom, which also helped 
businessmen like Liem succeed. The positive effects of this boom on the 
private sector were tax and credit benefits in certain fields as well as 
increased private and government demand248. After the initial import 
substitution industrialisation period, there was a period of state-led 
industrialisation focusing on resource processing industries that required 
more capital. This phase came with more protectionist measures such as 
restricted foreign investment and trade barriers, and it reversed some of the 
measures towards liberalisation249.  
 
During that time, the Salim family also benefited from its regional Chinese 
networks around Asia. The Bangkok Bank in Thailand, for example, funded 
the construction of cement factories250. The possibility to tap international - 
ethnic Chinese - capital was one additional factor that enabled the Salim 
Group to move from trading into more capital intensive manufacturing.  
 
In this second import substitution industrialisation phase, the Salim Group 
became involved in steel and chemicals manufacturing during the early 
1980s. An example of chemicals was its company Unggul Indah 
Corporation, which was set up in 1983 and started production of alkyl 
benzene (ingredient for manufacturing of detergent) in 1985. Its entry into 
the steel industry was another example of close cooperation with the 
Suharto regime. The idea to build a steel industry came from the 
government and Liem was “encouraged” to put up 40% of the costs of the 
                                                 
248 See Sato (1994). 
249 See Hofman et al. (2004). 
250 According to Anthony Salim in an interview, Robison (1986) and Sato (1993).  
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steel plant251. When asked about their entry into the steel industry the Liem 
family said: 
 
‘We moved into Krakatau Steel to help the government’. (Liem Sioe 
Liong) 
 
‘If you want to invest up to USD 800 million it is easier to invest in 
other factories that make profit more quickly. But this is a special 
task’. (Anthony Salim)252 
 
To help the Salims finance their part of the deal, the government gave them 
an import monopoly for steel in the years preceding the coming on stream of 
domestic production, and allowed for significant increase in prices. In 1985 
the import of cold-rolled steel became the exclusive right of Giwang 
Selogam, a Liem company formed in 1984253. State company Krakatau 
formed a joint venture with Liem and the Ciputra group to produce cold-
rolled steel. The cold-rolled steel business was set-up with considerable 
overseas borrowing, but never made the expected profits. Therefore, the 
Salim Group withdrew from this business in 1990 by selling its 
shareholdings to government company Krakatau Steel.   
 
Apart from the above mentioned new ventures, the Salim Group also 
continuously expanded the capacity of its existing businesses such as cement 
and flour. Activities in other industries such as real estate, construction and 
plantations were started as well, usually with domestic or foreign partners. 
Many of the Salim companies were market leaders or held (semi-
)monopolies and were considered closely associated with the presidential 
family. The press therefore popularly referred to the Salim Group as part of 
the “Cendana Trust” after the name of the Jakarta Street in which the 
Presidential Palace was located.  
 
Anthony Salim argues that a change in strategy occurred as early as 1972, 
during the period of rapid diversification. In the words of Anthony Salim: 
‘rather than being driven completely by opportunity, the group began 
selecting its business opportunities’. This idea is not in line with other 
sources, which indicate that the group started to be active in virtually all 
sectors of the economy, not only in the 1970s but also in the 1980s. One 
                                                 
251 See for example the Economist (1990). 
252 Both quotes stem from an interview with Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
253 According to Bresnan (1993, p.250) ‘the import monopolies collected a commission 
of USD 20 per ton and a “handling fee” of 2.5% of the value’. In 1984 and 1985 
Indonesia imported more than USD 400 million in cold-rolled steel. 
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author even labels the period from 1981-1985 conglomerate diversification 
into unrelated business254.  
 
In the early 1980s the Liem Groep consisted of 54 companies in six fields: 
trading, automobile, manufacturing, property & construction, finance and 
timber, logging & miscellaneous (Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 Salim Group Companies in the early 1980s according to Robison 
Automobile 
P.T. National Motors (Hino, Mazda sole 
agents) 
P.T. Unicor Prima (Hino & Mazda assemblers) 
P.T. Indo Mobile Utama (Suzuki sole agent & 
assemblers) 
P.T. Central Sole Agency (Volvo) 
P.T. Salim Jaya (Volvo assemblers) 
P.T. Harapan Mobil Nusantara (Ford 
distributers) 
P.T. Indohero (Suzuki motorcycle assemblers) 
 
Property & Contruction 
P.T. Metropolitan Kencana 
P.T. Wisma Metropolitan 
P.T. Metropolitan Devt. 
P.T. Jakarta Land 
P.T. Green Land 
P.T. Jaya Bali 
P.T. Jaya Mandarin Agung 
P.T. Agung Utama 
P.T. Perwick Agung 
P.T. Asia Nusantara 
P.T. Kabele Asia Nusantara 
P.T. Central Sari Int. Builders 
P.T. Nugraha Kencana Jaya 
P.T. Cahaya Tugu Kencana 
P.T. Central Salim Builders 
P.T. Rimba Kencana 
P.T. Budhi Agung  
 
Logging, Timber & Miscellaneous 
P.T. Kayu Lapis (plywood) 
P.T. Dono Indah (logging) 
P.T. Overseas Timber Products Corporation 
Indaco Ltd. (tin mining) 
Manufacture 
P.T. Multiatex (textiles) 
P.T. Indah Kencana (nails) 
P.T. Indara Mas (bicycle tires) 
Rubber Refineries 
P.T. Tarumatex (textiles) 
P.T. Pangan Sari Utama (food 
processing) 
P.T. Bogasari (Flour Milling) 
P.T. Indonesia Cement 
P.T. Distinct Indonesia Cement 
Enterprise 
P.T. Perkasa Cement 
P.T. Perkasa Indah Cement Putih 
P.T. Perkasa Into Abadi Cement 
P.T. Tridaya Manunggal Perkasa 
P.T. Krakatau Cold Rolling Mill 
 
Finance 
Bank Windu Kencana 
Bank Central Asia 
P.T. Multifinance Corporation 
Central Antar Jasa 
Metropolitan Leasing 
P.T. Asuransi Central Asia 
P.T. Asswansi Java Central Asia 
Raya 
 
Trade 
P.T. Waringin 
P.T. Waringin Kencana  
P.T. Permanent  
P.T. Mega 
P.T. Arimono 
P.T. Hanurata 
Source: Robison (1986, p. 298-300)255 
                                                 
254 See Sato (1993, p. 413). 
255  Asswansi Java Central Asia Raya should probably be Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia 
Raya, a company mentioned in other sources such as Soetriyono (1989). 
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In the mid-1980s the number of companies started to rise quickly. Having 
started with just one small company the business of Liem was now a group 
of separate companies that had grown from 3 companies in 1957 to 225 
companies in 1986 (Figure 4.2)256. A CISI report in 1989 recorded 350 
separate Liem-affiliated companies (Annex 5). Although known as the Salim 
Group, the companies are separate entities and have no common legal 
identity. The ownership of the companies is often shared between Liem and 
other partners. 
 
Figure 4.2 Number of Salim Group companies according to Sato  
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Source: Sato (1993, 1994) 
 
Faced with a group of companies that was growing rapidly, Liem and his 
sons started to introduce professional in addition to family management and 
attempted to decrease the dependency on government contracts.  
 
‘From 1972 that’s when the crossover occurred. When we start to 
become much more by design rather than opportunity driven. 
Design in the selection of the business opportunity. The way we set 
up things. And also managing professionally, establish the concept 
of holding company, operating units (OPUs), accountability of 
management’. (Anthony Salim) 
 
                                                 
256 See Sato (1993. p 412-413). 
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‘For a company as large as the Salim Group there is not enough 
family to take up all the leadership roles. We already have the 
separation between ownership and management here. The family 
and partners indeed are still the owners, and slowly we can go 
public. But our management is already professional. I think we are 
one of the groups in Indonesia that already had the courage to leave 
the management and operations to professionals’. (Anthony 
Salim)257 
 
According to Anthony Salim, the group began to be more market based in 
its outlook and strategy and wanted to be less connected to the government. 
Yet various sources indicate that the group was still very much intertwined 
in government relations at least until the early nineties. Some of its 
companies received government contracts, licenses beyond maximum quota 
or special credit facilities. Examples are Indomobil, the automotive pillar of 
the group that received attractive government orders258, or the above 
mentioned steel activities of the group. However, the codes of reciprocity 
also required Liem to step in when needed. For example, when Bank Duta, 
the majority of which is owned by several Suharto-related foundations, 
experienced financial difficulties, Liem injected USD 200 million in 1990259. 
 
After the oil boom ended, in the early 1980s, the Indonesian economy 
witnessed a drawback, and a set of new policies were introduced, mainly 
aiming at the liberalisation of the economy. In that difficult period, the 
rupiah was devalued several times, and companies having borrowed abroad 
suffered during this crisis. P.T. Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa (a Salim 
company) was rescued by the government, which bought up 35% of the 
shares for USD 325 million in 1985260. Despite this, by 1985 the Salim Group 
emerged as the largest conglomerate in Indonesia, with annual group sales 
estimated to be over 900 million USD261, and 225 separate companies 
affiliated with the group in 1986262. Liem’s business success was attributed to 
                                                 
257 See Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
258 Interview with an executive of Astra, a competitor of Indomobil. 
259 According to a leading newspaper, Sudwikatmono ‘confirms Salim chairman Liem 
Sioe Liong helped bail out PT Bank Duta after 1990 scandal’ (Asian Wall Street Journal, 
1994). This was also reported by Elson (2001, p.252). It is likely that other such 
transactions also occurred, although these were often done in a discrete manner, and not 
well published. Liem also helped pay for the gambling debts of Suharto’s eldest son, 
according to some unconfirmed reports.  
260 See for example Dick (1985). 
261 Sato (1994) estimates the turnover at over 1 trillion rupiah, which is equivalent to 900 
million USD at that time with an average annual rupiah rate of 1111 in 1985. 
262 Soetriyono (1989) lists 192 companies in: trade; finance, construction/real estate; 
automotive; metal; food; textile; chemical; forestry; cement; pharmaceutical; electronics; 
glass; plastic; mining, survey; holding companies, and others. 
 98 
his proximity to the regime, but the Salim Group was apparently also “good 
at what it did”263. 
 
Thus, in the 1980s the Liem group still grew rapidly and now also moved 
into new capital-intensive industries such as steel and chemicals. In the 
difficult period after the oil boom the government stepped in to help Salim 
Group companies in several industries (cement, steel) by taking over (part 
of) their shareholdings. The Salim Group also started in numerous other 
industries and the number of companies affiliated with the group started to 
rise rapidly. The group was composed of an ever expanding number of 
legally separate entities that are under ownership of Liem or the Liem 
Investors. 
 
 
4.7 The Design of an International Portfolio 
 
Having outgrown its rather small home markets, and probably wanting to 
diversify their country risk, from 1975 onward, the Salim Group family 
business had already started expanding internationally to Hong Kong, and 
other Asian countries. This internationalisation process intensified in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the mid 1980s, the Group seriously started its 
internationalisation efforts. The possibility of Suharto retiring and the 
business opportunities in the region must have played a role in this. 
Anthony Salim describes the new non-government and more international 
strategy as follows:  
 
‘From 1979 we started to sort of elevate ourselves from government 
to market based enterprise. We do understand a lot of political 
implications, because we try to choose that it is much more on 
business directions rather than government related business – which 
is still good. Another characteristic is that of course we start to 
balance our portfolio. We have no pretension to hide that we have 
started to invest outside Indonesia since 1975, when we created our 
Singapore and Hong Kong companies’. (Anthony Salim) 
 
The Liem family established an entity under which most of the international 
activities were grouped: First Pacific Company located in Hong Kong, but 
with investments in various countries. First Pacific started in 1982 as First 
Pacific Finance Limited, initially a financial services company. One of the 
early directors was quoted saying ‘we would be the Liem’s window to the 
world’264. In that year, several other companies with similar names were set 
up and the First Pacific group (listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) 
                                                 
263 Elson, 2001, p. 250. 
264 See Wilson and Williamson (1992, p.2). 
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started to acquire other companies, among which the Dutch trading firm 
Hagemeyer in 1983 and a US-based bank. In 1983 the Liems also controlled 
KMP, a Singapore based holding company that in turn controlled a number 
of Singapore-based companies. 
 
In this period Liem also started investing in Fuqing, his home town, together 
with Djuhar Sutanto. With a group called Yuan Hong they invested in flour 
milling, a nearby port, and an industrial park. According to Djuhar Sutanto:  
 
‘When we started this in 1987, Fuqing had no factories and no 
industrial workers. There were no conditions for them – no hotel 
and only a few antiquated telephones. We had to put in the 
infrastructure - roads, telecommunications, hotels and a pier," he 
said. "Our aim was to do something for our home town, provide 
work for its people and raise living standards”’. (Djuhar Sutanto)265  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the Salim group got access to international business 
networks, including the international capital market which gave it the 
option to move into more capital-intensive industries and also more degrees 
of freedom when it came to choosing its opportunities both in the domestic 
Indonesian market as well as abroad.  
 
After a period of international diversification, by the mid 1990s, the result 
was that 25-30% of the assets were now outside Indonesia and around 70-
75% inside whereas prior to the mid 1980s most assets were located in 
Indonesia (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Internationalisation of the Salim Group   
 
Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996 
 
                                                 
265 According to the South China Morning Post (1997). 
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The main Salim businesses both in Indonesia and abroad produced for the 
local markets. When the Indonesian government tried to promote exports 
rather than industrialisation for domestic consumption only, the Salim 
Group set up some export businesses (such as shoes) but largely stuck to 
their domestic business model. Perhaps this can be captured in Liem’s 
motto: 
 
‘We plant a tree with the purpose of it growing big. What you 
should not do is to move the tree, which has already grown, to 
another place’. (Liem Sioe Liong)266 
 
As a result of the deregulation packages from 1986-1988, Indonesia’s capital 
market witnessed a structural change because of a rapid growth in banking 
on the one hand (among those Liem’s BCA bank) as well as the rapid 
development of the Jakarta Stock Exchange267. The take-off of the Jakarta 
stock exchange gave the Salim group more access to capital, and they listed 
various companies on the Stock Exchange, starting with Indocement in 1989. 
The listing of Indocement was controversial, since the company had made 
losses for the previous years, which resulted in the government buying up a 
significant portion of the shares a few years earlier. A condition for listing 
was that the company made profits for the preceding two years prior to 
listing. Indocement could only be listed on the stock exchange because of an 
exceptional ministerial decree268.  
  
‘The most publicised aspect of this transformation was the floating 
in the mid-1989 of new share issues in subsidiaries of about half a 
dozen of the biggest corporate conglomerates, including (..) Liem 
Sioe Liong’s PT Indocement. All of these shares were offered for sale 
at very substantial premiums (..)’269. 
 
Other Indonesian Liem companies followed Unggul Indah (1989); Indofood 
(1994); Darya-Varia (1994)270; and Indomobil (1997)271. With the growth of 
                                                 
266 Excerpt from Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. Liem mentioned that this motto is 
what he wanted to pass on to his children. 
267 The stock exchange opened in 1977, but only 24 companies were listed until 1988. 
See for an analysis of the economic policies with regard to financial markets in Indonesia 
from 1966-1990 Cole and Slade (1992).  
268 The result of the listing was that Indocement started to make profits again. .  
269 According to Mackie and Sjahrir (1989, p. 23). 
270 Darya-Varia is a pharmaceuticals company owned through First Pacific Company in 
Hong Kong. It was listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1994, and was disposed by 
First Pacific after the Asian Crisis.  
271 Indomobil was listed on the stock exchange by a so-called “backdoor listing”. The 
Salim Group merged Indomobil with its already listed PT Indomulti Inti Industri; 
renamed it and sold the original Indomulti assets back to itself. (Jakarta Post, 1997b). 
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the region, and the maturing of the capital markets, the Salim Group was 
now able to tap international capital from banks and investors. 
 
 
4.8 Summary & Conclusion 
 
Chronologically speaking, we can distinguish a number of different 
strategies for the Salim Group. It was started by a poor immigrant and was 
first a small-scale trading business in Central Java. Soon Liem, with his 
immediate family members, started in other lines of business, but still on a 
rather small scale.  
 
As soon as the Group had accumulated some capital, it started to be active in 
a number of other non-trading businesses such as manufacturing and 
banking. Most of these were industries in which the hokchia dialect group 
was strong.  Apart from links to family and dialect group members, Liem 
also formed partnerships outside the Chinese community, mainly with the 
Indonesian army. 
 
With the help of high-level contacts, the Salim Group diversified into many 
industries catering to local consumers. The business of the group became 
closely linked to the activities of Suharto. The Group started to be active in 
flour milling because of the policy of the government to first and foremost 
produce (rather than import) its own food to feed its people. This happened 
in a policy environment of import substitution manufacturing. The main 
diversification strategy was horizontal diversification into a number of 
unrelated industries. The group has profited from favourable policies for 
domestic companies such as licences and financing options from the 
government. This enabled them to move into various industries such as 
cement, steel, food, textiles and car manufacturing.  
 
When favourable conditions in industries such as steel were abolished, the 
group used its connections to move out of these industries or to eliminate its 
debts. Later, when the group became larger, and when the second 
generation family members entered the business, international expansion 
into Asia and Europe became a logical next step. It started in the Pacific 
region but the Salim Group also established a foothold in Europe. With the 
development of capital markets, the Salim Group started to list its 
companies on various stock exchanges and also got access to international 
capital sources (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2 Summary 
Period Institutional  
Environment 
Strategic Choices 
1938-1945 
Genesis 
- Chinese enjoyed strong 
position in trading   
- business context for private 
business strictly regulated 
- opportunities in 
smuggling/trading 
- small scale trading of 
various products  
- close cooperation with 
family members 
1945-1957 
Army relations 
- difficult business 
environment  
- demand for basic products  
- important role of the army 
- start of a national economy.  
- initial small-scale 
diversification 
- manufacturing of basic 
products and banking.  
- supplying goods to the 
army. 
1957-1965 
Diversification 
- nationalistic political 
environment 
- slow economic growth 
- rising power of the army in 
business. 
- trade and manufacturing of  
basic products  
- further diversification and 
expansion 
1966-1972 
Capitalising on 
Suharto’s New 
Order 
- economy improving 
- army most powerful political 
actor & very active in business 
- opening up for foreign 
investment and international 
trade 
- import substitution & 
protection of local capitalists 
- linking up with Suharto to 
develop economy 
- evolving conglomerate as 
new business opportunities 
arise, e.g. import substitution 
industries 
1972-1980 
Institutionalising 
the business 
- flourishing economy 
- industrialisation 
- business opportunities exist, 
especially when linked to 
Suharto or army  
- government connected 
business 
- supplemented with 
international businesses 
- design the conglomerate:  
institutionalize & 
professionalize  
1981-1993 
Institutionalising 
the business 
- oil crisis and currency 
depreciation 
- import substitution efforts 
halted 
- export promotion policy 
-reduced cronyism 
- build international 
businesses 
- expand local businesses 
- work with government in 
order to resolve losses in 
various industries 
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Chapter 5: The Midas Touch 
 
 
‘In the 1990s, it was as if every business  
you touched turned into gold’  
Anthony Salim,  
CEO & President, Salim Group 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the historical development of the Salim Group from 
its start by a Chinese immigrant in Central Java until its international 
expansion in the mid-1990s was described. The Salim Group developed from 
a small family business to the largest Indonesian conglomerate with 
operations abroad.  
 
In the following chapters, I look more closely at the specific features of the 
Salim Group in the last decade (1994-2003), the focus of this study. The 
Asian Crisis, which started in mid 1997, had a major impact on the Salim 
Group. It changed its size, composition, business model and management. 
Therefore, I divide this period into three phases: The period before the Asian 
Crisis from 1994 – mid 1997 (The Midas Touch); the Asian Crisis from mid 
1997 to 2000 (Fire-Fighting) and the post-crisis period from 2001-2003 (Axis 
of Opportunity).  Each of these phases will be discussed in a separate 
chapter.  
 
In the following three chapters I will present empirical data gathered as part 
of this thesis, particularly interviews, annual reports and analysis of relevant 
media sources. In each chapter I focus on the business context; organisation 
structure; strategy; coordination and control; and leadership style of the 
Salim Group. 
 
This chapter starts with a description of the business context in the mid-
nineties, a period of optimism and economic growth. It then provides a 
detailed overview of the Salim Group in 1994-1997, including estimates of its 
size and structure. Various sources indicate that the period 1994-1997 was a 
period of strong growth and expansion. Aside from growth of the existing 
portfolio, the group also diversified with several new investments. Many 
ventures were carried out in close cooperation with a variety of partners, 
thus creating a network of business relations. In addition to that, the internal 
dynamic of the Salim Group in terms of internal restructuring and different 
types of synergy is analysed. In the last section, I look at the managers and 
their management practices within the Salim Group. 
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5.2 Growing with Asia 
 
In the period from 1994 until mid-1997 most Asian economies, including 
Indonesia, experienced strong growth rates272. Looking in more detail at the 
Indonesian economy, the growth in the non-oil manufacturing, construction, 
finance, and business services exceeded 10% for the years 1995 and 1996. In 
these sectors many of the Salim companies (Indofood, Indocement, 
Indomobil, BCA, and Unggul Indah) are active. The high growth offered 
business opportunities in Indonesia, especially for the already well 
established Salim Group, which was in a position to undertake large 
investments in a number of promising sectors.  
 
The Indonesian economic policy was aimed at further deregulation and the 
promotion of exports, the latter having already started in the mid-1980s. As 
a consequence the exports indeed increased annually, as in other Asian 
economies like Thailand and Malaysia. Trade deregulations as well as the 
deregulation of foreign investment in 1994 and 1995 in Indonesia meant that 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started to increase273.  
 
FDI was USD 2.6 billion in 1994/1995, but after the regulatory changes the 
net realised foreign investment rose to USD 5.4 billion in 1995/1996 and 
USD 6.5 billion in 1996/1997274. Sectors that received a large share of foreign 
investment were chemicals, paper, metal goods, food, infrastructure, textiles 
and plantations. Japan was the key foreign investor with 19% of the 
approved non-oil foreign investment from 1994-1996275. But a similar surge 
in investments occurred domestically, with an increase in domestic 
investment that surpassed the FDI. Food, paper, textiles, chemicals and non-
metallic minerals were important recipients of domestic investments. The 
new investments were mostly financed with debt (56% in 1994; 103% in 
1995; 70% in 1996). As a result the corporate leverage in Indonesia increased 
from 58% in 1994 up to 92% in 1996276.  
 
Because of the strong economic growth figures there was a strong sense of 
progress and trust in the economies of the Asian region by Western 
investors and local businessmen alike. The World Bank, in a 1993 report, 
termed this growth the East Asian Miracle277. Confidence was also reflected 
                                                 
272 According to the Asian Development Bank Key Indicators 2004, the Indonesian GDP 
growth was 7.5% in 1994; 8.2% in 1995 and 7.8% in 1996. Available at 
www.adb.org/statistics , [accessed January 6, 2005].  
273 See Thee (2002). 
274 According to Feridhanusetyawan (1997). 
275 According to Lindblad (1997). Japan also topped the list of foreign investors with 
23% in the period 1967-1996. 
276 See Pomerleano (1998). 
277 See World Bank (1993). 
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in the annual reports of the Salim Group companies. In 1996 the annual 
report of First Pacific (Hong Kong listed Salim company) was named 
“growing with Asia” and Liem confidently reported ‘improved profit on an 
increasingly solid foundation’278. 
 
With the growing optimism about the future of Asia, many ethnic Chinese 
also started to feel more confident about their position, and some opened up 
for interviews. In 1996 the Salim Group published a brochure with an 
overview of the group’s activities (see Annex 7). As ethnic Chinese firms in 
the region had started to list their companies on stock exchanges, more 
information was available on the size of ethnic Chinese business. Interviews 
and articles about the overseas Chinese were published in the popular press. 
Following this uncharacteristic openness from the side of ethnic Chinese 
firms in the region, a number of books and academic studies started to 
appear that paid attention to the power of the ethnic Chinese in the Asian 
region and their investments in China279.  
 
Despite the high economic growth in Indonesia experts were increasingly 
worried about the rising corruption and preferential treatment of some 
businessmen. Although the deregulations were generally effective in 
bringing down protection, some industries were still enjoying protective 
government measures, such as the automotive industry280. Another example 
of protective measures was the sudden ban of foreign investment in the 
palm oil sector in 1997 - a promising sector dominated by four 
conglomerates. The Salim Group ranked second in this sector with 150,000 
hectares under cultivation281. The ban was later changed and foreign 
investment was allowed in eastern Indonesia (most plantations were located 
in western Indonesia). Other examples included the controversial “national 
                                                 
278 See the First Pacific Annual Report 1996, p.9 
279 Early influential articles were an article by Kao (1993) in Harvard Business Review 
and an article by Kraar (1994) in Fortune Magazine. The East Asia Analytical Unit of the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs published a report on the overseas Chinese in 
1995 that was well covered in the international press, and followed up by numerous 
articles. These articles established the idea that the Chinese owned a disproportionate 
share of the wealth and economic power in Southeast Asia. Later books like 
Weidenbaum and Murray (1996) analysed the ethnic Chinese as one regional power, 
with strong links to China. Academic studies also followed. This research body was 
subject of a thorough analysis later in Chapter 2. 
280 Fane and Condon (1996) have surveyed the level of protection enjoyed by certain 
sectors. Apart from the heavily protected automotive industry other sectors like livestock 
and plastics also enjoyed similar protection.  
281 See Feridhanusetyawan (1997). 
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car” project by one of Suharto’s children, which received various tax 
exemptions282.  
 
The combination of strong economic growth as well as their semi-protected 
status further enhanced the rise of certain corporate groups in Indonesia, 
most prominently those business groups closely associated with Suharto. 
According to two observers: ‘favours to companies associated with the first 
family continue to concern –even to shock- long term observers’283. The well-
connected companies included the businesses of Suharto’s children 
(primarily Hutomo Mandala Putra (“Tommy”); Bambang Trihatmodjo and 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (“Tutut”) as well as the so-called cronies such as 
Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan. President Suharto denied any wrongdoing 
when it came to his relation with Liem, in particular the quasi-monopolies of 
Indocement (cement) and Bogasari (flour milling). Instead, he presented the 
Salim Group as his instrument to achieve economic progress.  
 
‘The development of these two (Salim) companies is not a collusion 
between me and Oom Liem, but the government's effort to reach 
self-sufficiency by utilising a businessman who is willing to work’284 
.  
In order to further diminish criticism Suharto issued a decree in January 
1996 forcing large businesses to “donate” 2% of their annual revenues to a 
special foundation. The foundation would attempt to reduce the gap 
between rich and poor. Among the foundations board members were two of 
Suharto’s children, Anthony Salim and Sudwikatmono, another member of 
the Liem investors285. This unusual fund-raising effort caused even more 
concern over the transparency of Suharto’s policies. 
 
Thus, we can summarise the business context as follows. The economic 
growth in the region gave rise to substantial optimism. Large foreign and 
                                                 
282 Japan launched a complaint at the WTO over the protective measures offered for the 
production of the car named Timor. The national car project encountered many 
difficulties, and was considered an embarrassment. When the problem was to find a 
manufacturing location Indomobil, a Salim company, provided a plant where the car 
could be assembled. (Financial Times, 1997a) 
283 See Manning and Jayasuriya (1997, p. 17). 
284 According to the Australian Financial Review (1995b). 
285 In 1995 large Indonesian conglomerates held a meeting about alleviating poverty, 
which was described by the press as being a reaction to government plans to issue new 
competition rules to limit conglomerate power. (Financial Times, 1995b). The meeting, 
which was actually initiated by the government, resulted in the so-called Bali Declaration 
which aimed at alleviating poverty by supporting small business growth. The decree 
issued by Suharto however apparently went further than the conglomerates had intended. 
It required all large domestic companies to donate 2% of their earnings (Financial Times, 
1996).   
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domestic investments in Indonesia occurred. The excellent economic 
position of some wealthy Chinese in the Asian region and their business ties 
with China became well-publicised. The preferential treatment of some 
ethnic Chinese businessmen like Liem was criticised but Suharto made no 
attempts to change the situation.  Economic growth in combination with 
favouritism gave particularly good opportunities for well-connected groups. 
As we will see in the following sections, this business context offered a 
golden age for business groups such as the Salim Group.  
 
 
5.3 Qiaoxiang Ties: The China Connection 
 
The favourable economic climate was not only limited to Southeast Asia. 
China, which had gradually opened up for investments, started to offer a 
wide range of business opportunities, particularly for ethnic Chinese. Many 
of the now rich business tycoons, such as Liem, invested in China, usually 
starting with their regions of origin, in this case Fujian Province. Estimates of 
the share of FDI into mainland China from ethnic Chinese in Asia run as 
high as 80%286. Especially the southeast part of China profited from these 
investments, such as Fujian where most migrants came from. The links 
between the ethnic Chinese abroad and their home provinces were called 
qiaoxiang ties.  
 
When Chinese migrants invested in China they were often criticised in 
Indonesia, because it would reveal a lack of assimilation and loyalty of the 
ethnic Chinese. Liem also came under attack and an international newspaper 
reported the following about Liem:  
 
‘Recently he came under strong criticism for multi-million dollar 
investments in his home province in China. 'Where can I go?' asked 
Mr Liem. 'If I invest abroad, they call it capital flight: if I invest in 
Indonesia they say I want a monopoly’’287. 
 
As a consequence most people like Liem kept a low profile when it came to 
their business ties with China288.  Despite this low profile it is clear that Liem 
has been an important investor in Fujian province. He built several factories 
such as a shoe factory, a flour factory and he invested in real estate. In 1993 
he set up a joint venture with the Bank of China and opened the Fujian Asia 
                                                 
286 See for example Yeung (2000). 
287 See Financial Times (1995a). 
288 The effect was that reliable estimates of investments of the Salim Group in China 
were hard to obtain. For this reason I had to rely on media and on interviews. 
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Bank289. According to interviews with various people close to the Salim 
family, these investments seem to be at least partly stemming from non-
commercial reasons. The investments in his native place of birth have had a 
large impact on the small village of Fuqing. Several newspapers reported on 
Liem’s influence on his native village. According to The Australian Financial 
Review, who dispatched a journalist to Fuqing in 1995:  
 
‘About 90 per cent of the factories on the strip are controlled by 
Liem, tipping money back into his ancestral home. Of the village's 
50,000 workers, Liem's operation - comprising food, plastic flowers, 
shoes, clothes, packaging and Fuqing's new port - employs 20,000 of 
them’290. 
 
Liem was also an active member of the Fuqing Association. The Chinese 
associations, often based on region or dialect, are known to be effective 
business networking platforms for ethnic Chinese. Liem was also on the 
executive committee of the International Association of Fuzhous (Fuzhou 
being the capital of Fujian Province), together with Robert Kuok291. The 
latter had entered into several partnerships with Liem, such as a sugar 
plantation in Sumatra. Within the period under review, 1994 until mid-1997, 
the Salim group made at least four new investments in Southeast China in 
automotive, telecom, city development and ports, mostly in partnership 
with other firms.  
 
Thus, with China opening up for investments, Liem also invested in his 
native province Fujian - particularly in Fuqing village. In view of criticism at 
home, Liem kept a low profile when it came to investing in China. From 
1994-1997 the Salim Group made several new investments in Southeast 
China. 
 
 
5.4 Supersize Salim 
 
In the period prior to the Asian Crisis the Salim Group was by far the largest 
Indonesian business group. Since the group consisted of various separate 
entities, some listed on the stock exchange, others privately held, it is not 
easy to estimate the size of the group, although the Salim Group was the 
                                                 
289 The Fujian Asia Bank was set up as a 50/50 joint venture with the Bank of China to 
introduce overseas investment opportunities to Chinese enterprises, as well as promote 
foreign investments into China (Nikkei Weekly, 1993). It remained a small bank and was 
later sold to Ping An Insurance and renamed Ping An Bank (Financial Times, 2003a).  
290 According to the Australian Financial Review (1995a). 
291 See the Weekend Australian (1995). 
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largest conglomerate in Indonesia, and according one source in all of 
Southeast Asia292.  
 
The large earnings of the Salim Group also translated into personal wealth 
for the Salim family and its partners – who were the main shareholders. In 
1994 Liem was the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, and Salim executives were 
reported to take the top-5 taxpayer positions293. Having been Indonesia’s 
largest tax-payer for a long time, Liem also consistently appeared on the list 
of wealthiest people in the world published by Forbes. Liem already ranked 
no. 48 in 1988 and was no. 68 in 1997, with an estimated net worth of 
respectively USD 2 and USD 4 billion294. With wealth came status, not just in 
business circles, but also in other fields. Liem, who had not received any 
university education, received an honorary doctorate from the prestigious 
US-based Wharton School where a special chair named after him was 
established295.  
 
After more than three decades of expansion and diversification the Salim 
Group had 280,000 employees and was organised in 12 “divisions” in 
1995296:  
1. Agribusiness;  
2. Automotive and Shipping;  
3. Banking and Financial Services;  
4. Chemicals;  
5. Computers & Communications 
6. Construction Materials;  
7. Food & Consumer Products;  
8. International;  
9. Multi-industry297;  
                                                 
292 See Sato (1993). 
293 A Japanese newspaper reported: “The largest individual contributor to the national 
coffers last year was Liem Sioe Liong, founder of the Salim Group. In fact, taxpayers 
from Salim, Indonesia's biggest conglomerate, swept the top five positions.  Suharto's 
first cousin Sudwikatmono, a founding shareholder in Salim, came in seventh” (Nikkei 
Weekly, 1994). 
294 For example Soetriyono (1989) or Lever-Tracey (2002). 
295 In 1996 Liem received a doctorate honoris causa from the Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, according to the 1997 Indomobil Annual Report. This was 
apparently connected with the 1.6 million USD gift by Anthony Salim to the Wharton 
School for a professorship named after his father and First Pacific Company. (Wharton 
Alumni Magazine, 1996).  
296 According to Sato (2004) and a Salim Group brochure. The term division may suggest 
that the group was established under one single umbrella or had a legal status as a group, 
but this was in fact not the case. As explained previously, the Salim Group consisted of a 
variety of separate legal entities under ownership of the Salim family and partners.  
 110 
10. Natural Resources;  
11. Property Development & Leisure Industry;  
12. Trading & Distribution.  
 
Figure 5.1 gives an indication of the importance of the Salim Group activities 
by division. According to the turnover figures in the 1996 Salim brochure298 
banking (mainly BCA), food (mainly Indofood) and construction materials 
(mainly Indocement) stand out as relatively important industries in the 
Indonesian context. Its international division was substantial as well and 
contributed around 26% to total turnover in 1995. The international activities 
are mainly the listed company First Pacific in Hong Kong; the much smaller 
QAF (listed on the stock exchange in Singapore) and KMP in Singapore 
(which owns the majority of QAF, but owns stakes in other companies as 
well); and some investments in privately held companies in Fujian, China 
and some other regions (See for more details Annex 7). 
 
Figure 5.1: Salim Portfolio as a Percentage of Total Turnover 
 
Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996; excludes property, natural resources and 
computers for which the figures are not known. 
 
Several authors and media have estimated the turnover of the group in its 
golden age before the crisis. The most influential researcher on the Salim 
Group is Sato who has reported on the turnover of the Salim Group in 
various years: USD 9.8 billion in 1992; USD 8.6 billion in 1993; and USD 22.8 
                                                                                                                   
297 This is a term used by the Salim Group for “other manufacturing activities”. It 
includes diverse activities such as sport shoe manufacturing, textiles, and galvanised iron 
sheets. 
298 To my best knowledge the brochure published in 1996 is the latest promotional 
material on the Salim Group as a whole.  
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billion in 1996299. The latter figure represents about 4% of Indonesian Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)300. 
 
According to various newspapers, notably the Financial Times and the 
Australian301, the turnover of the Salim Group ranged from 9-11 billion USD 
between 1993 and 1995. The Salim Group, in its brochure, puts its turnover 
for 1995 at over 20 billion USD. If these estimates are combined, a picture 
emerges of the approximate rate of growth. If Sato’s estimates are accurate, 
the group experienced an overall growth in turnover of 40-50% annually 
between 1993 and 1996302. This would mean that the growth rate is high and 
would certainly be a challenge for existing financial and managerial 
resources within the Salim Group. The high growth rates were a reality for 
Indofood and First Pacific Company, both companies grew mainly through 
acquisitions. Table 5.1 shows the turnover figures for the main listed Salim 
companies while a more complete overview is available in Annex 8. 
 
Table 5.1 Turnover of Main Public Salim Group companies (USD Million) 
 Indofood Indocement First Pacific QAF Indomobil UIC 
1994 622 1568 3804 206 1049 131 
1995 930 1753 5249 231 1335 141 
1996 1207 1824 7025 265 1361 157 
Sources: various annual reports. N.B. not corrected for cross-ownership. 
 
Thus, the Salim Group, which was already the largest group in Indonesia, 
grew very rapidly in the period under review. This growth, of which the 
turnover was just an indication, was the result of organic growth as well as 
acquisitions and new partnerships. In the next sections, we will look in more 
detail at the factors underlying the rapid growth of the Salim Group. 
 
 
5.5 The Salim Web 
 
Like many Asian conglomerates, the Salim Group works with a variety of 
partners. The core group of investors consists of Liem and his two sons 
                                                 
299 According to Sato (1993; 1994; 2003). Calculated in USD using the historic annual 
average rupiah rates. 
300 The GDP in 1996 at current market prices was 532 trillion rupiah. (Asian 
Development Bank) www.adb.org/statistics. [accessed January 6, 2005] 
301 These turnover figures were mentioned in: Financial Times, 1994; Australian 
Financial Review, 1994; Australian, 1995b; Australian, 1996a; Australian, 1996b. Other 
newspapers reported similar figures.  
302 There is a rather large discrepancy between the 1995 figures mentioned by 
newspapers and those mentioned by the Salim Group (billion 11 vs 20), but a plausible 
explanation could be that the figures mentioned in newspapers lag behind those 
published by the Salim Group itself.  
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(Anthony Salim and Andree Halim). The so-called Liem Investors (i.e. the 
Liem family, Djuhar Sutanto and his sons, Ibrahim Risjad and 
Sudwikatmono) have also invested in several Salim Group companies. But 
there are other (minority) partners as well. A company may be owned by the 
Liem family and the other Liem Investors plus a partner, but could also be 
owned by the Salim family and a foreign partner. Despite all the different 
ownership structures all companies in which the Salim family has a major 
share are commonly considered part of the Salim Group. 
 
‘In every company with a partner, the Liem Group is always the one 
with the largest shareholding’. (Liem Sioe Liong)303  
 
‘You have to differentiate between the Salim Group, Salim family 
owned, and the bigger group comprised of the Salim partners and 
the Liem investors. Salim Group [the Salim family] may have some 
activities in which the Liem investors have a stake. But Salim Group 
[the Salim family] also has its own business. For example the Liem 
investors invested in First Pacific and Indocement. Salim family has 
Indomobil, plantations and so on where Liem investors have no 
role’. (Salim Group Manager) 
 
What is part of the Salim Group and what is not often remains unclear. It is 
therefore helpful to create in your mind a picture of the Salim Group as a 
network rather than as a single unit (see Figure 5.2). The companies in the 
group are connected by ownership and leadership. Whether or not a 
company belongs to the Salim Group is often a matter of inside information, 
as the group only publishes results of its publicly listed companies, not of 
the private operating units or private holding companies. Interview results 
suggest that the Salim Group sometimes purposefully maintains the 
confusion as to who is the real owner. The Liem family and the Liem 
investors are considered the core group of partners that have shaped the 
Salim Group.  
 
Aside from the core group of shareholders many new businesses, 
particularly in the industrial manufacturing area, started out as 
partnerships. In the early stage the Salim Group often became the leading 
partner in a domestic venture by acquiring a company that was not very 
successful. Examples of this are Indomobil and part of the cement business.  
 
‘To buy what already exists and then make it big, that’s the strength 
of the Liem Group. This is the reason why I can keep costs low’. 
(Liem Sioe Liong)304 
                                                 
303 See Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
304 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. 
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Figure 5.2 The Salim Group Ownership and Structure 
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In the period 1994-1997 a large number of new partnerships were 
announced. These partnerships support the notion that the Salim Group is 
seeking to diversify even further, both in the nature of its activities as in 
their geographical locations. The new partnerships show a great variety of 
new activities for the Salim Group with a range of partners. We can 
distinguish between three types of partners: foreign (non-Indonesian and 
non-Chinese) partners; ethnic Chinese partnerships; and political 
connections (Figure 5.3). Generally speaking Western and Japanese partners 
are common in industries were outside technology was required. 
Indocement, Indofood, Indomobil were all set up in such a way.  
 
In several cases the original partners later withdrew or were bought out and 
the companies came under control of the Salim Group. In other cases the 
partnership continued or was expanded into new fields. Ethnic Chinese 
partners are common when it comes to large Indonesian or Asian ventures 
or investments, often in the form of a consortium. Indonesian partners often 
involve ventures with the second generation Suharto family, but the scope 
and value of these seem rather modest in this period compared to the overall 
size of the group.  According to a person interviewed for this study and 
familiar with the group:  
 
‘Before the crisis there was not really a strategy. If he (Anthony 
Salim) diversified into small other things, it was probably to help 
out partners, such as the Suharto family’. (IBRA Employee) 
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Figure 5.3 New Partnerships of the Salim Group 1994-1997 
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Source: coding results 
 
The choice of partners appeared to be opportunistic, as the following story 
reveals: 
 
‘The partnership with Dunlop, which is basically run by Sumitomo, 
was completely by accident. At that time the Dunlop manager 
visited and proposed a tire factory in Indonesia, but we considered 
the investment to be too high. Then there was the Kobe earthquake 
in Japan, and the whole top-management of the company was in 
Indonesia. As their lives were saved, they wanted to move their 
facilities to Indonesia, and therefore with a low investment we had a 
partnership with them’. (Salim Manager) 
 
Thus, in the period from 1994-1997, the Salim Group entered into a number 
of partnerships with foreign (mostly Japanese and Western), ethnic Chinese 
and crony partners. The partnerships with Japanese and Western companies 
seem to be most important for the group when building up manufacturing 
businesses in Indonesia. The Salim Group also participated in regional 
ethnic Chinese networks, albeit usually as a minority shareholder. Ventures 
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with the Suharto family also take place, although the scale of those activities 
seems rather modest.  
 
 
5.6 Further Expansion 
 
Aside from the new partnerships the Salim Group announced in this period, 
the existing companies also expanded further through organic growth and 
acquisitions. The substantial organic growth of the Salim Group in 1994-mid 
1997 can partly be illustrated by the production capacity levels of the largest 
Salim companies in Indonesia. Production capacity for noodles, cement, 
flour, and alkyl-benzene was expanded before the crisis, although in some 
cases, like Indocement, the new plants only came on stream during the 
crisis305.  
 
Most of these companies sold their products on the domestic market, and 
the organic growth was directly related to the growth of the Indonesian 
economy.  
 
‘Previously they were in every business. They usually target 
companies with mass production, no high-tech and also little 
branded goods. Take for example Indosiar, a TV channel that is not 
investing in high-tech, more on the creation of programmes for the 
masses that attract advertisers. They need cash for short term, 
working capital’. (IBRA Employee) 
 
Despite the Indonesian policy of stimulating exports, none of the listed 
Salim Group companies in Indonesia were exporting substantial portions of 
their production306. In 1995 the Salim Group reached market shares of 90% 
for instant noodles and 89% for flour. In cement the market share was 38% in 
Indonesia, but 71% in Java where about 60% of the Indonesian population 
lives. UIC, the partly Salim-owned alkyl-benzene producer, held a 
monopoly. All these businesses achieved substantial production capacity 
growth (Figure 5.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
305 Figures for Indomobil and BCA were not available for the period, The Indomobil 
Group was only listed on the Jakarta stock exchange in 1997 and BCA in 2001.  
306 Although the listed companies were not heavily engaged in exporting, this does not 
apply for the private companies. Some of those were mainly producing for exports, such 
as shoes, flower, meat, and shrimps. 
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Figure 5.4 Production Capacity Growth 
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Sources: Annual reports of Indofood, Indocement, UIC, various years. The cement 
production expansion started in 1996 came on stream in 1999, for this reason the 
figures until 2000 are displayed.   
 
The expansion of Indofood’s noodle production, which already had a 90% 
market share, caused some controversy. In 1995, the Salim Group applied 
for government permission to build 3 extra factories. The approval was 
initially withheld on the grounds that companies with a market share of 
over 50% would not be allowed to expand further. This policy was later 
suddenly reversed and it was announced that Indofood met the 
requirements necessary for expansion, which were that the company had to 
be listed and the products exported307. According to the 1996 annual report 
of Indofood however, only 1.5% of sales stemmed from overseas sales in 
1995 and 0.95% in 1996. Exports, which were never substantial for Indofood 
since its listing, even declined.   
 
Information on the expansion of Indonesian companies not listed on the 
stock exchange was harder to obtain, but information from the Salim 
brochure in 1996 also indicated the extremely ambitious expansion plans of 
the Salim Group.  Some examples were:  
• Planned expansion of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) production from 400,000 
tons in 1995 to 2 million tons; 
                                                 
307 See for example the Australian (1995a). 
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• Planned production of 700,000 tons refined sugar annually; 
• Intention to cultivate 200,000 hectares of rice 
• Production increase from 96,000 tons caustic soda in 1995 to 200,000 tons 
and from 90,000 tons of ethylene dichloride to 240,000 tons; 
• Galvanised iron sheets production projected to increase from 90,000 in 
1995 to 190,000 tons.   
 
The international activities of the Salim Group also expanded rapidly. Listed 
First Pacific Company in Hong Kong can itself be described as a 
conglomerate with telecom, property, marketing & distribution and banking 
interests. It operated as an investment holding and several of the companies 
under its umbrella were themselves listed on various stock exchanges308. 
Contrary to the Indonesian companies, which were mainly active on the 
domestic markets, First Pacific did business in over 50 countries, not only in 
Asia, but also in Europe and the US. First Pacific was run by Manuel 
Pangilinan, a professional manager of Filipino descent who earned the 
nickname Pacman for his numerous acquisitions. These led to further 
diversification of First Pacific. The rapid development of First Pacific also 
contributed to the further internationalisation of the Salim Group. QAF, one 
of the smaller companies listed in Singapore showed a moderate growth, 
and also started to expand beyond Singapore, for example to Malaysia, 
China and Thailand. The main business of QAF is bakery products. 
 
Thus, having emerged as the largest conglomerate, the 1990s were used for 
additional expansion of existing businesses and for further 
internationalisation. The international activities, which now accounted for 
over a quarter of turnover, effectively decreased the dependence on 
Indonesia. The explosion of new ventures as well as the substantial 
expansion of existing businesses together made up the large growth of the 
Salim Group. 
 
   
5.7 Consolidation and Vertical Integration 
 
In the previous sections we looked at new partnerships and organic growth; 
in this section I describe the strategy of the Salim Group to cope with such 
high growth. One of the noteworthy aspects of the Salim Group is its 
complexity with large numbers of separate legal entities. The Salim Group 
                                                 
308 For 1996 the listed companies under the First Pacific umbrella were (company name 
(country of listing) economic interest attributable to subsidiary company in %): 
Hagemeyer N.V.  (Netherlands) 38.1%; Berli Jucker Company Ltd. (Thailand) 57.5%; 
P.T. Darya-Varia Laboratoria (Indonesia) 51.4%;  Metro Pacific Corporation 
(Philippines) 63.7%;  FPB Bank Holding Company Ltd. (Hongkong) 51%; PDCP 
Development Bank Inc. (Philippines) 21.8%.  
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companies were themselves subdivided into groups, such as the Indomobil 
group, the Oleochemicals group, the Mosquito Coils group and so on309. The 
Indomobil Group had 90 subsidiaries in 1997 with activities in 
manufacturing parts, assembling, distribution, sales, financing and vehicle 
rental services. Partly this complexity comes with the large number of 
partners. Indomobil had partnerships with Suzuki, Mazda, Hino, Ford (in 
financing), Nissan, Volvo and some smaller automotive players. According 
to a Salim manager interviewed for this study and involved in automotive: 
‘Every partner with whom we have a JV needs a new holding company, 
because you cannot mix partners up.’ 
 
From 1994 to mid 1997 the group made several efforts to integrate its 
operations. The way in which this took place was by means of internal 
mergers and acquisitions. Internal acquisitions occur if one Salim Group 
company takes over another or if the ownership of Salim company A is 
shifted from Salim owned company B towards Salim owned firm C. 
Although information on private companies is limited, the information 
available on the listed companies provides a picture of the inter-group 
consolidation efforts. If we look at the internal dynamic of the group, we see 
a number of interesting patterns. 
 
In the case of the food industry, the noodle activities were merged and then 
listed on the stock exchange under the name Indofood Sukses Makmur 
(Indofood) in 1994. Following the listing of Indofood on the stock exchange, 
the Salim family started to sell several of their private enterprises to the now 
listed Indofood. In 1995, the flour milling activities (Bogasari), previously 
part of Indocement, were brought under the Indofood umbrella. In 1996 
there were no major acquisitions, but in 1997 the majority shares of the 
privately owned edible oil activities, plantations and distribution activities 
were all sold to Indofood. These were all companies under the umbrella of 
the Salim Group, so we can speak of internal acquisitions. Palm plantations 
produce Crude Palm Oil, which is processed into edible oil and used in the 
manufacturing of instant noodles. Flour is another main ingredient for 
noodles, and the distribution and retail activities are the sales outlets for 
instant noodles. In a period of four years the Salim Group had consolidated 
its food activities in Indonesia by following a strategy of vertical integration 
and internal reshuffling of assets. A person familiar with the group:  
 
                                                 
309 After the Asian Crisis the Salim Group handed over a large number of companies to 
the Indonesian government, who subsequently sold them. Because of this sales process, 
information on the structure of the various companies was published. It became evident 
that the companies were organised in sub-groups of operating companies under the 
umbrella of at least one, but often more holding companies (Holdiko, 1999, 2001). 
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‘Anthony Salim wants to be an integrated food player where he 
controls everything from the wheat to the noodles and from the pig 
to the frozen pork in the Chinese supermarkets. This food business 
is about 50-60% of the profits and cash flow of the empire. Therefore 
food is a strong recurring theme for the Salim Group’. (Person close 
to the group) 
 
If we look at the cement activities in this period, the strategy was also one of 
vertical integration, complemented with related diversification. In 1996 
Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa (Indocement) was working on the 
establishment of a coal mining facility, which would provide energy (one of 
the major cost components in cement production). It distributed its cement 
in Java with 164 trucks and partly owned its distributors. Indocement had 
portfolio investments in property such as office buildings, hotels and 
industrial estates. Activities in construction management were also part of 
the portfolio as well as a minority interest in a toll road operator (owned by 
Tutut, one of Suharto’s daughters)310.  
 
Another example of the strategy of merging existing companies was Darya-
Varia Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company in Indonesia. It first acquired 
a distributor – formerly owned by Salim311. It was subsequently listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange.  It subsequently made a series of acquisitions and it 
became the second-largest Indonesian pharmaceutical company by market 
share with production and distribution activities312.  
 
Yet another example of an internal acquisition was UIC, the partly-Salim 
owned chemicals company, which bought Salim Oleochemicals Singapore in 
May 1997313. The chemicals division of Salim, which according to an in-
depth report shows a high degree of vertical integration and is comprised of 
chemicals producers in various phases of the value chain for products like 
detergents, plastics and packaging materials314. A Salim manager explained:  
 
‘They (the Salims) want to be vertically integrated, in all industries. 
The choice of industries is opportunity driven. E.g. Hagemeyer was 
                                                 
310 According to a Jakarta analyst interviewed for this study the shares in the toll road 
operator were given as a payment for the delivery of cement to construct the toll-road.  
311 A Hong Kong Newspaper reported in 1994: ‘First Pacific Co subsidiary Darya-Varia 
Laboratoria has agreed to buy stakes in two Indonesian companies for 8.5 billion rupiah 
(about HK$ 32 million). It has signed an agreement to buy 50 per cent of the shares in 
Central Sari Medical Supplies and 49 per cent of the shares in Gelatindo Mukti Graha.’ 
(South China Morning Post, 1994). Both companies were mentioned in a list of Salim 
Group companies in 1989 (CISI, 1989) 
312 According to the First Pacific Annual Report, 1996. 
313 See Asia Pulse (1997). 
314 See for example the Chemicals Business Newsbase (1997). 
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bought because the prices for Indonesian products are set by large 
traders/distributors. If you buy Hagemeyer you can control the 
price’. (Salim Manager) 
 
Aside from the fact that these asset shuffles led to some degree of vertical 
integration, they also provided the opportunity to influence the flows of 
money within the group. Several interviews as well as newspaper articles 
indicate that the internal acquisitions are a way to make money, for example 
when listed companies overpay for acquisitions of private Salim companies. 
A banker close to the group said:  
 
‘Take for example Indofood. The Salim Group has a private 
plantation, assets are inflated, and the plantation is bought by 
Indofood. On the basis of those extra assets, they are able to get 
extra borrowing capacity.’ 
 
Thus, the number of separate entities was consolidated by means of smartly 
grouping companies under the umbrella of larger listed companies. The 
large listed companies in Indonesia followed a strategy of vertical 
integration by means of internal restructuring. The strategy of consolidation 
and vertical integration was carried out by internally transferring companies 
from private ownership to listed Salim companies. 
 
 
5.8 Intra-group Synergy 
 
Aside from vertical integration, there were also several indications of 
coordination between the different Salim Group companies in order to 
achieve synergy. Interviews with Salim Group managers clearly show that 
major activities are coordinated amongst them. Anthony Salim explained 
that synergy was about knowing how to create the right products:  
 
‘We see this with different angles. What is the synergy between 
retail chain (Indomarco, 800 branches), Indofood and television. We 
see that as a synergy. Why? If you are able to understand the shelf, 
where people are buying things, the product, Indofood, then TV, 
then you can understand how the behaviour is of the people that are 
going to buy. Synergy is that we understand how people are 
creating new products. We can observe trends by the TV station, for 
example in advertisements. That helps us to understand what new 
products we should introduce. Of course we talk flour, packaging – 
vertical; another synergy. Different ways of defining synergy’. 
(Anthony Salim)  
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‘For example the TV. The way we monitor is in 24 hours how many 
seconds you are advertising. The free second which you broadcast, if 
it is unused, we are trying to use as much as what we call inside 
advertising’. (Anthony Salim)   
 
In this period for example, when the group companies needed cars, they 
would go to Indomobil and Indorent, the automotive parts of the group. 
When they needed construction, they would use Indocement and so on. 
Several managers called group companies their customers and this is 
confirmed by the related party sales and purchases (Table 5.2). Indofood for 
example, sold 60% of their output to related parties and Indocement 65% in 
1994.  UIC shows a particularly high level of related party sales, which is in 
line with the interview with one of the managers who indicates that the 
potential weakness of his company is losing touch with the “real” market 
because UIC sells mostly to related parties315. 
 
Table 5.2 Related Party Sales as a Percentage of Total Sales 
Related Party Sales 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Indofood 60% 69% 31% 4% 
Indocement 65% 63% 66% 78% 
UIC n.a. 91% 90% 88% 
Source: Annual Reports 
 
The group companies used BCA (Bank Central Asia) as their main bank, 
making this financial institution perhaps the most important integrating 
factor (Table 5.3). BCA was a key factor in providing loans to group 
companies, particularly short term rupiah loans. As a result of the relatively 
attractive rates on USD loans, most companies increased their indebtedness 
to foreign banks (and vulnerability for currency fluctuations), but BCA 
remained important when it came to domestic loans. In its annual reports 
BCA stated that it extended about 1.5-2.5% of its total loans to related parties 
in 1994-1996. However, in view of information that surfaced during the 
Asian crisis, it is more likely that this figure was considerably higher, 
according to interviews and reports it may have been in the range of 50-80%.  
 
Table 5.3 BCA Short Term Loans (% of Total Short Term Loans) 
Short Term Loans with BCA 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Indofood 75% 26% 26% 52% 
Indocement 25% 16% 38% 14% 
Indomobil n.a. n.a. 17% 39% 
NB: UIC did not have banking relations with BCA; it obtained most of its loans in 
USD. 
                                                 
315 In this case, the related parties are not only Salim Group companies, but also 
companies linked to other major UIC shareholders such as the Wings Group. 
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BCA was but one example of joint services; another is insurance. Most 
companies use group companies like PT Asuransi Central Asia and PT 
Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia Raya to insure their assets. There are also 
connections between listed and non-listed Salim Group companies. Take for 
example the food activities. Indofood focused on the Indonesian market, but 
apart from Indofood the Salim Group also has similar but much smaller 
businesses in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and China. Indofood provided 
management services for these foreign noodle makers and received fees in 
return. Other examples included packaging, for which group companies are 
used – although managers stressed that they had the option to choose non-
group companies as well when it came to purchasing packaging materials. 
There were also inter-company loans which were actively facilitated by the 
people close to Anthony Salim.  
 
‘They [people from the holding company] were familiar with the 
cash-flow; I could approach them to obtain cash from other [Salim] 
companies. For example if another company has excess cash, I can 
borrow from another company, but I have to pay. The holding 
company knows the situation of the companies, but if I borrow, the 
payment is directly between the companies, not between the 
holding. It’s like a broker, but no fee. (..)  When I want to borrow, I 
directly go to the other [Salim] companies for cash or I get the 
capital outside, for example by issuing bonds like we did. Every 
month we submit a financial report, so Anthony Salim knows it if 
we borrow from other companies’. (Salim Group Executive, 
Automotive) 
 
Thus, looking at the internal dynamic of the group, we can say that there 
seems to be a coherent group-level strategy of achieving synergy between 
seemingly unrelated businesses. In the period for 1994-1997 this strategy 
was not only diversification, growth and vertical integration (as 
demonstrated in the previous sections), but also one of achieving synergy, of 
intra-group coordination. The horizontal integration can be witnessed in 
high levels of related-party transactions (sales and purchases) and shared 
professional services such as financing, leasing, insurance and management 
consulting for group companies.  
 
 
5.9 Coordination and Control of the Salim Group 
 
In the previous sections I demonstrated the existence of a coherent group-
level strategy of vertical integration and intra-group coordination. This 
overall strategy was carried out under leadership of Anthony Salim by 
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means of a number of control and coordination mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are the focus of this section. 
 
The pattern of ownership within the Salim Group was often a pyramid 
structure. Companies were controlled sometimes directly, sometimes 
through a range of holding companies.  Company A, at the top of the 
pyramid, may own company B with 51% of the shares, B in turn owns C by 
51%, and so on. The ownership construction in the form of a pyramid 
allowed the Liem investors to control the companies in the pyramid while 
not having direct majority ownership in all the companies. In other words, 
their cash flow rights were lower than their control rights. This ownership 
pattern was common for various companies316. An essential part of such a 
pyramid structure was that all companies are ultimately controlled by a 
holding company, which was not listed. Anthony Salim comments that ‘a 
private holding is much more flexible, but it does not mean that we have no 
checks and balances. We operate with very stringent rules’. This pyramid 
ownership structure ensures that the legitimate decision-making power was 
in the hands of the Salim family.  
 
A direct reporting line existed between the directors of the Salim Group 
companies and the Salim family. In the beginning the top managers had to 
report to Liem Sioe Liong in Singapore, but in the 1990s Anthony Salim 
gradually took over the leadership. Managers had to file weekly or monthly 
reports which gave fairly detailed income statements as well as market-
related data.  Anthony Salim actually studied and commented on all these 
reports in detail according to the various top-managers interviewed. Thus, 
the decision-making power inherent in the ownership structure was used by 
the Salim family to intervene in the management of the Salim companies 
until a fairly high degree of detail. 
 
The Salim family often used terms that are common on Western 
management, without necessarily attaching the same meaning. One of such 
terms was the word holding company, which normally would mean a 
company that holds shares in other companies. The Salim Group considered 
its headquarters the “holding company”, even if such a thing did not exist as 
a legal entity nor did it hold shares in other companies. What they called the 
Salim Group holding company, which was presented as the headquarters in 
the Salim brochure of 1996, had the following units:  legal affairs & taxation; 
internal audit and financial analysis; treasury; and human resource 
management. This holding company (or sometimes called a management 
holding company) was not a holding in the sense that it holds shares in 
                                                 
316 This pyramid structure is also evident in the companies transferred to Holdiko. 
Virtually all the companies handed over to the Indonesian government had one or more 
holding companies. (Holdiko 1999, 2001). 
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other companies, but in the sense that it gave management services. One of 
the Salim managers adds to the confusion:  
 
‘The holding company is not a corporate identity as such. Legally is 
there is not a board as such. But certainly there is an organisation in 
the holding companies’. (Salim Executive) 
 
What seemed to be the case was that the Salim family with a number of staff 
took most of the decisions and plotted the long-term strategy of all entities 
belonging to the Salim Group. The ‘holding’ was chaired by Liem, whereas 
the day-to-day decisions were made by president and CEO Anthony Salim, 
assisted by his top-management including executive director Benny Santoso.  
 
Before the crisis a legal entity called Inti Salim Corpora performed the above 
mentioned tasks– although it is not unlikely that more than one registered 
entity performed coordination tasks for the group317. According to 
interviews with top-managers Inti Salim Corpora recruited them and paid 
their salaries. It organised trainings and social events. Several managers saw 
Inti Salim Corpora as the group of top managers of the Salim companies: 
‘Anthony’s own people’. There were regular coordination activities within 
this group, which, according to one of the managers, comprised of over 20 
people and had meetings at least monthly. They coordinated activities such 
as joint projects or inter-company transactions such as sales or financial 
transactions and perhaps acted as an informal board for the Salim 
companies.  
 
‘Inti Salim Corpora was set up as a management holding company. 
It is not truly holding company as such, but only comprising of 
people who are providing the services to the Salim Group as a 
whole as well as to the operating units within the group. For 
example in the past they used to have the internal audit division, 
HR division, tax and legal department’. (Salim Group Executive, 
various industries) 
 
[Inti Salim Corpora] ‘takes care of the management of the Salim 
Group. It’s the key management people like Indofood, cement, 
Bogasari, the chemicals, property’. (Salim Group Executive, 
Automotive) 
 
Inti Salim Corpora also had a large group of internal controllers and legal or 
tax-advisors. Estimates of the number of auditors that worked for the group 
                                                 
317 PT Salim Inti Corpora was established in 1983 and had a registered capital of just 100 
million rupiah, the owners being Anthony Salim and Andree Halim with 50% each 
(Berita Negara, 1998).  
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as a whole and provided controls and directions to the different Salim 
companies run into the hundreds. They too received the periodic reports. 
Several managers experienced the internal auditors as “very tough” and one 
top-manager called them ‘consultants – but with power’. The internal 
auditors also brokered financial transactions, but according to a manager if 
you borrowed from other group company you had to pay, so using the 
internal capital market was possible but not always the most favourable 
option.  
 
Thus, in order to be able to carry out a coherent group-level strategy, the 
group made sure that the formal decision-making power was firmly 
centralised in the hands of the ultimate owners: the Salim family. The 
decision-making power is actively used to give detailed directions and was 
made possible because of a management information system of weekly 
reports that are studied in detail by Anthony Salim. Apart from this, a large 
number of internal auditors continuously scrutinised and checked the 
financials of the Salim companies. By means of one (or possibly more) 
entities a set of coordination mechanisms was implemented which ensured 
the group spirit and coordination of Salim activities in terms of possible 
inter-company synergy. A coherent recruiting strategy was also in place. An 
internal capital market was facilitated by the internal auditors.   
 
 
5.10 Salim Group Leadership 
 
In 1993 Liem Sioe Liong, now aged 77, started to pass on the leadership of 
the family business to one of his younger sons: Anthony Salim, who 
gradually increased his positions on the various corporate boards.  Liem 
himself also remained active in the group on various boards. Anthony Salim, 
then aged 44, started his career in 1971 after graduating from a London 
technical college and was chosen leader of the group despite the fact that he 
was younger than his brothers.  One of the top-managers described going to 
Singapore to report to Liem regularly, although in the period under review 
this role was slowly taken over by Anthony Salim. 
 
The board of executive directors of a large Salim Group company is mostly 
composed of professional managers. These are usually trusted people that 
have been linked to the group for a long time. Professional managers 
generally stay with the group for decades and the group offers good 
incentives to its managers. Some managers eventually leave strike out on 
their own and build their own group, such as Mochtar Riady. This former 
CEO of the BCA Bank successfully built his own financial group, the LIPPO 
group. The Salim family may also hold one position on the executive board 
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and several on the supervisory board (as non-executive board-members318). 
If the group is a Liem Investors company, the other Liem investors (Risjad, 
Sudwikatmono and the Djuhar family) tend to also have seats on the board 
(Annex 9 gives an overview of Salim Group executives). Table 5.4 shows the 
involvement of the Salim family and Liem Investors in Indocement, 
Indofood, and First Pacific, Indomobil (as of 1997), Bank Central Asia (BCA) 
and Unggul Indah Cahaya (UIC).  
 
Aside from Liem and his two sons, the only other family member that 
occupied a strategically important position is Franciscus Welirang, the 
brother-in-law of Anthony Salim. He held an important position in Indofood 
(overseeing flour milling) and held board positions in other Salim 
companies as well. However, aside from these four, there is no evidence that 
more family members are actively involved in managing the Salim Group.  
One other person that stands out is Benny Santoso, who is working very 
closely with Anthony Salim. In the period from 1994 to 1997 he held board 
positions in Indocement, Indofood, Indomobil and Bank Central Asia. 
 
The board memberships displayed above are in majority commissioners. 
This implies a supervisory rather than an executive role. Companies like 
Indofood, First Pacific, Indomobil and UIC are all run full-time by 
professional long-time Salim managers with strong personalities and 
thorough knowledge of the business. Unlike the owners, they stick to their 
business and rarely hold board positions in other listed companies. These 
managers are sometimes in charge of other non-listed companies in similar 
fields.  
 
The common ‘Salim-culture’ the managers describe is one of informal 
decision-making and very hard-working. There is very little internal 
bureaucracy and reporting lines are short. Once managers are trusted they 
enjoy a considerable level of freedom. Outsiders generally find the culture 
different from other Indonesian family conglomerates. They describe it as 
very professional. But others comment on the seemingly unchecked empire 
building and the aggressive style of doing business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
318 Indonesia follows the Dutch two-tier board system consisting of a board of directors 
and a supervisory board which consists of commissioners. Hong Kong and Singapore 
have a one-tier board with executive  
and non-executive members.  
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Table 5.4 Liem Investors and Board Memberships 1994-1997 
First Pacific Indofood 
Liem Investors 19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
Liem Investors 19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
Soedono Salim x x x x Soedono Salim x x x x
Anthony Salim x x x Anthony Salim x x x x
Franciscus Welirang Franciscus Welirang x x x
Sudwikatmono x x x x Sudwikatmono x x x x
Ibrahim Risjad x x x Ibrahim Risjad x x x x
Sutanto Djuhar x x x Herman Djuhar x
Tedy Djuhar x x x Tedy Djuhar x x x x
Indocement  UIC 
Liem Investors 19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
Liem Investors 19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
Soedono Salim x x x x Soedono Salim
Anthony Salim x x x x Anthony Salim x x x x
Andree Halim x x x x Andree Halim x x x x
Franciscus Welirang x x x x Franciscus Welirang
Sudwikatmono x x x x Sudwikatmono
Ibrahim Risjad x x x x Ibrahim Risjad
Sutanto Djuhar x x x x Sutanto Djuhar
Johny Djuhar x x x x Johny Djuhar
Tedy Djuhar x x x x Tedy Djuhar
Indomobil BCA 
Liem Investors 19
94
*
19
95
*
19
96
*
19
97
Liem Investors 19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
*
Soedono Salim x Soedono Salim x x x
Anthony Salim x Anthony Salim x x x
Andree Halim x Andree Halim x x x
Franciscus Welirang x Franciscus Welirang
Sudwikatmono x Sudwikatmono
Ibrahim Risjad Ibrahim Risjad
Sutanto Djuhar Sutanto Djuhar
Johny Djuhar Johny Djuhar
Tedy Djuhar Tedy Djuhar
* no annual report available * no annual report available  
Source: Salim Group Board Membership Database compiled by the author. 
 
 
5.11 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The period from 1994 –mid 1997 can be considered a golden age for the 
Salim Group. The economic environment was favourable, and the well-
connected and large Salim Group was in an excellent position to profit from 
this business context. The overall sales growth rates for the group were 
possibly around 40% per year in this period, substantially higher than the 
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economic growth in the region. Most existing businesses, which were in 
high-growth areas of the Indonesian economy, had ambitious expansion 
plans. Their sales increased through organic growth as well as through 
acquisitions. The growth of the international division of the Salim Group, 
First Pacific, was particularly high, and as a result the internationalisation 
process, which had started in the mid-1980s, intensified and now 
contributed more than a quarter of total sales. The Salim Group became less 
dependent on Indonesia, where anti-Chinese sentiments and criticism 
towards Liem personally were always present under the surface.  
 
A large number of new partnerships were formed in a variety of fields and 
countries, particularly Indonesia and China. Many of the joint ventures were 
formed with Japanese or Western partners, in particular in those industries 
that required technological expertise or large capital layouts. As part of 
consortia, the Salim Group also partnered with other ethnic Chinese in the 
region, although these ventures did not form a major share of their activities. 
Good relationships with Suharto and his children meant that the Salim 
Group could take advantage of the high economic growth by lobbying for 
favourable regulations, for example in instant noodles. Direct business 
ventures with the Suharto family seem less important than in its initial 
growth phase. 
 
The Salim Group cannot be categorised as a portfolio of different companies. 
A coherent group strategy of internal restructuring and vertical integration 
rationalised the main Salim Group companies. In addition to vertical 
integration, there was also a pattern of synergy between the group 
companies, which is for example evident in the sales, purchases, and loans 
to related parties. This shows that the Salim Group is not completely run as 
a portfolio, but that it takes advantage of inter-group linkages.  
 
The control over the group is firmly in the hands of the Salim family, which 
established a system of reporting, control and active intervention. Further 
coordination took place by facilitating contacts through a holding company 
named Inti Salim Corpora. The task of this unit was to control as well as 
facilitate integration.  
 
The intra-group links become even more apparent if one analyses the board 
memberships of various Salim Group companies in the period 1994-1997. 
The Salim family and Liem Investors take up important board positions, 
although professional manager usually do the day-to-day management. The 
Salim Group culture is characterised as professional, hard-working and 
aggressive in its business pursuits (Table 5.5).  
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Table 5.5 Summary 
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices 
1994-1997 
rapid 
growth 
- continuation of liberal 
economic policies 
- protection of selected 
businessmen 
- activity in connection with 
Suharto as his succession is 
discussed 
- more crony capitalism 
- FDI inflow 
- continue internationalisation  
- restructuring & vertical 
integration 
- hiring professional managers  
- small businesses with Suharto’s 
children 
- fast growth of existing & new 
businesses, increasingly with 
foreign partners 
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Chapter 6: Fire-Fighting 
 
 
‘Uncertainty is always in the equation’  
Anthony Salim,  
CEO & President, Salim Group 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter described the growth of the Salim Group in the period 
1994-mid-1997. It argued that the group developed rapidly through new 
investments with partners, growth of existing business and acquisitions. 
Some of its important businesses were structured along the value chain by 
following a strategy of vertical integration. In addition a conscious strategy 
of intra-group coordination was carried out by the Salim family. The 
international division diversified and expanded through acquisitions. All 
this happened in a business context of high economic growth and 
government protection for well-connected conglomerates like the Salim 
Group. 
 
In the period that is covered in this chapter the business context is suddenly 
reversed. The economy contracted, the rupiah devaluated and many 
companies in Indonesia became insolvent319. The Asian Crisis led to an 
unprecedented decline and near-nationalisation of the Salim Group. Since 
the Salim Group played such a prominent role in the Indonesian economy, it 
also played a prominent role in the political and economic crisis in 
Indonesia. The Salim Group faced the most devastating years of its history. 
 
This chapter covers the period from the start of the crisis in mid 1997 until 
the end of 2000. It starts with a description of the events leading up to the 
Asian Crisis, particularly in Indonesia. The dramatic events in the crisis and 
its effects on the Salim Group are analysed as well as the strategy followed 
by the Salim Group to cope with the crisis – a strategy of fire-fighting. It 
discusses the impact on the group’s structure, ownership and leadership. 
 
 
6.2 Unprecedented Problems 
 
In May 1997 the Thai currency started to devaluate rapidly, causing a panic 
among investors in the Asian region. In July 1997, the crisis had started to 
                                                 
319 Of the 214 companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 128 companies reported a 
loss for the first months of 1998 and 53 companies reported a negative equity (Zhuang et 
al., 2001).   
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spread to other countries, including Indonesia. The Indonesian government 
initially assured local conglomerates that the Indonesian currency would not 
be devaluated. This proved not to be sustainable. After first widening the 
band, in August the monetary authorities of Indonesia implemented a free-
floating exchange system for the rupiah, which subsequently fell further in a 
rapid pace. The rupiah, which stood at 2,450 to the dollar by the end of June 
1997, rapidly lost value until it reached a low of 15,000 in June 1998. The fall 
of the rupiah caused a ballooning corporate debt since companies had most 
loans denominated in dollars whereas assets and income were measured in 
rupiah.  
 
The results of the crisis were that in 1998 - the worst crisis year - half of the 
Indonesian companies were technically insolvent and the economy 
contracted by over 13%320. The stock exchange fell sharply to a third of its 
previous level, particularly in the last quarter of 1997 and the Salim 
company stock prices fell as well (see Figure 6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1 Indexed Stock Prices of Indofood and Indocement 
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Source: Jakarta Stock Exchange 
 
                                                 
320 See Zhuang et al. (2001). 
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The vulnerability of the corporate sector in the region was clearly 
demonstrated in a paper by Pomerleano321, who analysed the health of the 
corporate sector in various countries prior the crisis, and concluded that 
Thailand, Korea and Indonesia were the most vulnerable (Figure 6.2). 
During a time when capital poured into Southeast Asia, many businesses, 
among them the Salim Group, had started to borrow heavily from foreign 
banks, which offered substantially lower interest rates than local banks. In 
addition most companies, including the Salim Group, expanded rapidly - 
which required extra capital. The result was a general rise in the debt-to-
equity ratio of many Asian companies, and an increase in dollar 
denominated loans, making the corporate sector vulnerable to currency 
fluctuations. According to an IMF report the external corporate debt rose 
from USD 34 billion in 1996 to USD 60 billion early 1998322. 
 
Figure 6.2 Corporate Leverage in Selected Countries  
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Source: adapted from Pomerleano (1998, p.8) 
 
Thee, an Indonesian economist, mentioned comparable figures: the total 
foreign debt of Indonesia was USD 138 billion, of which USD64.5 billion was 
private debt323. Even worse, many of these foreign currency loans were 
short-term. Indofood, for example, saw its proportion of USD short term 
loans as a percentage of total short term borrowings rise from 11% in 1994 to 
49% in 1996, the year prior to the crisis. Most Salim companies experienced 
more vulnerability to currency fluctuations, as is demonstrated by their 
proportion of USD loans as a percentage of their total loans (see Table 6.1). 
                                                 
321 See Pomerleano (1998). 
322 See IMF (2004). 
323 Thee, 2003, p. 189. 
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Indofood admitted it had hedged only 15% of its debt, and was forced to 
issue a profit warning in October 1997324. 
 
Table 6.1 US Dollar Loans for Major Salim Companies (% of total) 
USD Loans 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Indofood 37% 54% 63% 77% 
Indocement 29% 40% 54% 96% 
Indomobil n.a. n.a. 51% 71% 
UIC 88% 100% 98% 99% 
Sources: annual reports of mentioned companies 
 
As it became clear that the corporate sector experienced widespread 
problems paying foreign debts, the government appointed a special 
commission of five people (the Private Foreign Debt Settlement Team) that 
had to look into the matter. Anthony Salim was one of the members. The 
committee concluded in January 1998 that 228 Indonesian companies had 
problems paying their foreign debts325. Anthony Salim also sat on a 
committee called DPKEK (Council of the Stabilisation of Monetary and 
Economic Resilience) which advised on the macro-economic situation 
during the crisis. 
 
Unfortunately, problems were not restricted to the private sector. When the 
rupiah entered a free fall, Indonesians started withdrawing from ATM’s and 
changing their money into dollars en masse, amidst a panic among the 
population as well as within the banking sector. Many Chinese businessmen 
had already started bringing their capital abroad. Since the 1988 
deregulation the financial sector had seen a quick rise in the number and 
importance of private banks. However, financial institutions were generally 
not properly monitored, and many banks were stuck with increasing 
amounts of Non Performing Loans326 and withdrawals. It was a phenomenal 
blow to an already fragile banking system. The government sought 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and signed an 
agreement in October 1997. In November 1997, sixteen banks were closed as 
a result of demands by the IMF. As a consequence of the crisis most banks 
were on the verge of collapse and were given life-saving injections from the 
Bank of Indonesia (the liquidity assistance was called BLBI credits)327. Many 
                                                 
324 Reported in the Financial Times (1997b). 
325 See van Dijk (2002). 
326 Even before the Asian crisis erupted, there were already high levels of Non 
Performing Loans in the Indonesian banking sector (Zhuang et al. 2001; 
Feridhanusetyawan, 1997). 
327 An investigation by the Supreme Audit Agency later revealed irregularities in the 
liquidity credits provided by Bank Indonesia to several banks (totalling over USD 20 
billion). BCA was one of the largest recipients of the liquidity support. It was suggested 
that bank owners had used the capital injections to speculate on foreign exchange rather 
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conglomerates had also used their banks for intra-group lending, something 
officially not allowed but a widespread practice in Indonesia328. When the 
conglomerate companies started to experience problems, their banks 
naturally also experienced those in the form of bad loans329.  
 
Aside from the crisis in the private sector and the collapse of the banking 
sector, the economic crisis in Indonesia also led to a political crisis. By the 
end of 1997 it became clear that the crisis was more serious than expected 
and a new agreement with IMF was announced in January 1998. The 
package of policies that was agreed with the IMF included lowering tariffs 
on various products, including those that had been beneficial to Salim 
companies such as wheat and chemicals import tariffs as well as lowering 
the protection rate of the automotive sector and abolishing the restrictive 
distribution arrangements for cement. Suharto was apparently reluctant to 
commit himself to the IMF agreements which meant to abolish privileges of 
the people around him330. The relationships with IMF were strained. While 
the economy worsened a third IMF agreement was announced in April 1998. 
Suharto’s health – he was now 76 – also led to speculations with regard to 
his succession and for the first time in decades Suharto’s position came 
under increasing pressure.  
 
In early 1998 economists started to voice open criticism on how the 
government handled the situation331. Despite this Suharto was re-elected in 
March although his credibility was falling. His new cabinet, which also 
                                                                                                                   
than using it to increase the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of their banks (AFX Asia, 
2004). But the Bank of Indonesia was not above criticism either. End of 1997, much of 
the management was changed after accusations of corruption (van Dijk, 2002, p. 84)   
328 The legal lending limit for lending to affiliated companies was a maximum of 20% 
but this was violated by most banks owned by Indonesian conglomerates. 
329 Several interviews and also the literature (e.g. Soesastro and Basri, 1998) confirm that 
conglomerates in fact used their banks to collect money from the public and 
subsequently lend to their own group companies. However, most of those people also say 
that the Salim Group, including BCA was much better run and more professional than 
other banks. 
330 There were many instances where Suharto backtracked on decisions that hurt his 
relatives’ or friends’ business interests. One reason for doubting Suharto’s commitment 
to implement the IMF packages is worth noting here. The closure of 16 banks also 
included Bank Andromeda, a bank 25% owned by Suharto’s son Bambang Trihatmodjo. 
He was furious and first threatened to sue the minister of finance. Within a short period 
however, Bambang was able to buy another bank, Bank Alfa. (Wall Street Journal, 1997) 
This bank was bought from Albert Halim (son of Liem Sioe Liong) after an asset swap 
took place. Assets and liabilities of Bank Alfa were transferred to the Bank Risjad Salim 
International (also under the Salim Group) and the assets and liabilities of bank 
Andromeda were inserted (van Dijk, 2002, p.89). Apparently the Salim Group was again 
helping out old friends.  
331 See for example Soesastro and Basri (1998) and van Dijk (2002). 
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included allies like his daughter Tutut and Bob Hasan, an ethnic Chinese 
businessman, was not well received. In January and February 1998 there had 
already been some scattered riots against small Chinese businesses, and the 
Chinese feared to become a scapegoat for Indonesia’s problems. A panic 
emerged and many people started to hoard food. Daily demonstrations by 
students against the current regime became the norm. Liem and some other 
rich Chinese started distributing food parcels to families most affected by 
the crisis332.  
 
By May 1998 large-scale and devastating riots erupted. Public anger, 
aggravated by mounting prices for food and other basic needs, was mostly 
directed at the Suharto family and his so-called cronies. The latter were 
mostly Chinese businesses, among which the Salim Group was considered 
the largest. In practice, all companies small or large that were suspected to 
be owned by Chinese were attacked by rioters while physical violence 
against them also took place. Indonesia witnessed yet another period of 
violence against the Chinese minority and, amidst widespread riots the 
family house of the Salims in Jakarta was set to fire as well as several 
branches of their BCA bank333.  This unrest forced Suharto to resign on May 
21, 1998 and hand over the reign of the country to vice president Habibie. 
After Suharto stepped down a movement arose to fight corruption and 
cronyism. The common term in Indonesia is ‘KKN’ – corruption, collusion 
and nepotism. The backlash against the “Suharto way of doing things” was 
to have serious repercussions for all contracts and businesses linked to the 
Suharto family – including the Salim Group. 
 
Habibie’s presidency was fairly short (from May 1998 until October 1999) - 
and fairly troubled because of the ongoing crisis. After elections in 1999 
President Wahid, nicknamed Gus Dur, took office while the economy 
stopped contracting, but did not grow either. Wahid apparently realised that 
Indonesia could not recover without the capital and talent of businessmen. 
Some of the conglomerates, including the Salim Group had simply grown 
too large to fail. He negotiated with the Chinese-Indonesian business 
tycoons in order for them to return the money that had fled the country – 
estimated between USD 10 and 80 billion. One of Wahid’s first actions was 
to visit Singapore in November 1999 and talk to Chinese-Indonesian 
businessmen. Liem was reported to have been in the audience with Anthony 
                                                 
332 See for example Associated Press (1998a). 
333 Rumours circulated that the riots had been organised, particularly those in the vicinity 
of Liem Sioe Liong’s house (van Dijk, 2002). 
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Salim and to have agreed to return to Jakarta and resume his investments 
there334.  
 
Some trials against former power holders started, notably Suharto’s son 
Tommy (who went into hiding but was later convicted and sent to jail) and 
Bob Hasan (also sent to jail). Several scandals involving corruption and 
nepotism came to light335. Another movement that threatened stability of 
Indonesia was that several regions now demanded more autonomy. Wahid 
made national unity a priority and announced a process of decentralisation 
which made the “cost of doing business” (i.e. corruption) no less, but less 
centralised. Wahid’s government was generally plagued with problems, 
prompting a comment that ‘economic recovery remains hostage to politics, 
with the diverse coalition that makes up the cabinet unable to provide 
strong and effective government’336. Only in 2000 did the economy show 
some growth (4.8%) but the institutional context (government policies, 
bureaucracy, legal system) did not undergo any substantial changes.  
 
The recovery from the crisis in Indonesia was slower than elsewhere in the 
region. According to an economist: ‘owing to its weak financial and 
economic structures and institutions, Indonesia was not able to withstand 
the severe shock of the currency crisis. A political crisis arose that rendered a 
speedy economic recovery more difficult and intractable than in Korean and 
Thailand’337. The other regional economies also experienced a deepening 
economic crisis affecting most companies under the umbrella of First Pacific 
in Hong Kong and KMP in Singapore as well, although the effects of the 
crisis were less devastating for the group than those in Indonesia, which had 
the extra burden of political crisis. The GDP growth in various Asian 
countries reveals the depth of the economic crisis and the recovery (see 
Figure 6.3).  
 
Summarising, the Asian Crisis in Indonesia caused corporate debt problems 
as well as a collapse of the banking sector. During the subsequent political 
crisis the favourable regulatory environment for the Salim Group was 
abolished, and their formerly valuable political connections turned against 
the group. The political crisis and anti-Chinese mob violence posted a direct 
                                                 
334 South China Morning Post, 1999c. The most likely reason why the range of estimated 
capital flight is so broad is that there were no statistics. The source also mentioned that 
the figure was more likely to be closer to USD 10 billion. 
335 These KKN scandals were numerous. The Bank Bali scandal led to the detention of 
the governor of the central bank. The case of Texmaco, another conglomerate, revealed 
that Suharto intervened directly to enable this conglomerate to obtain loans, although this 
was against the prevailing regulations. The Bulog (state logistics agency) scandal 
provided another case of KKN. 
336 McLeod, 2000, p.5. 
337 See Thee (2002, p. 186). 
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physical threat to the Salim family and their assets. The business context in 
this period can best be characterised as extremely hostile. 
 
Figure 6.3 GDP Growth in selected Asian Countries 
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Source: ADB statistics 
 
 
6.3 House on Fire 
 
During the first months of the crisis the group continued its strategy of rapid 
growth and aggressive acquisitions. It was involved in several large bids 
and take-over attempts. These included a hostile take-over attempt of San 
Miguel (a listed Philippine brewer) and a bid for a large stake in the second-
largest Indonesian private bank, Bank Danamon, in November 1997338. Both 
deals would eventually not materialise as a result of the unfolding crisis.  
 
                                                 
338 Newspapers reported rumours of the Salim Group planning to buy a controlling stake 
of San Miguel for 1.6 billion USD. (Australian, 1997) Manuel Pangilinan, CEO of First 
Pacific, reported that “we bought 2% of the company in 1997 for approximately USD 70 
million as a toehold to possibly acquiring a major equity position.” (Annual Report First 
Pacific, 1997). Negotiations with other shareholders, including the Philippine 
government, did not succeed, and therefore the acquired shares were subsequently sold. 
The transaction with Bank Danamon involved 84 million USD (Jakarta Post, 1997c) and 
also involved CSFB as a partner, but was cancelled on April 6, 1998 because of ‘recent 
developments’ i.e. the unfolding crisis (The Jakarta Post, 1998a). 
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Next to its acquisition plans, however, the Salim Group also quickly acted 
upon the emerging economic crisis. When asked whether he had prepared 
for the crisis, Anthony Salim said: 
 
‘Yes, uncertainty is always in the equation. Pak Suharto cannot live 
forever. Number 2, we already started to institutionalize our 
business. Market based put into our consideration. Whatever change 
of politics, it’s going to impact on macro-micro. Since we are in the 
market, we are somehow implicated. There is a public perception 
that we are close to Suharto, which is true, we don’t deny it. What 
we did the best way to do it at that time - three things: distance 
ourselves from government contracts, at that time is a fruitful 
business – last 20 years no government contracts; having market 
orientation for our business direction; we always do business based 
on the regulations, prevailing law. Our family is always top ten 10 
tax payer in Indonesia’. (Anthony Salim) 
 
The first action the group took when the crisis broke out was an attempt to 
bring Indofood, its largest Indonesian company, under the umbrella of a 
foreign Salim company. Its first choice was the much smaller Singapore-
based QAF339. In order to do this, a rather complicated set of transactions 
was proposed by Indocement, Indofood and QAF to the shareholders. 
Indocement owned a majority (50.1%) of the Indofood shares, and it 
distributed those among its shareholders (i.e the majority to the Salims 
themselves). The Liem investors subsequently sold their stake in Indofood to 
QAF in Singapore. As the government owned 26% of Indocement (and had 
also received Indofood shares) it had a say in the deal. The attempt to move 
Indofood offshore received explicit approval by the government, voiced by 
various ministers340. By virtue of its share in Indocement, the government 
now also owned 10% of Indofood as a result of this transaction. In order to 
maintain the majority ownership of Indofood, the Salim family had 
partnered a close business friend Putera Sampoerna, owner of another 
Indonesian group, to also take a 6% stake in the company. This was 
necessary to maintain full control over Indofood.  
 
These moves were discussed in the Indonesian press as “capital flight”, 
although this was denied by the Salim Group and the government. The 
unusual step was taken to allow media interviews with spokesman Benny 
Santoso, who had the indeed rather difficult task of explaining this move in 
terms of synergy and attracting more capital in the lower risk environment 
                                                 
339 The turnover of QAF in 1997 was only USD 224 million, whereas Indofood reported 
a turnover of USD 1.7 billion in the same year according to annual reports of both 
companies.  
340 See for example Jakarta Post (1997a). 
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of Singapore341. Just how much synergy you can achieve when you are a 
giant bought by a little dwarf remained in the open. This action sparked 
suspicion in Indonesia that a change in political power was in sight. One 
former minister, interviewed for this study said ‘if a group like the Salim 
engages in capital flight it indicates a shift.’ There were indications that the 
Salims also planned a similar move to bring Indocement under control of a 
foreign company342.  
 
However, the events that followed distracted attention away from this deal 
and the Salim Group had to focus on more urgent issues as the crisis 
worsened: negotiations to pay off or restructure mounting dollar 
denominated debts. An example was Indocement which declared a 
moratorium on its debts because it could not afford to pay them any more. 
The company had started a large and expensive expansion at the wrong 
moment, financed it with dollar loans which mounted as the rupiah 
depreciated while the demand for cement in Indonesia declined rapidly.  
Other companies also suffered from debts and had not hedged their foreign 
currency loans.  
 
‘In the past every business you touch becomes gold. You think that 
the things never end. For example in cement, we started with 1 
million, then 3 million, become 6 million tons, and then you’re 
dead.’ (Anthony Salim) 
 
‘I believe Anthony Salim missed a chance. His financial advisors 
told him to hedge, but he calculated that it would cost him in the 
area of 80-100 million and he considered this too much. Then crisis 
came and it turned out he made a mistake. He has taken a lot of 
credit at the BCA bank in order to save his companies. This was of 
course against the banking regulations’. (Person close to the Group) 
 
‘The debts (of the Salim Group) were accumulated because they 
overvalued their assets. There was no proper check on financial 
institutions – this was for political reasons. It was in nobody’s 
interest to have a functioning system of checks & balances. In 
general the rules in Indonesia are not followed, because they can be 
bent by political connections’. (International Journalist) 
 
But the Salims were not alone in their misery. Anthony Salim, who was 
appointed by the government to negotiate with creditors of the private 
                                                 
341 E.g. Bisnis Indonesia (1997); Sinar (1997); Forum (1997). 
342 It is possible that the sudden moves to influence the composition of the board of 
Jurong Cement Limited (a Singapore listed cement maker in which the Salim Group held 
a 20% stake) were connected with these plans (Business Times, 1997). 
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sector, was quoted saying ‘It's as if you're sitting on the Titanic. If Indonesia 
sinks, all the corporations will sink’343. While most Indonesian Salim 
companies were indeed sinking quickly and approaching insolvency, an 
even more serious problem for the Salim Group arose: the collapse of BCA, 
which had grown to be the largest bank in the country. Siti Hardijanti 
Rukmana (Tutut) and Sigit Haryoyudanto, two of Suharto’s children, 
together had a 30% stake in the BCA bank, and with Suharto’s position 
under pressure all kinds of rumours spread in Indonesia. On May 14, 
newspapers reported the first attacks by mobs on BCA branches. The next 
day, newspapers reported that angry mobs burnt and looted the house of 
the Salim family, and many Chinese tried to rush to the airport and board 
flights to Singapore or elsewhere while Jakarta was on fire. The New York 
Times reported later: 
 
‘Rioters had dragged out and slashed a portrait of his [Anthony 
Salim’s] father and spray-painted the words "Suharto's dog" on the 
gate. Reluctantly, Mr. Salim caught the next flight to Singapore. "If 
your house is already burned, the next thing they would try to do is 
get the people," he explained in a rare interview here. "You don't 
want to get caught in the middle of something like that" ‘344. 
 
Part of the widespread violence and panic was a bank-run on BCA by 
worried customers. For weeks people were lining up to withdraw their 
money from the bank345. On May 19, after various days of violence, the bank 
announced that 122 branch offices and 150 ATMs were destroyed346. After 
more days of continued withdrawals the newspapers reported on May 28, 
1998 that BCA was placed under state supervision347. The Salim family had, 
according to the interview with Anthony Salim as well as news sources, 
tried hard to rescue and recapitalise the bank. But they could not succeed 
and handed over BCA to the government for recapitalisation348. Other 
sources tell a different story and claim that the Salim had used the bank’s 
money to save other companies: 
 
‘When there was a rush on their (BCA) bank people did not 
withdraw 53 trillion. That is a lot of money. Conservatively 
estimating, maybe 25 trillion. They used the other half to channel it 
to their corporations’. (Former Minister) 
                                                 
343 See Business Week (1998). 
344 New York Times, 1999. 
345 Because of the long queues for withdrawing money BCA became known as Bank 
Capek Antre (Tired of Queuing Bank) (van Dijk, 2002, p.194).  
346 Jakarta Post, 1998b. 
347 According to a Salim manager, the Salim family handed over the bank on May 20, 
1998 
348 Associated Press, 1998b. 
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Within the hostile environment of riots, political chaos and panic, the top-
management of the Salim group withdrew to Singapore for a few weeks to 
see how things were evolving from a political perspective. The direct attacks 
on the Salim family, with their family house having been set to fire, made 
Jakarta too dangerous a place. Although Anthony Salim came back, his 
father remained in Singapore and did not return to Indonesia after the crisis. 
As a result of the collapse and nationalisation of the BCA Bank on May 28, 
1998 the Salim Group became by far the biggest debtor to the government, 
owing some USD 5 billion. This amount was composed of the pay-back of 
capital injections in the BCA bank (3 billion USD) and a fine for violating the 
inter-group lending limits349.  
 
As Suharto stepped down, there was suddenly open criticism possible of 
companies previously close to Suharto. As a result of this anti-KKN 
movement several recent Salim contracts came under pressure, one of them 
being the recently signed Jakarta City drinking water project that the Salim 
Group had embarked on together with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux from 
France – which had clearly benefited from close relationships with the 
former Suharto regime350. The Salims were forced to withdraw from the 
venture. A Salim property project on the coast in Jakarta was also cancelled.  
 
Most of the already technically insolvent Salim companies experienced 
further set-backs as the demand for all products in Indonesia dropped. This 
was particularly true for luxury products, such as cars and personal 
computers. Car sales dropped 83% in 1998 - which meant that companies 
like Indomobil posted losses and their partner threatened to pull out. Volvo, 
one of the Salim partners, issued a statement that they were revising their 
strategy for Indonesia351. Other Salim companies in Indonesia were not 
better off: their main cash cows Indofood and Indocement also reported 
losses for 1997 (Table 6.2).  
 
First Pacific, the international division of the group, also suffered. Its 
subsidiary Metro Pacific started to post losses (over a troubled property 
project in the Philippines) and First Pacific announced a strategy of selling 
off investments in a variety of companies. It first raised USD 2 billion by 
selling Hagemeyer, a Dutch trading company, and a few other companies.  
                                                 
349 According to Finance Minister Bambang Subianto (Asia Pulse, 1998b).  
350 The drinking water contracts for Jakarta were divided between the Salim Group 
(partnering with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux) and Suharto’s son Sigit (with Thames 
Water). Because the contracts were awarded in a non-transparent way, crony capitalism 
was assumed, and they came under pressure. (Australian, 1998). Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux cancelled its joint venture with the Salim Group and took 100% ownership of the 
company managing the west Jakarta water supply.   
351 Jakarta Post, 1998c. 
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Table 6.2 Profits of Selected Salim Companies during the Asian Crisis 
Profit/Loss (USD million) 1996 1997 
Indocement 235 -130 
Indofood 150 -412 
Indomobil 46 -139 
UIC 18 2 
Sources: annual reports. N.B. not corrected for cross-ownership. 
 
The sale of Hagemeyer, which was the foothold of the Salim Group in 
Europe, meant that First Pacific again became a conglomerate completely 
focused on Asian markets352. The money was subsequently used to 
strengthen its existing businesses and invest in new acquisitions. One of the 
acquisitions was a majority stake in Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
(PLDT) for USD 749 million (Financial Times, 1998a, 1998b)353. When it 
became clear that QAF could not buy Indofood First Pacific moved to its 
rescue and in December 1998 First Pacific acquired a controlling stake of 
Indofood354. 
 
 
6.4 Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
 
The government had established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) on January 27, 1998 as a result of agreements made to obtain IMF 
assistance355. IBRA was tasked with overseeing ailing (but still viable) banks. 
As of May 1998 this included the formerly Salim controlled BCA bank, along 
with most of the Indonesian banking sector. IBRA was supposed to recover 
the banks’ debts, either in cash or in assets. Assets that IBRA received were 
subsequently sold on to investors or the general public, with the proceeds 
flowing back to the state.  
 
Unlike the average scruffy Indonesian government institution, this entity 
had the appearance of an investment bank, with young well-educated staff 
                                                 
352 According to the 1997 annual report of First Pacific Company. 
353 This acquisition aroused some criticism, since a Salim-controlled company was 
paying so much while still owing billions of dollars to the Indonesian government . Rizal 
Ramli, who later became minister of economic affairs, commented that this showed that 
the Salim Group had money to pay the government (Jakarta Post, 1998c) 
354 The deal first included Nissin, but was blocked by creditor after which Nissin pulled 
out. First Pacific went ahead and tried to achieve a controlling stake in Indofood alone. 
The stake was sold by the Salim family for a big discount (Financial Times, 1999). 
Minority shareholders of First Pacific approved acquiring a 40% stake of Indofood for 
USD 600 million. In subsequent years they built a majority stake in the company which 
was achieved in 2002.   
355 The Indonesian name was Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (BPPN). 
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members and a shiny building. Its employees were mostly from investment 
banks whereas the chairmen (it was a coming and going of chairmen in the 
short period IBRA existed) were political figures. IBRA quickly became one 
of the most powerful institutions in Indonesia as they managed assets worth 
a third of the Indonesian GDP and most large conglomerates were its 
‘patients’356. Its mission as described in the strategic plan for 1999-2004 
stated:  
 
‘to aid economic recovery through the restructuring of the banking 
sector and corporate debt, and to maximize the recovery of state 
funds to reduce pressure on the government budget’357.   
 
IBRA requested the former owners of those banks under its supervision to 
inject new funds into their banks, which the Salim Group agreed to do in 
August 1998358. In that same month, the chairman of IBRA revealed that 
besides having to pay back the liquidity assistance provided by the central 
bank to keep BCA running, the Salim Group also violated the legal lending 
limit, for which it also had to pay as well. In total the amount to be paid was 
agreed to be over USD 5 billion.  According to Anthony Salim,  
 
‘Our approach is: ok, we open up. We don’t believe that negotiation 
will be hide and seek. This is our wealth; now let’s negotiate how 
this is going to solve the problem.’ (Anthony Salim) 
 
The IBRA employees that frequently negotiated with him at that time 
confirm that he laid his cards on the table - yet he was a tough negotiator. 
Anthony Salim as well as sources in IBRA confirmed that Anthony Salim 
offered a list of his companies, and IBRA was able to choose the most liquid 
assets. Despite these statements, the majority of the Salim-owned shares in 
its cash-cows, Indofood and First Pacific, were not surrendered. According 
to Anthony Salim the reason for this was that the shares were pledged as 
collateral for certain loans. This may have been true – but in any case it was 
very convenient, and it allowed the Salim Group to hold on to a few of its 
most important companies. According to some IBRA employees, this was “a 
political process”. One of them stated:  
 
                                                 
356 To illustrate IBRA’s importance: in May 2000 it managed assets valued at USD 53 
billion (IBRA monthly newsletter, June 2000) while Indonesian GDP was around USD 
150 billion in 2000. Of course this made the institution an interesting target for all kinds 
of people inside and outside the organisation trying to get a piece of the pie. IBRA 
complained that the government interfered with their task. In any case several 
irregularities were revealed at IBRA (van Dijk 2002).   
357 See IBRA (1999). 
358 See for example Asia Pulse (1998a). 
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‘Within IBRA Anthony Salim laid down his cards on the table, yet it 
was still a poker game. He is smart. Asks us for our conditions first. 
We would like to have the liquid assets, like Indofood shares, but it 
turns out that there is a condition, that if he has less than 51% 
ownership, his bank-loans become immediately payable. Obstacles 
arise. Instead he offers Indomobil.  Anthony Salim is very tough to 
negotiate with’. (IBRA employee) 
 
In September the Salim Group reached an agreement with the government 
to pay its obligations of USD 5 billion by transferring stakes in over 100 
companies359. Anthony Salim and a few other tycoons arranged the transfer 
by signing a Master of Settlement and Acquisition Agreement (MSAA) with 
the government. IBRA employees, who negotiated with various tycoons at 
the time, claim that the Salim Group was cooperative and the most 
professional of all. The administration of its companies was excellent, which 
was the reason that the transfer took place in such a short period.  
 
‘They have centralised financial control, a team of maybe 100 people 
work on the holding level. When we took over the assets it was easy 
to get the data, they were easily available at Salim because of their 
centralised financial system. (..) They have only grown so big 
because of this way of running things’. (IBRA employee) 
  
‘Salim is known to keep very good records, very detailed records. 
This is the reason why IBRA was able to acquire and dispose the 
Salim assets in such a short period of time – it was because of the 
completeness of the information. Apart from the case of the sugar 
plantation basically the figures provided by Salim were quite 
accurate’. (IBRA Employee) 
 
In 2000 it appeared that the assets the Salim family (and other conglomerate 
owners) surrendered were worth much less than the promised value, and 
Anthony Salim agreed to pledge more assets360. Enemies of the group 
described it as “theft”, for example a former minister interviewed for this 
study:  
 
‘They transferred companies worth 53 trillion Rupiah. But when 
these assets are audited again the value is only 20 trillion, so we are 
                                                 
359 See for example New York Times (1998). 
360 The total obligations of the Salim Group to IBRA were over 50 trillion rupiah 
(approximately USD 5 billion) but the sales value of the surrendered assets was only 20 
billion (Financial Times, 2000b). The reason for this lower value could have been due to 
the value of assets falling in value over time; and/or due to the value of the assets having 
been inflated at the time of surrender in 1999. 
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talking about theft here. But the Salim Group was one of the most 
cooperative groups. Others were far worse. Now these Salim assets 
are with the government, with IBRA.  What solution they took was 
also vague. The loss for the government is huge. If we had a choice it 
would be better not to have this type of conglomerates any more’.  
 
In July 2002 it was agreed that the Salim Group had to pay IBRA an extra 
USD 107 million (or 960 billion rupiah) for misrepresenting asset values361.  
These reports as well as the interviews show that the involvement with 
IBRA was a process of continuous negotiation – a game of give and take 
played not only at IBRA level, but also at the highest political level. The 
Salim Group wanted to have a document stating that they fulfilled their 
obligations by paying off their debts, the so-called Release & Discharge 
(R&D) document. According to an IBRA employee: 
 
‘While the asset disposal was progressing, the Salim Group has in 
the meantime, on another level, been working towards the R&D 
document. Surprisingly the 5 names on the list to obtain this release 
and discharge document are 2 small debtors; Anthony Salim, 
Sudwikatmono and Risjad - the 3 owners of the Salim Group. There 
is political activity at another level.  Anthony Salim has connections 
with the chairman of IBRA and also with ministers etc’.  
 
Much of what has happened is not transparent until this date, but the 
interview results show an interesting dual image of the Salim Group. From 
the side of the former ministers interviewed, the Salim Group comes out as 
immoral, because they try to gain as much as they can and attempt to leave 
their debts for the government to pay; while the picture at IBRA was that of 
a very smart and respected businessmen who was “squeezed” by politicians 
because he was the most cooperative of all.  
 
Following the agreement with the Salim Group, a special company named 
PT Holdiko Perkasa was set up under IBRA to receive, manage and sell the 
shares and assets in 107 Salim companies on December 14, 1998.  Among the 
transferred shares was a majority stake in publicly listed company 
Indomobil (72.63%) and smaller stakes in Indocement (13.2%); Indofood 
(2.5%), Astra International (24.27%), QAF (20%) and First Pacific (5%). Apart 
from the 13.2% stake of Indocement held by Holdiko, IBRA held a further 
6.6% and the government was also a shareholder in the company with 26% 
ownership. Therefore, Indocement was in fact now fully controlled by the 
government. The Salim family kept its control of First Pacific.  
 
                                                 
361 According to statements by Temenggung, then head of IBRA, at a press conference 
on July 11, 2002 (AFX Asia, 2002).  
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The remaining 89% of the value came from private companies. These 
included palm plantations; oils & fats; sugar; coal & granite; plywood; 
television, textiles & garments, chlor-alkali; oleochemicals; food & consumer 
products; trading; multi-industry; and property. The industry composition 
of those companies in terms of value is shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4 Salim Assets transferred to Holdiko Perkasa, % of total value.  
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Source: Holdiko Perkasa Memorandum 1999, p.7362 
 
 
6.5 Salim Asset Disposals  
 
BCA Bank was declared healthy on April 25, 2000 by the government, and 
IBRA listed the bank through an initial public offering of 22.5% of IBRA’s 
total shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange on May 31, 2000363. The stake of 
the Salims in the bank had been taken over by the government except for a 
                                                 
362 The figures given in the Holdiko report do not add up to 100%, but it is not clear to 
the author why. 
363 IBRA, 200a; 200b. 
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share of 7% and a new management had been installed tasked with 
restructuring the bank. Surprisingly, a few of the new bank executives came 
from Indomobil, another Salim company. The result of the IPO - proceeds of 
109 million dollars - was considered disappointing364. An IBRA employee 
remarked: 
 
‘The Salim Group was unable to get back Bank Central Asia. 
Anthony Salim could not enter the bidding process because it was 
too political. Too bad because otherwise the government could have 
probably gotten a higher price for BCA’. (IBRA Employee) 
 
Under leadership of Scott Coffey Holdiko Perkasa swiftly started to sell the 
assets under its management to investors. According to interviews with 
IBRA employees the process could be relatively quick because of the 
professional management of the Salim Group, and its adequate financial 
administration of the companies transferred. After some back and forth 
discussion in the government, it was agreed that the former owners could 
not buy back their assets for the coming two years.  
 
In 1999 and 2000 several disposals took place. In the first quarter of 2001 the 
total proceeds amounted to around USD 1 billion. Shares in listed companies 
were sold and the private companies were disposed of by means of tender 
processes. The stakes in those companies that were joint ventures with 
foreign partners were mostly sold to the partners. Several companies were 
acquired by foreign investors, such as the palm plantations, which were 
bought by Guthrie from Malaysia and a stake in Astra, largest Indonesian 
automotive company, which went to a consortium led by a Singapore 
company (see Table 6.3). 
 
 
6.6 Leftovers & Asset Shuffles 
 
The strategy of the Salim Group during this period was to completely focus 
on fire-fighting and dealing with its debt problems with banks and the 
Indonesian government. As many companies started to post losses, the 
growth strategy of 1994-1997 was reversed into one of shrinking, 
restructuring and selling.  
 
Yet the Salim family did not abandon its debts (as APP, a large listed 
company belonging to Sinar Mas Group, the second largest Indonesian 
conglomerate, did) and negotiated as smartly as they could to fulfil the 
demands of the government and creditors. In that process they handed over 
                                                 
364 According to the Financial Times (2000a). This lack of interest spurred Business 
Week (2000) to publish an article under the title ‘Crony bank, anyone?’  
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large parts of the Salim empire, while holding on to a few of the most 
profitable assets in Indonesia (i.e. Indofood) as well to some non-Indonesian 
companies.  
 
Table 6.3 Assets Disposals by Holdiko in 1999 and 2000 
Company Name 
(Shareholding) 
Product Buyer Proceeds  
PT Pacific Indomas 
Plastics Indonesia (50%) 
Polystyrene Dow Chemical 
Company (JV Partner) 
USD 4 
million 
PT Indofood Sukses 
Makmur (2.5%) 
Food Market Placement USD 38 
million 
PT Standard Toyo 
Polymer (49.3%) 
Polymer Tosoh Corporation and 
Mitsui Co. (JV Partners) 
USD 15 
million 
PT Astra International 
Tbk. (22%) 
Automotive Cycle & Carriage 
Consortium 
USD 177 
million 
Wisma BCA  Property Keppel Land USD 29 
million 
Karimun Granite 
(17.25%) 
Granite PT Pendawa Sempurna USD 2 
million 
QAF Ltd (19.44% + 
4.76% held by IBRA) 
Food & 
other 
Market Placement  USD 20 
million 
Salim Oleochemicals 
Group 
Natural fatty 
alcohol 
Bhakti Investama 
Group consortium 
USD 127 
million 
Indomilk Group  Dairy 
products 
Bakti Maju Bersama 
Abadi (JV Partner) 
USD 42 
million 
PT Indomiwon Citra 
Inti 
MSG Daesang Corporation 
(Joint Venture Partner) 
USD 9 
million 
Mosquito Coil Group 
(100%) 
Mosquito 
Coil 
Reckitt Benckiser Plc USD 63 
million 
Salim Palm Plantation Palm 
Plantation  
Gumpulan Guthrie 
Berhad 
USD 375 
million 
PT Indocement Tunggal 
Prakarsa Tbk. (13.2 + 
6.6%) 
Cement Market Placement USD 63 
million 
First Pacific Company 
(5% + 4.9% by IBRA) 
Various Market Placement USD 76 
million 
Total   USD 1,040 
million 
Source: Holdiko, 2001. All figures have been converted to USD using the end of year 
rupiah rate of 2000365. 
 
Aside from those companies transferred to the government, the Salim Group 
also tried to sell non-core assets outside Indonesia. Apart from Hagemeyer, 
which has already been mentioned, other companies that were sold included 
                                                 
365 The end of year rupiah rate for 1999 stood at 7085 while the 2000 rate was 9595, so 
there is a substantial difference. As the exact sales date of the assets was not always 
clear, I’ve taken the 2000 rate for all transactions.  
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property & supermarkets in Singapore366. The Salim Group had several 
investments in Singapore, of which it also tried to sell a 23% stake in United 
Industrial Corporation (UIC) initially to a company called HKR. After that 
deal fell through they finally sold the stake to JG Summit Group from the 
Philippines for approximately 194 million USD367.  
 
Next to the sales of assets, there were also internal changes within the group 
to raise money or shift control, for example to bring one Salim company 
under control of another, or to merge one Salim company with another. A 
recurring theme was that these asset shuffles usually did not succeed due to 
objections from creditors or minority shareholders. When the Salims tried to 
bring Indofood out of the country, it was finally bought by First Pacific, also 
a Salim Group company. The Salim Group sold its direct shareholding in 
Indofood to First Pacific at a discount but remained in control (by virtue of 
their majority shareholding in First Pacific). The sale of the shares was done 
to bring Indofood’s ownership abroad, but the Group also converted its 
shares into much-needed cash. Similar transactions of shifting company 
ownership were planned in Singapore with QAF. QAF announced in 2000 
that it would take over edible oil refineries in China by the name of Yinfu 
International Ltd (based in Fuqing) and Shanghai Yinfu Oils and Fats 
Industries Co Ltd. Due to ‘certain legal and regulatory issues’ the agreement 
was later aborted368.  
 
A number of transactions suggested that the Salim Group was preparing for 
a comeback. The QAF shares sold by IBRA were bought back and the 
company remained under Salim control. In May 1999, Indomobil’s debts to 
Bank Central Asia were taken over by the Salim family, by means of issuing 
bonds to the Salim family which could be exchanged for shares in Indomobil 
after three years.  
 
Indocement also was special: it was the only company in which Liem Sioe 
Liong stayed in the board position, which could indicate that the Salim 
Group was eager to hold on to this company. Already in 1998 Anthony 
Salim had found a partner for the company, when Indocement almost 
collapsed under debts. Initially Anthony Salim agreed with the German 
multinational Heidelberg Cement Group to share the ownership, but the 
government did not allow this and exercised power to block the Salims from 
keeping their company Indocement. A manager of Heidelberg Cement 
Group, who bought into Indocement said:  
 
                                                 
366 Belgian retailing group Delhaize bought 49% of Shop ‘n Save (previously under 
QAF) for approx. USD 14.5 million (South China Morning Post, 1999a).  
367 See for example the South China Morning Post (1999a). 
368 See AFX Asia (2001). 
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‘Finally the government told me, we are now in control, and even 
though we know you have a deal with Anthony Salim, we don’t 
want you to have a 50/50 partnership with him, because he is not 
very much liked any more in Indonesia. Make it a minority share. I 
told them I need a local partner with knowledge. So finally I ended 
up, against my wish, buying 65% of the company while Anthony 
Salim had 13%’. (Heidelberg Cement Group Manager) 
 
‘I will tell you a story of Indocement. When IBRA opened the 
bidding, two days before the bidding there was news in the market 
that Heidelberger Cement was interested. And that Heidelberger 
has an agreement with Salim in Hong Kong. Back to back 
arrangement. So we got the management of Heidelberger in and 
told them that if this is true, they will have to pay a penalty. They 
actually told us that they had the agreement, 50/50 where Salim 
would manage it. I told them, cement is not high technology, you 
can manage it yourself. So they cancelled the deal with Salim’. 
(Former Indonesian Minister)      
 
On other fronts the government pressured Salim as well, especially those 
businesses that were considered “crony” businesses. A European partner 
said:  
 
‘The pressure on the Salim Group became enormous, at the time 
they were afraid for their lives. When they had some idea that a 
Chinese hunt would become reality, they tried to moving everything 
out of Indonesia. The government was not fond of Salim, and forced 
them out of our joint venture. (..) We did not want the Salim Group 
to exit from our cooperation, we were unhappy with this 
development. When you do business in a country like Indonesia you 
need to find a local champion, who can solve problems when they 
occur, and with good relations with the government’. (Western 
Partner of the Salim Group) 
 
As a result of the Asian Crisis, the structure of the Salim Group changed: it 
diminished in size and changed in composition. The portfolio now merely 
consisted of First Pacific, which in turn controlled Indofood and PLDT, a 
major Philippine telecom operator. Also, the focus was now completely on 
Asian markets, in particular Indonesia and Philippines, as the European 
assets (Hagemeyer) had been sold. 
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6.7 Leadership 
 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that Liem Sioe Liong was in the 
process of transferring his central leadership role towards Anthony Salim. 
The Asian Crisis accelerated this process: Liem did not return to Indonesia 
and stayed in Singapore after the May 1998 riots and the very critical 
negotiations with the Indonesian government were handled by Anthony 
Salim. As is shown in Table 6.4, Liem withdrew from all company boards 
(except Indocement). Managers indicated that he still played a role in the 
background, but the decisions were now taken by Anthony Salim. It was 
him who did all negotiations with IBRA. When it was necessary to make 
statements in the press, he would put forward Benny Santoso rather than 
appearing in the news himself.  
 
Whereas prior to the crisis, the Salim Group had enjoyed close relationships 
with Suharto, these had turned against it in the crisis, with public sentiments 
running against any company associated with the previous regime. Anthony 
Salim moved carefully in this environment. On the one hand he cooperated 
with the new government and fulfilled its demands (albeit after tough 
negotiations). On the other hand he never abandoned Suharto publicly, 
despite the fact that everybody rushed to distance themselves from the 
Suharto family in late 1998.  
 
Table 6.4 Board Memberships by Liem Investors and Benny Santoso 
Name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Benny Santoso 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 
Djuhar Sutanto 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Ibrahim Risjad 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 
Sudwikatmono 2 3 3 4 3 2 1 
Johny Djuhar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tedy Djuhar 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Source: Board membership database compiled by the author 
 
The policy of many Chinese to open up more to the outside world, initiated 
in the period prior to the crisis, was reversed. The Salim family largely 
disappeared from the news, using Benny Santoso when it was necessary to 
explain sensitive strategies such as shifting the ownership of Indofood 
offshore. By adapting to the new situation without abandoning their old 
friends, the Salim Group chose to maintain a delicate balance – and at some 
points in time it was unclear whether Anthony Salim would be arrested. The 
following story was told to me by a Salim manager: 
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‘During the crisis we had some information that Anthony Salim 
would be arrested and put in jail. So we went to pray in his office. 
He saw us and asked ‘what are you doing?’ We said we are praying 
for you. ‘Why?’ Because we are afraid that you will be arrested. So 
he said, ‘if I have to go to jail, I will go, it is my responsibility’. We 
were surprised, but this is his attitude’. (Salim Manager)  
 
At that time the threat of the Salim Group being completely confiscated by 
the government and its leaders being put in jail was very real. Anthony 
Salim himself tells the story as if the crisis and the new government’s 
policies were a given. Within this framework he looked for the best solution 
for his companies.  
 
‘We talked to the new, emerging government and asked them 
several questions. 1. Whether a company like Salim can still exist 
under the new environment; 2. Is this going to be a political or 
commercial, economical solution. If this is a political solution you 
can do anything you like, nationalize companies or put someone in 
jail. But we believe it is a commercial solution: the new emerging 
country for economic policy heavily depends on IMF World Bank 
and bilateral support. We believe that has not been changed. So we 
believe commercial solution is one of the solutions for the economy. 
Secondly, it is not only us. It’s total: financial, monetary, corporate 
crisis. We are one of the problems, no doubt a big one, but one of the 
many. (..) So we talk to the government, if this is going to be a 
commercial solution, let’s talk about it. Number 1, we have the 
capacity to pay you. Now if you want cash, I don’t have it. Number 
2. Let’s define what the rules are. It’s not my rules, what will be the 
total solution for banking and monetary and corporate. So within 
the rules, let’s talk about how the Salim problem and solution fits in. 
(..) When that’s established they have the product of MSAA, BPPN. 
So that is the product of the IMF, government’. (Anthony Salim)369 
 
However, other interviews and media sources indicate that the group was 
clearly in a position to influence at least some environmental factors, so this 
can only be part of the story. There must have been a lot of high-level 
political activity behind the scenes, as an earlier agreement with Wahid 
already indicated. IBRA officials too hinted at activity on a higher political 
                                                 
369 MSAA means Master Settlement and Acquisition Agreement, which regulated the 
transfer of assets from ailing conglomerates that had their banks recapitalized by the 
government to IBRA. BPPN is the Indonesian acronym for the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA). 
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level but at the same time join in saying that Anthony Salim focused on the 
problem and was very pragmatic in his dealings with IBRA. 
 
The changed environment had a profound impact on the way the Salim 
Group operated. Whereas prior to the crisis visitors were lining up to meet 
Anthony Salim with business proposals, the office now became silent. Some 
IBRA officials told me they believed he was lonely. The image of a powerful 
group was suddenly changed into that of a troubled group. It must have 
been hard to swallow.   
 
Indeed in this period the professional top-managers of the group (those 
heading Indofood, First Pacific, Indomobil, and Indocement) did not leave 
the company but tried to get out of the crisis together. Interview reports 
show that some of the management of the companies that were sold (e.g. 
from Indomobil and from the palm plantations) joined other Salim 
companies. As we will see in the next chapter however, some of the 
strategies implemented to save the Salim Group were hard to swallow for 
them.  
 
 
6.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Thus, during the crisis in 1997-2000 the previously favourable political and 
economic environment turned into an extremely hostile business context for 
the Salim Group. It suffered from corporate debt, falling stock prices, and an 
attack on their bank as well as mob violence against the family directly.  
 
Being surrounded by fires everywhere, the group adapted a strategy of fire-
fighting. All new investments were stopped. Within the context of the 
political and economic crisis the future of the Salim Group was highly 
uncertain. Anthony Salim’s multi-level negotiations allowed the group to 
come out of the crisis alive and as a free man, but he had to hand over most 
of his assets to the government. Some other assets outside Indonesia were 
sold to raise capital, such as Hagemeyer. 
 
Nevertheless, the group held on to several important companies, such as 
First Pacific and Indofood, to his share in UIC, as well as to some smaller 
private companies. It structure changed and First Pacific, now also 
controlling Indofood in Indonesia and PLDT in the Philippines, became the 
key asset. Salim Group tried hard to maintain a majority shares in all these 
three companies. As a result of the changes, the Salim Group became again 
an Asian rather than an international conglomerate. Anthony Salim was 
now clearly in charge and his father Liem Sioe Liong withdrew from most 
management positions in the Salim Group companies (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5 Summary 
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices 
1997-1999 
regime 
change 
- anti-Chinese riots and looting 
create hostile atmosphere for 
Chinese business 
- Suharto’s regime falls apart 
- IMF stops protectionist 
policies 
- anti-cronyism  
- use connections to survive & help 
Suharto family 
- focus on solving the crisis  
- comply with government 
demands, sell businesses to pay 
debts 
- retirement of Liem  
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Chapter 7: Axis of Opportunity 
 
 
‘Whatever you learned in the last decades,  
you’ll be able to save because you don’t make the same mistake.  
And opportunities are now much bigger than the ASEAN tigers.’  
Anthony Salim,  
CEO & President, Salim Group 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter the black years of the Asian crisis were described in 
which the Salim Group went through a crisis. It weathered the storm of the 
Asian Crisis only barely. The leadership was now passed to Anthony Salim, 
who had to hand over large parts of its empire in the process of coping with 
the political and economic crisis in Indonesia. 
 
Starting from 2001, the group made its first steps on the bumpy road to 
recovery in the context of a modest recovery of the Indonesian economy and 
a more impressive growth in the surrounding Asian economies. Although 
the economy showed positive growth figures, the Indonesian investment 
climate did not improve substantially, with corruption cost still high and the 
institutional context weak.  
 
Despite some internal conflicts within the Salim Group, by and large a 
process of buying and buying back started. The buy-back preparations were 
highly controversial. Besides this the remaining companies were re-
structured and by the end of 2003 the Salim Group was in a better shape and 
looked in a position to re-gain some of its lost glory. The Asian Crisis did not 
lead to a fundamentally different business model for the Salim Group, 
although some minor elements of the strategy were changed.  
 
The chapter starts with a description of the business context in this period. 
Within this context the moves of the Salim Group to resume a strategy of 
growth are described as well as their post-crisis structure and management 
style, which was increasingly centralised around Anthony Salim but less 
focused on Indonesia.  
 
 
7.2 Business Context  
 
As of 2000, the Indonesian economy showed more stability and resumed its 
growth, albeit at a much lower rate than prior to the crisis (around 3-4% in 
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2001-2003)370.  These growth rates were not able to absorb the new entrants 
to the labour market, and were considered too low to decrease poverty. 
Indonesia recovered from the crisis much slower than the surrounding 
economies371.   
 
Factors that contributed to this slow recovery were the still fragile banking 
sector, and the fact that the corporate sector was not in a position to initiate 
new investments while foreign direct investment remained low. In fact, 
Indonesia recorded net capital outflows; the balance turned positive only in 
the second quarter of 2003. The bombings in Bali in October 2002 also did 
little to restore the already low FDI levels. 
 
The corporate sector had suffered tremendously during the crisis and was 
still in the recovery process. The previously insolvent Salim companies 
started to post modest profits again while they were still struggling to lower 
their debt levels. Indonesian exports did relatively well, and contributed to 
the modest economic growth (although mainly because of a few 
commodities), together with private consumption. Generally speaking, 
export recovery, like overall economic recovery, was slower in Indonesia 
than in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand372.  
 
Indocement, UIC, Indofood and Indomobil had made some attempts to 
increase their previously negligible exports after the crisis. This was a logical 
strategy in view of falling domestic demand, dollar denominated debt and a 
depreciated rupiah. Despite this, none of these listed companies became 
particularly strong in exports. Some non-listed Salim companies, for 
example the pig farms in Bulan that were producing for the Singapore 
market, were specifically set up for exports to nearby Singapore. Data from 
Holdiko also show that some private Salim companies were world leaders 
and exported most of their products. The larger Indonesian listed Salim 
companies, however, were never willing or able to export.  
 
Meanwhile the political environment in Indonesia remained relatively 
unstable. Wahid, who had become president in 1999, came under pressure 
as a result of various scandals and a generally inconsistent record of policy 
implementation. On July 23, 2001 Megawati, who was vice president under 
Wahid and a daughter of former president Sukarno, was inaugurated 
president. Despite this change of power, there was no major policy reversal 
or improvement in the macro-economic situation. Most people interviewed 
                                                 
370 According to the ADB key economic indicators for Indonesia the GDP growth rates 
were 3.5%; 3.7% and 4.1% respectively in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Available at 
www.adb.org/statistics , [accessed January 6, 2005]. 
371 See IMF (2004). 
372 See Athukorala (2002). 
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confirmed that in this respect, very little had changed in the Indonesian 
business context.   
 
One of the main issues that surfaced during the crisis, KKN- or corruption, 
collusion and nepotism, was not effectively addressed, and as a result of this 
the institutional environment remained weak and corruption cost high. In 
addition to this the decentralisation policy also brought adverse 
consequences, such as a higher cost of doing business due to new local 
regulations and more corruption373. One expert interviewed for this study 
stated: ‘something worse than organised corruption is unorganised 
corruption’ and another complained about increased cronyism and 
corruption: ‘Now under [President Megawati, daughter of former president] 
Sukarno you only have to be loyal, meaning to pay. It’s 100% cronyistic’. 
Although the Salim Group lost their patron Suharto, under the subsequent 
governments they tried to influence policies by using their contacts - and, if 
the interview results are correct, by paying bribes to people close to former 
president Wahid. 
 
With regard to the measures implemented by the IMF packages during the 
crisis, their effects became noticeable once the crisis faded. The protection 
rate of domestic industries was greatly reduced as a result of these 
measures. The lowering of protection rates and abolishment of favourable 
marketing and distribution schemes probably had adverse effects on some 
Salim operations, such as flour milling, cement and chemicals. It is hard to 
demonstrate a direct link between the changes in regulatory environment 
and the performance of the Salim companies. Such a link however, is 
suggested in the interviews by insiders. The data available in the annual 
reports of Indofood, UIC and Indocement show that profit margins of most 
companies continued to decline (Figure 7.1).  
 
In particular we see declining margins for UIC, a monopolist in 
alkylbenzene production protected by an import tariff of 15% prior to the 
crisis, which was lowered to 5% in 2000. Indofood shows declining margins, 
but as the figures are consolidated and include both the noodles and the 
flour milling business (as of 1997), it is not clear whether one or both 
products have caused this decline. Interviews suggest that the noodles faced 
competition from a local group, whereas Bogasari suffered from the new 
regulatory environment374. In 2001 Indocement was taken over by 
Heidelberger Cement. Indocement showed increased profit margins in 2002-
                                                 
373 See for example Dick (2001). 
374 Indofood had plans to spin off Bogasari since 1999. One of the reasons for the spin 
off mentioned by analysts was the new anti-monopoly law implemented after the crisis, 
another reason was to raise money to pay of debts. Citing low price, Indofood has so far 
deferred its plans to spin off Bogasari.  
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2003 because of an explicit strategy by Heidelberger Cement to focus on 
improving margins rather than on increasing volumes. This was different 
from the Salim Group strategy which focused on market share. 
 
Figure 7.1 Profit Margins of Indofood, Indocement and UIC 
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Sources: Annual Reports 
 
 
7.3 IBRA Asset Sales 
 
After 2000 the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) increasingly 
became a source of controversy. Although the sale of the Salim assets 
proceeded rather quickly, the institution’s overall asset sales process was 
slowing down while the changes in chairmen did not375. One of the IBRA 
employees interviewed for this study said: ‘IBRA became preoccupied with 
power. The instinct of Asian bureaucracies is then to slow things down’.  As 
                                                 
375 During its 5 years of existence IBRA had 7 different chairmen, namely: Bambang 
Subianto; Radius Prawiro; Glenn Yusuf;  Cacuk Sudarijanto; Edwin Gerungan; I Putu 
Gede Ary Suta; and Syafruddin Temenggung.  
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IBRA was approaching its agreed closure date (February 2004), it appeared 
that restructuring the banking sector was not highly successful and asset 
recovery was lower than expected376.  Within IBRA some of the employees 
seemed embarrassed by the “politics”: 
 
‘Within IBRA, Anthony Salim is the businessman that has won the 
highest respect. In fact I saw him many times. Every time we had a new 
policy or a new minister, I had to go to him and explain that now our 
policies are this and this, which was a bit strange. He is quite an 
amicable person, very bright, some say hyperactive. Work is his life; it is 
very much a one-man show. He’s not a bad guy, not shadowy or 
anything like some of the other conglomerate owners around. I think he 
would like to avoid politics altogether if possible. Not much of a 
lobbyist’. (IBRA employee) 
 
In the period from 2001-2003 it became clear that the Salim Group intended 
to get back some of its assets. The previous chapter described how IBRA had 
started to sell of stakes in joint ventures (which were usually taken over by 
the joint venture partner) and shares in listed companies. These were the 
easiest to sell. In addition to that, some companies were sold to foreign 
firms, like the plantations which went to Guthrie from Malaysia. According 
to Scott Coffey, around half of the assets pledged by Salim were sold to 
foreigners377.  
 
But the assets put up for sale in the next wave of disposals by IBRA were 
those companies that were harder to sell. In 2001 76 companies were ready 
to be sold by IBRA, of which 28 were Salim companies. IBRA required the 
buyers to state in writing that they were not related to the Salim Group, but 
this was something that was hard to prove. Indomobil and Indosiar stakes 
were sold at the end of 2001, almost immediately to be followed by 
persistent rumours that the Salim Group was behind the buyers378.  
 
‘They got Indomobil back. The government bought the shares at 
2700 a piece, but re-sold it at a quarter of the price to the highest 
bidder. This happened in 2000-2001. How I know? Well, in the deal 
with Suzuki there was a clause that should the Salim pull out as a 
                                                 
376 See Pangestu and Goeltom (2001); Siregar (2001). 
377 See Business Week (2003). 
378 See for example United Press International (2002). In order to dispose of its 
shareholding in Indosiar IBRA initiated an IPO. On March 22, 2001 the company was 
listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. On November 28, 2001, IBRA and Holdiko 
announced they sold 49% of the shares to TDM Aset Manajemen, a newly formed 
company. The sale of 72.63% ownership in Indomobil was announced on December 5, 
2001. The buyer was a consortium led by Trimegah Securities. People close to Anthony 
Salim have confirmed there rumours. 
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major shareholder, all loans would immediately become payable. 
Therefore it was obvious that Salim was behind the buying back of 
Indomobil’. (Financial Analyst) 
 
‘In IBRA there was a decree that the original owners cannot own 
their previous companies for two years. Now it is almost one year, 
so they are preparing now. After two years they are free to buy back. 
So far they use nominees: companies or other conglomerates. These 
are paid in the form of shares or something. Salim is quietly re-
taking some of his companies such as Indosiar, Indomobil, 
Indomilk; shipyard’. (IBRA employee) 
 
The sale of Indocement was initially controversial. The Group had an 
agreement with the future buyer, Heidelberg Cement Group from Germany, 
to jointly run the company379. However, under pressure from the 
government Heidelberg acquired a majority ownership, and swiftly started 
to change Indocement’s strategy of diversification and sell off bits and pieces 
that were the result of prior diversification, such as property. 
 
The sugar plantations received a great deal of attention, because of rumours 
that Anthony Salim tried to block the sale and was in favour of another 
buyer, closely associated with him, according to interviews with IBRA 
executives. The eventual sale to a local conglomerate was an example of a 
power game for control over the company, where the Salims used various 
legal tricks to prevent the new owner from successfully operating the sugar 
plantation. Court cases followed, while another asset sale also was criticized 
because Anthony Salim intervened. 
 
‘There was the case of a Mosquito Coil company, where the new owner 
had a no competition clause; however Anthony Salim built a factory 
next door and hired all the personnel. The new owner can sue Salim, but 
in this country - well you know how it works’. (IBRA Employee) 
 
‘Take for example the case of the sugar plantation, Indolampung. There 
was a problem since the factory was sold, but not the land. IBRA initially 
did not know that there was land, there was nothing indicating this. 
When we went to do a due diligence with the prospective buyer we 
found out that the land rights were in another company. It was not 
traceable to Anthony Salim, IBRA could not prove that the land was his, 
the only reason we knew was the name of the company – indo-
something – and secondly the people working on the land sold to the 
factory, and the plantation workers’ salaries were paid by that company. 
                                                 
379 The transaction to sell the Holdiko ownership of Indocement shares to Heidelberger 
Cement was finalised on April 18, 2001. 
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There was nothing illegal about it, but it serves as an example of how 
ownership patterns are opaque. The companies acquired by IBRA were 
never directly owned by Anthony Salim’. (IBRA Employee) 
 
‘However, Salim is much better than the others in terms of quality of 
assets surrendered, speed of cooperation etc. Unlike the others, they 
only play in the grey areas, like asset valuation, not in the written, clear 
agreements. Other conglomerates used blatant manipulation’. (Financial 
Analyst) 
 
However, these well-publicised cases seem not to be the norm as most sales 
proceeded rather smoothly without much ado (Table 7.1). But the most 
sensitive case of all was Bank Central Asia. IBRA still owned 70% of the 
bank in 2001. It was politically a sensitive sales process, and people 
rumoured that the Salims somehow wanted to buy back the bank. High-
level politicians were involved and the parliament delayed the sale over 
concerns of future ownership. It was finally decided to sell a majority share 
of the bank to the highest bidder, either local or foreign. The minister for 
state enterprises had to reassure the public that he had Anthony Salim’s 
word that he would not participate in the bidding380.  
 
Press reports and interviews contract each other, and it is not completely 
clear what exactly happened. According to insiders interviewed for this 
study, the Salim family held on to a separate company that was responsible 
for the IT systems related to the bank – thus keeping a core function of the 
bank under control. Interview results indicate that although the Salims may 
have been involved in the buy-back process, they did not have control over 
the bank. The consortium that won control of the bank was composed of 
several groups including US-based investment fund and the Djarum family 
from Indonesia.  
 
When the last Salim assets were sold by IBRA in 2003 the government 
obtained a total of around USD 2 billion, a recovery rate of between 30-
40%381. Many complained since they felt that the remaining balance had to 
be covered by the Indonesian public. Moreover, the Salims were able to buy 
back some of their own debt for a much lower price, and were reckoned by 
some to have actually gained in the process.  
 
                                                 
380 See for example Asia Pulse (2002). 
381 Reported in Business Week (2003). Based on Table 6.3 and Table 7.1 I arrive at a 
total of USD 2.4 billion, which would be a recovery rate of 48%, but the difference can 
easily be caused by taking a different currency rates. The average recovery rate for all 
Indonesian debtors stood at 28.5%. This is comparable with the Malaysian results (29%) 
but lower than Thailand (35.34%) and Korea (39%) as reported by Tempo (2004).   
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Table 7.1 Holdiko Asset Sales 2001-2003  
Company Name 
(Shareholding) 
Product Buyer Proceeds 
(USD) 
Indomarco 
Prismatama 
(Indomaret) 
Retail Bhakti Investment 
Management 
Unknown 
First Pacific (0.8%) Various Market placement 9 million  
Indocoal  Coal PT Centralink Wisesa 
(linked with Banpu 
Minerals Singapore) 
46 million 
Indocement Cement Heidelberger Cement 116 
million  
Sulfindo Group Chemical 
manufacturer 
Durability Enterprise 41 million 
Yunnan Kunlene 
Film Industries 
(63%) 
Packaging/ 
BOPP Film 
Jefflyne Golden Holdings 
(co- shareholder) 
14 million 
Salim Rengo 
Containers (60%) 
Packaging Rengo (JV Partner) 24 million 
Gumindo Industri 
Perkasa (43%) 
 Ridwan Soeriyadi (co-
shareholder) 
2 million 
Poli Contindo Nusa  Steel drums Kerismas Witikco 
Makmur 
6 million 
Indosiar (49%) TV station TDM Aset Manajemen 89 million  
Riau Industrial 
Estates 
Real Estate Dwi Sinergi Utama 83 million 
Yakult Indonesia 
Persada (51%) 
Health drinks Yakult (co-shareholder) 7 million 
Indomobil (72% + 
bonds) 
Automotive Trimegah (local 
consortium) 
74 million 
Sugar Group Sugar 
Plantations 
Garuda Pancaarta 
Consortium (local 
consortium) 
137 
million 
Berdikari Sari 
Utama Flour Mills 
(93%) 
Flour Milling ATS consortium 27 million 
Bank Central Asia 
(51%) 
Banking Farallon Capital 
Consortium 
662 
million 
Metropolitan 
Kentjana (48%). 
Property Berca Indonesia Group  78 million 
Total    1.415 mln 
Sources: IBRA, 2001-2003382  
                                                 
382 The Monthly IBRA Newsletters in this period were reviewed. (IBRA, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2001g, 2001h, 2001i, 2001j, 2001k, 2001l, 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f, 2002g, 2002h, 2002i, 2002j, 2002k, 2002l, 2003a,  2003b, 
2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003h, 2003i, 2003j, 2003k, 2003l). Calculated into 
US dollar using the end of year rupiah rate of 2003. The list of asset sales does not 
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Nevertheless, the Salim Group is generally believed to have been the most 
cooperative debtor from whom most funds were recovered compared to 
other Indonesian conglomerates. As one IBRA employee put it: ‘it was such 
an emotional period. Anthony Salim got us through by just focusing on the 
problem’. Anthony Salim admits that the group has learnt a very hard 
lesson. But the issue is: ‘Simply face reality. Confront the problems. Never 
give up’. 
 
By the end of 2002 the government started contemplating giving those who 
had paid off their debts a letter stating that they had fulfilled their 
obligations. This letter, flowing from the original MSAA (Master Settlement 
and Acquisition Agreement), would also free them from future criminal 
charges related to their debts in the Asian Crisis. The initial list of people 
eligible was composed of 3 of the Liem investors (Anthony Salim, 
Sudwikatmono, and Ibrahim Risjad) and two other smaller conglomerate 
owners, later complemented by Suharto’s daughter Tutut. Being a highly 
sensitive topic, nobody in the government dared to sign the letter. The letter 
was in the end approved (but not issued) by the Financial Sector Policy 
Committee in January 2004383. IBRA formally closed in February 2004, 
although some people remained in office to deal with administrative issues. 
The Release and Discharge letter to Anthony Salim was finally issued by 
IBRA in March 2004384.  
 
 
7.4 The Axis of Opportunity 
 
After a few years of coping with the Asian Crisis, the Salim Group started to 
take its first steps towards growth, albeit not at the rate achieved before the 
crisis. Based on the interviews, the strategy of the group was changed in 
three aspects: the geographical as well as industry composition of the 
portfolio and the network orientation.  
 
With regard to the geographical composition of the group, Anthony Salim 
aimed at achieving a portfolio of companies with 50% inside Indonesia and 
50% outside, thus reducing the dependence on Indonesia, which would 
however still remain the most important market. He saw an axis of 
opportunity in the Pacific region, between Australia, ASEAN and China. In 
the words of Anthony Salim: 
 
                                                                                                                   
appear to be complete if compared with the companies that were handed over by the 
Salim Group.  
383 See for example the Jakarta Post (2004a). 
384 See for example the Jakarta Post (2004b). 
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‘Salim will be able to arbitrage between China, Asia, and Australia. 
How we define is very wide. That is the game. There will be a north 
south axis in Asia. Between China, as a main point of gravity Japan, 
to a certain extent Korea and Australia. And a little bit of India. This 
equation will hold almost 2 billion people. And 2 billion rich people, 
because they have a growth of 4-8% so in a few years (..)  that’s as 
big as America if you put that together. We can arbitrage.’ Question: 
Between China and Australia? ‘No, all products and services.’  
(Anthony Salim) 
 
If there was an opportunity to link these countries, for example the 
Australian expertise in agribusiness with the Chinese and Indonesian 
markets, then lucrative business could be achieved. A few steps were taken 
to realise this strategy. One of the examples of this strategy was the 
acquisition of a minority share in listed Australian company Futuris. Futuris 
had a wheat division, and Indofood was one of the largest wheat importers 
for its noodles. Following the acquisition of this minority stake Anthony 
Salim was appointed on the board of directors of Futuris in March 2003385.  
 
In China, the group paid USD 500 million for a 45% stake in the COSCO 
property group386. According to Anthony Salim, these acquisitions fit in a 
strategy where the Salim Group aims at mediating on the axis between 
Australia- ASEAN – China. On this ‘axis of opportunity’, the Salim Group 
will not be a product based company: they will use their expertise and 
capital to mediate in any lucrative business in the region, be it in agri-
business, cement or other activities.  
 
‘We have to transform ourselves to manage our resources. To 
transform our assets. It does not mean money, you see, it is whether 
we have the contacts. We believe we can operate in different 
markets’. (Anthony Salim) 
 
With regard to the industry composition, the Salim Group wanted to move 
away from a very large number of smaller companies, but instead focus on a 
few sectors they know well. This objective was already achieved because of 
the crisis, since most ‘bits and pieces’ were handed over to IBRA while the 
Salims held on to a few large businesses. Most of the new investments fall 
into the food, telecom, media, and property categories, which are all 
industries with products or services for the masses.  
 
                                                 
385 According to the annual report of Futuris in 2002. 
386 According to a report by Jones Lang LaSalle (2002, p. 12). 
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The Salim Group perceived its key competence as a mediation role with 
good knowledge of local markets. According to Anthony Salim he wanted to 
remain a broadly oriented conglomerate:  
 
‘Big and small companies they have their place. If you are big, you 
become a component. If you are a system, components become your 
friends. It is like a rubber belt. Even if you have a big wheel it does 
not move without a rubber belt. So you have to choose, and we want 
to be a rubber belt, it is easier‘. (Anthony Salim)  
 
The third factor that changed was the network orientation. The importance 
of political connections seemed to fade. After the crisis, the Salim Group did 
not start new activities with political connections, and apparently did not 
want to or manage to link up with new power holders. One person close to 
the group said that Anthony Salim could not get along with Suharto’s 
children, which led to more distance between Suharto and the Salim Group 
already before the crisis.  
 
In addition, the Group was now less interested in the ethnic Chinese 
networks, which Anthony Salim considered outdated.  
 
Question: What is the role of Chinese networks in the region for the Salim 
Group? ‘Only in the early days, when Anthony came back from 
school. When we did not have the relationship with the 
international bank. Since early 90s when the group developed, we 
have access to more and international institutions. Then everything 
is basically open for us, in terms of capital. (..) Of course we know 
the business from the region. They are just businessman friends, 
connection do not really help. We may do something with non-
Chinese in the Philippines. Business is Business.  (..) Anthony Salim 
is not interested in that. The second generation usually does not 
regard this as important’. (Salim Group Manager) 
  
Question: How about the Fujian investments? ‘Of course for the first 
generation like Anthony’s father they have a sense of attachment to 
their home country. Of course the first investments, 50% based on 
non business motives - even if it is not profitable you can do 
something good for the people. We invested in a shoes factory for 
employment and so on. Anthony he does not care because he was 
born here. Of course we invest in China, but not because his father 
came from China. We believe that China is very prospective, can 
offer us a business opportunity that we can develop. It does not 
matter in Fujian. From a purely commercial perspective in fact we 
believe that Fujian is not the place to do business. It is Shanghai, 
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Beijing. A lot of new activities are done outside Fujian’. (Salim 
Group Manager) 
 
‘Within the Chinese community there is a paradigm shift, a 
tendency to make connections through cross-holdings. However, the 
Salim Group still follows the old paradigm of autocratic leadership. 
(..) Their strategic alliances are more based on business, not on cross-
holdings’. (Second generation leader of another ethnic Chinese 
conglomerate) 
 
‘Liem and Kuok are clan members and good friends. In Asia the big 
ones help the other big ones, not so much that the big ones help the 
small ones. I mean clan is more the region, not the surname. Many 
have risen above the clan networks, Liem being one of them. 
Because people started to study abroad and also through changes in 
the structure, the clans have lost their influence in Indonesia, but not 
in Singapore and Hong Kong’. (Person familiar with the Salim 
Group) 
 
The relationships with their long time partners the Djuhars also became 
increasingly strained, and Anthony Salim seemed to prefer dealing with 
Western companies. As a result, the network orientation of the Salim Group 
changed and the ethnic as well as political connections, which had already 
decreased in importance before the crisis, we now negligible compared to 
contacts with foreign partners. According to Anthony Salim his strategy was 
now less based on connections:  
 
‘During Suharto time we thrive in that constellation. During crisis 
time, when I work with IMF and the World Bank here, we adapt 
ourselves, we become more market oriented. Post-IBRA, we are 
thriving, we are also adapting to a new market situation.’ (Anthony 
Salim) 
 
Despite a little more focus and less dependence on Indonesia, the Salim 
Group apparently had no intention to change its basic business model- that 
of a family controlled conglomerate, focused on producing mass products 
locally in different markets. 
 
 
7.5 The Salim Group Structure & Control 
 
After the crisis First Pacific Company, the listed Hong Kong based 
conglomerate, held the two largest remaining companies: Indofood and 
PLDT. As was discussed in previous chapters, the ownership structure was 
 167 
basically a pyramid structure. This continued to be the way in which the 
Salim Group was formally structured (see figure 7.3).  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Ownership & Control of Indofood in 2002 
60.0% 40.0% 100.0%
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First Pacific 
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Listed on the Jakarta and Surabaya Stock Exchange
Other Liem Investors Salim Family
 
Source: Annual Reports of First Pacific and Indofood 2002387. 
 
Other companies, such as QAF in Singapore and PLDT in the Philippines, 
showed similar pyramid-like structures which ensured full control over the 
company with limited cash flow rights. The holding company always 
remained private.  
 
‘I don’t believe in the short time that the family holding will be 
changed to a listed holding in the future, because there is no 
necessity. And number two, non-listed holding is more flexible to 
embark on what we want to do’. (Anthony Salim)  
 
There were some exceptions now to the majority ownership principle.  The 
majority ownership of Indocement was sold to Heidelberger Cement. 
Despite having lost control over the company, a minority stake of 13.5% was 
retained, and Benny Santoso remained on the board, as well as Ibrahim 
Risjad. This could indicate a long term interest of the Salim Group in the 
                                                 
387 It is possible that the Salim family had shares in First Pacific and in Indofood directly, 
but the First Pacific and Indofood annual reports of 2002 did not disclose this aside from 
mentioning that Anthony Salim had a 0.01% share in First Pacific. 
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company. A 7% stake in BCA was also retained. In Indomobil, a company 
that was in severe financial trouble, the Salims sold part of their stake to 
partner company Suzuki, with the option to purchase it back in the next 
years. Despite the fact that they now had minority stakes in the different 
Indomobil companies, the company remained part of the Salim Group and 
the core management was not changed. A top-manager interviewed for this 
study admitted that Indofood was still considered part of the Salim Group:  
 
‘After the crisis it’s complex, Anthony Salim has nothing and has 
everything. He sold bits of everything. Officially Indomobil is not 
any more part of the Salim Group, but informally it is’. (Salim 
Group Manager) 
 
In short, the Salim Group maintained its strategy of full control over its 
remaining companies after the crisis by means of a pyramid structure, 
although there were some exceptions. The control mechanisms which 
consisted of internal weekly reporting systems and majority control by the 
Salim family were complemented with the external control of minority 
shareholders. Indocement and Indomobil, both previously under IBRA, 
were now minority owned by the Salim Group, but the latter was still 
considered part of the Salim Group.  
 
 
7.6 Leadership 
 
From 2001-2003 a number of interesting leadership-related issues arose. The 
first was related to the development of companies under IBRA. IBRA 
installed a number of its executives on the boards of Salim Group 
companies, such as Indocement, Indomobil and Indosiar. As these 
companies were now not any more majority-owned by the Salim Group, the 
Salim family withdrew from those boards of directors. However, in those 
companies that the Salim Group planned to buy back, like Indosiar and 
Indocement, the rest of the management was not changed, and in the two 
above mentioned cases Benny Santoso kept his position in the board. In 2003 
Benny Santoso had more board positions (within companies in the author’s 
database) than Anthony Salim (Table 7.2). Interviews indicate that a similar 
thing happened in the private companies: if the management was not 
changed, it was likely that the Salims were still in control, or planning to in 
the near future. 
 
The withdrawal of Anthony Salim from various boards did not mean that 
his central position was waning, on the contrary. In the previous chapter we 
have seen that the Asian Crisis triggered a rapid withdrawal of Liem Sioe 
Liong from most company boards. Andree Halim also withdrew from his 
Indonesian board positions. It became clear that Anthony Salim was fully in 
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charge – he was personally doing all negotiations on behalf of the family 
with creditors and with IBRA as witnessed in one of the IBRA reports (and 
supported by the interviews):  
 
‘On July 11, 2002, IBRA, represented by the Deputy Chairman of 
AMI and the Division Head of PKPS-1, has met with Salim 
Shareholders namely Soedono Salim, Anthoni Salim, and Andree 
Salim (SS), represented by Anthoni Salim’. (IBRA Monthly 
Newsletter July 2002)388 
 
Table 7.2 Board Memberships Liem Investors & Benny Santoso 
 Name 1
99
4 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2 
Benny Santoso 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 
Djuhar Sutanto 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 
Ibrahim Risjad 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 
Sudwikatmono 2 3 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Johny Djuhar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Tedy Djuhar 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: Board Members Database compiled by the author. 
 
In 2003 Andree Halim launched a take-over bid for the majority of the shares 
of QAF and entered the board of directors of this small Singapore-based 
company. Interviews also indicate that he was in charge of some of the 
factories in Fuqing. He also became board member of a small company listed 
in Hong Kong (Peaktop International Holdings Limited), which was – 
according to one of the interviews, run by his wife389. After the crisis Andree 
Halim got a separate corner of the family business group. 
 
The major share of the empire however, was run by Anthony Salim. The 
structured coordination between the companies by means of companies like 
Salim Inti Corpora changed. Inti Salim Corpora was not any more used and 
                                                 
388 It is rather strange that Andree Halim, being the son of Soedono Salim, has a different 
family name – but it could be the result of a simple mistake in the name registration. 
Although usually the name Andree Halim is used in official documentation, IBRA here 
uses the Salim family name. Anthony Salim is sometimes spelled Anthoni Salim. 
389 According to the Peaktop corporate website, Andree Halim was appointed co-vice 
chairman in October 2003. The company is mainly active in garden and home 
decorations and production is in Fuqing, China. It started producing in 1992 in Fuqing 
and was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1998. (www.peaktop.com [accessed 
May 29, 2005] 
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the number of financial people working directly with Anthony Salim had 
decreased. Several interviews indicate that any cross-company coordination 
was now directly through Anthony Salim personally making the group 
more and more dependent on him. Managers said that after the crisis it felt 
more as if each manager was just running his/her own business rather than 
the pre-crisis “family” feeling. 
 
‘Now the synergy is not any more there, people are more working 
for themselves rather than helping each other. Now they try to build 
their own kingdoms. For example a competing company [in my 
field] was set up. I told Anthony Salim I like to compete, but they 
are so small, so it’s easy. After 2 years their accumulated losses were 
quite high and I feel bad because I use the group’s money to kill 
these competing companies that are also group members’. (Salim 
Manager)  
 
During the crisis none of the top-management left the company, but after the 
crisis several internal conflicts or changes arose within the top-management. 
Angky Camaro resigned from Indomobil and took a top position in 
Sampoerna. Eva Riyanti, who had already occasionally showed some 
disappointment in the strategy of Indofood in the press, now ended up in a 
conflict with Anthony Salim and resigned in December 2003390. She was 
replaced by Anthony Salim himself. Manuel Pangilinan, responsible for First 
Pacific, also clashed with Anthony Salim. Apparently the Salims wanted to 
sell PLDT, the Philippines telecom company, and Pangilinan successfully 
blocked the deal391. While Manuel Pangilinan was previously chairman of 
the board he now had to hand over the latter position to Anthony Salim and 
stayed on as CEO. Anthony Salim’s second man Benny Santoso was also 
appointed to the board after the COO and finance director resigned over the 
conflict.  
 
These facts and evidence from interviews shows that the Salim Group was 
still very centrally managed by Anthony Salim, who apparently actively 
intervened in many businesses.  
 
‘Every week we report on sales to Anthony Salim, he likes to 
concentrate on market share. He is very detailed. One day he asked 
                                                 
390 See Financial Times (2003b). 
391 Anthony Salim already discussed the sale of PLDT with a potential buyer, an ethnic 
Chinese businessman from the Philippines. However, Manuel Pangilinan was 
vehemently opposed to the deal. Two directors resigned. First Pacific finally held on its 
shareholding in PLDT and the prospective buyer pulled out. Instead First Pacific sold its 
majority share in Bonifacio Land in the Philippines to another Filipino group for USD 
102.2 million (Financial Times, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). 
 171 
for the profitability of each product. So we submitted a pile of 
papers, and he actually did read it. He commented that product 
such and so was not profitable. He has very good and creative ideas; 
fresh remarks’. (Salim Manager) 
 
‘It is very difficult to get along with him. His personality makes him 
want to meddle in things. Anthony Salim is energetic, intelligent 
and has a dazzling breadth of knowledge; the level of detail is very 
high. He has the illusion that he knows enough to run the business’. 
(Person close to the Group) 
 
Thus, as the empire was now a lot smaller the formal and informal grip of 
Anthony Salim on the empire strengthened making the group more 
centralised in its decision-making. His style also led to some conflicts 
internally, which caused some of the best CEOs to leave the company. 
 
 
7.7 Summary & Conclusions 
 
Thus, after a period of fire-fighting, the Salim Group embarked again on a 
growth strategy, confined within the Pacific region. The Indonesian business 
context changed from hostile to slow growth and recovery, and most of the 
previous problems, such as lowering debt and dealing with IBRA, were in 
the process of finalisation. The remaining Salim companies, particularly 
those under First Pacific, started to recover, although margins were under 
pressure.  
 
Within Indonesia, most of the IBRA sales were completed and those 
companies sold to foreigners were beyond the control of the Salim Group. 
Yet it also made preparations to buy back a few of the former assets, such as 
Indomobil and Indosiar. Indocement was now majority owned by a German 
cement-maker, but the Salim family held on to a minority stake, which was 
an unusual strategy since most companies tended to be majority owned 
through a pyramid structure.  
 
The new post-crisis structure and strategy of the Salim Group differed very 
little from that before the crisis, except for relatively less emphasis on 
Indonesia and a more selective approach to the choice of industries. The 
group remained active in a variety of industries that supplied products or 
services to the masses, on the premise that contacts were more important 
than industry knowledge. It attempted to integrate its operations across the 
region, most notably the axis running between Australia, ASEAN and 
China, on which it planned to be a mediator.  
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Anthony Salim seemed to consciously or unconsciously disrupt many of the 
previously strong relationships with ethnic Chinese groups, connections, 
close partners and his own CEOs. The leadership of the Salim Group 
underwent a couple of changes, most notably the stronger dependence on 
Anthony Salim as a central leader. The former structured way of achieving 
synergy was replaced with an informal coordination mechanism (Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2 Summary 
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices 
2000-2005 
refocusing the 
portfolio 
- continuation of IMF liberal 
economic regime 
- tariff barriers and protectionist 
policies now largely abolished 
- new type of politico-business 
alliances with new power-
holders 
- refocus business, more 
emphasis outside 
Indonesia 
- Asian multinational 
player 
- compete for maintaining 
market share 
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Chapter 8: Evolution of the Salim Group Strategy 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous four chapters described in detail the development of the Salim 
Group, in particular its strategy before, during and after the Asian Crisis. 
Whereas before the crisis the Salim Group showed a strong growth pattern 
and attempted to achieve synergy between the portfolio of diversified 
companies, in the crisis the growth stopped and the Group declined while it 
had to cope with an extremely hostile environment. Only after the crisis did 
the Group start new investments, and it modified some minor aspects of its 
strategy while maintaining its domestically oriented diversified strategy. In 
this chapter key elements of the case are brought together and placed in a 
long-term perspective.  
 
Without referring to theoretical concepts the evolution of the Salim Group 
strategy within its context and covering several decades is presented in the 
first section. It summarizes salient aspects of the rich narrative from the 
previous chapters. I emphasise the two themes identified in chapter three: 
business networks and flexibility. The second section deals with the third 
theme, the dichotomy between a relationship-model and a market-based 
strategy. First, the Salim Group strategy is visualised in these terms using an 
interpretative approach and secondly by using coding procedure. The last 
section deals with the coevolution of the Salim Group and Indonesian 
institutions, focusing on mutual influences between the two. 
 
 
8.2 Corporate Strategy of the Salim Group 
 
After telling the history of the Salim Group from its inception until after the 
Asian Crisis, it is now possible to make an overview of the institutional 
context of the Salim Group as well as to describe what strategic choices the 
Salim Group leadership has made over time (Table 8.1).  
 
The Salim Group started out small and then diversified to cope with a 
chaotic business environment. It had to adapt to a colonial regime, then 
Japanese occupation, a colonial war, and an emerging national state. It 
focused in its initial stage on contacts within ethnic Chinese circles and its 
activities were mainly imports and small scale manufacturing for the local 
market. Even if the Group was active in exports, its main companies were 
producing for the domestic market.  
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Table 8.1 Strategy of the Salim Group over time 
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices 
1938-1945 
Genesis 
- Chinese enjoyed strong 
position in trading   
- business context for private 
business strictly regulated 
- opportunities in 
smuggling/trading 
- small scale trading of various 
products  
- close cooperation with family 
members 
1945-1957 
Army 
relations 
- difficult business 
environment  
- demand for basic products  
- important role of the army 
- start of a national economy 
- initial small-scale 
diversification 
- manufacturing of basic 
products and banking.  
- supplying goods to the army 
1957-1965 
Diversificati
on 
- nationalistic political 
environment 
- slow economic growth  
- rising power of the army in 
business. 
- trade and manufacturing of  
basic products,  
- diversification and expansion 
1966-1972 
Capitalising 
on Suharto’s 
New Order 
- economy improving 
- army most powerful political 
actor & very active in business 
- opening up for foreign 
investment and international 
trade 
- import substitution & 
protection of local capitalists 
- linking up with Suharto to 
develop economy 
- evolving conglomerate as 
new business opportunities 
arise, e.g. import substitution 
industries 
1972-1980 
Institutionali
sing the 
business 
- flourishing economy 
- industrialisation 
- business opportunities exist, 
especially when linked to 
Suharto or army  
- government connected 
business 
- supplemented with 
international businesses 
- design the conglomerate:  
institutionalize & 
professionalize  
1981-1993 
Institutionali
sing the 
business 
- oil crisis and currency 
depreciation   
- import substitution efforts 
halted 
- export promotion policy 
- reduced cronyism 
- build international 
businesses 
- expand local businesses 
- work with government in 
order to resolve losses in 
various industries 
1994-1997 
Rapid 
growth 
- continuation of liberal 
economic policies 
- protection of selected 
businessmen 
- activity in connection with 
Suharto as his succession is 
discussed 
- more crony capitalism 
- FDI inflow 
- continue internationalisation  
- restructuring & vertical 
integration 
- hiring professional managers  
- small businesses with 
Suharto’s children 
- fast growth of existing & new 
businesses, increasingly with 
foreign partners 
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Table 8.1 Continued 
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices 
1997-1999 
Regime 
change 
- anti-Chinese riots and looting 
create hostile atmosphere for 
Chinese business 
- Suharto’s regime falls apart 
- IMF stops protectionist 
policies 
- anti-cronyism  
- use connections to survive & 
help Suharto family 
- focus on solving the crisis  
- comply with government 
demands, sell businesses to 
pay debts 
- retirement of Liem  
2000-2005 
Refocusing 
the portfolio 
- continuation of IMF liberal 
economic regime 
- tariff barriers and 
protectionist policies now 
largely abolished 
- new type of politico-business 
alliances with new power-
holders 
- refocus business, more 
emphasis outside Indonesia 
- Asian multinational player 
- compete for maintaining 
market share 
 
The domestically oriented business model was completely different from 
that of large ethnic Chinese companies in the colonial era. In those times 
ethnic Chinese businesses developed a business model based on producing 
commodities that were meant for exports, such as rubber and sugar. The Oei 
Tiong Ham Concern for example, the largest ethnic Chinese group in 
Southeast Asia during the late-colonial period, became successful with this 
export-strategy. Liem on the other hand was not shaped by the colonial 
export economy - probably because his business was still too small and too 
local when the colonial period ended - and he focused instead on domestic 
buyers.  
 
When Sukarno came to power Liem linked up with the army, which was at 
the time a major player in business. Sukarno was not interested in private 
business and he implemented poor economic policies resulting in economic 
decline. In addition he implemented policies discriminating against Chinese 
businesses. In this hostile context Liem achieved some stability as a supplier 
to the army. Already in this period Liem looked for suitable partners, and 
found both ethnic Chinese as well as political connections in the form of a 
family member of Sukarno. During his period as a supplier for the 
Diponegoro army division he was also introduced to Suharto, who was to 
succeed Sukarno after a bloody regime change.  Operating on the motto all 
business is good Liem diversified from the beginning, a characteristic of the 
Salim Group present till date.  
 
Suharto needed legitimacy for his power, which he soon realised lay in 
improving the economy. Ethnic Chinese partners were perfectly positioned 
to help Suharto in this respect. Several ethnic Chinese businessmen were 
competent, willing, and familiar with a crony model through their contacts 
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with the army. On the other hand, they formed a despised minority which 
stood no chance of getting political power. As they were easily made 
scapegoats for Indonesia’s problems and discriminated they did not form a 
political threat. The continued hostility against the Chinese minority made 
them vulnerable partners, and easier to control. Although several ethnic 
Chinese crony capitalists emerged in the early days of Suharto’s rule, the 
Salim Group evolved into the largest and most successful group associated 
with Suharto. In this situation competition also took place, but competition 
for favours rather than competition for market share. In this crony 
competition process Liem eventually emerged as the most successful player.  
 
Only during the Suharto period did the group evolve into a major player, 
and consistent with the opportunities of its time, it developed a range of 
businesses that produced goods for the domestic market. As Suharto created 
unprecedented economic growth, buying power of Indonesians increased, 
and there was a growing demand for the Salim products, which were 
protected from outside competition. It is this local-for-local business model 
that continues to characterize the Salim Group till date, both in Indonesia as 
well as abroad. Suharto aimed at modernizing and industrializing the 
country, for which he needed capable businessmen. Both relational skills as 
well as business competency played a role in the rapid growth of Liem’s 
businesses and in Suharto’s preference for Liem.  
 
From the Sukarno period onward Liem sought partners for his expanding 
ventures, and carefully chose them to incorporate both people from his own 
ethnic Chinese circles as well as political circles and indigenous 
businessmen. While during Sukarno’s leadership he linked up with a 
relative of Sukarno, under Suharto’s leadership Liem included one of 
Suharto’s family members in his circle of investors. 
 
The group received favours such as access to credit and special licenses in 
various sectors and was able to set up several industries that produced for 
the domestic market whereas these products used to be imported. The first 
phase of import substitution in Indonesia was aimed at industries that were 
not very capital intensive or high-tech. The early industries included wheat, 
cement, automotive assembly and textiles. Once the group surpassed its 
peers, it developed the resources and the market power to expand and 
professionalise its empire. Although it initially relied on ethnic Chinese 
networks, the Salim Group increasingly found Western and Japanese 
partners for their industrial ventures supplying technology or capital. In the 
second phase of import substitution more capital intensive industries such 
as steel were targeted, in which the Salim Group also participated along 
with the government and Western partners. 
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When Anthony Salim joined the business it was already large and intricately 
involved with Suharto. He tried to balance the risks associated with this 
political alliance and he attempted to professionalise the business by 
involving more non-family managers. In addition, he saw the need to build 
businesses outside Indonesia, many of which were also producing for local 
markets in Singapore or China. The anti-Chinese riots that occurred in 1974 
must have strengthened his fears and determination to become less 
dependent on Indonesia.  
 
While the founder of the business, Liem Sioe Liong, laid the foundations for 
success with the capability to select the right partners, which fitted the 
environmental conditions, the son tried to move the Salim Group towards a 
modern enterprise by making the business less dependent on relationships 
with politicians. Anthony Salim probably saw the risks in the alliance with 
Suharto, and tried to balance those risks by making the businesses less 
dependent on Suharto’s favours. He also mitigated the risk of the alliance 
with Suharto by investing in international businesses and restructured the 
group into divisions, a popular concept at the time.  
 
Even though he tried to move away from government contracts, there were 
still a lot of connected business ventures (Figure 8.1 indicating the number of 
partnerships and a trendline). The government bailed out the Salim Group 
in steel and in cement, clearly showing the preferential position the Salims 
had in Indonesia. Many of their companies enjoyed a certain degree of 
protection by special licenses or trade barriers. But the number of new crony 
businesses was indeed small compared to non-crony partners (Figure 8.4).  
 
Anthony Salim’s efforts, however, in a way ran contrary to the Indonesian 
context, which showed waves of increased cronyism, especially in the years 
prior to the Asian Crisis. While foreign investors flocked to the country, 
Suharto personally divided many licenses and special conditions, benefiting 
his family and friends. One could say that the strategy the young Salim was 
implementing worked against the business context, and that probably made 
the transition slow, and fall backs to crony businesses frequent. After all the 
Salim Group was immensely successful and a preferred partner for domestic 
and foreign businesses. There was no immediate necessity to detach 
themselves from the Suharto government, which was still firmly in power. 
Even though the Salim Group may have tried to move away from their 
crony connections, it did little to change their image in the eyes of the public, 
which interpreted the business of the group as an extension of the Suharto 
family. 
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Figure 8.1 Number of New Activities with Political Connections392 
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Liem already lay the foundations for a diversified business group with his 
motto that ‘all business is good’. Already from the 1970s the Salim Group 
moved into large scale manufacturing and became active in many of the key 
industries in Indonesia. Anthony Salim moved away from the traditional 
Chinese small family firm even more. He started to work with professional 
managers – not surprising given the size of the group – and implemented a 
more complex organisation structure. He professionalised the business to 
such an extent that foreign partners as well as government officials and 
bankers in Indonesia speak very highly of the corporate practices of the 
companies under Salim leadership. His investments and partnerships are 
selected on business criteria, and not on ethnicity. Although his father 
invested heavily in his birthplace in China, partly to help the local 
population, Anthony Salim preferred to invest in Shanghai which offered 
better business opportunities. The number of new business activities started 
with ethnic Chinese partners was relatively modest and declined slightly 
over time (Figure 8.2 and 8.4). Although there were linkages between the 
Salim Group leadership and other ethnic Chinese tycoons in the region, this 
study shows that new business activities were more often started with 
foreign partners than with ethnic Chinese or political partners (Figure 8.3).  
                                                 
392 The straight line in this Figure is the line that best represents the trend in the data 
based on the R-squared value. The same linear trendline technique was used in Figures 
8.2, 8.3; 8.4 and 8.6. In Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.6 the trendline appears in the legend as 
“linear” followed by the name of data series between brackets. 
 179 
Figure 8.2 Number of New Activities with Ethnic Chinese Partners 
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Figure 8.3 Number of New Activities with Foreign Partners 
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In fact, activities with foreign partners occur more often than activities with 
ethnic Chinese and crony partners together (Figure 8.4). The results show 
that the Salim Group is more embedded in global business than in ethnic 
Chinese business. Interview results have confirmed that Anthony Salim is 
not really interested in the ethnic Chinese network. Because the Salim Group 
was a preferred partner of the Suharto regime it became an attractive partner 
for Western companies, which used it to clear bureaucratic obstacles in a 
corrupt country. But this study shows how the Salim Group limited political 
connections as well as ethnic Chinese partners in favour of foreign partners.  
 
Figure 8.4 Salim Group Activities by Partnership Category 
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It appears that the second generation does not necessarily continue the 
partnerships of the first generation, even though Anthony Salim spent 
twenty years in the business before formally taking over the reigns. While 
Liem and Djuhar were close business partners for decades, their sons 
increasingly faced conflicts over business issues. While Liem and Suharto 
got along very well and developed a close relationship, Anthony Salim 
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appears to do some business with Suharto’s son Bambang, but has little 
involvement with the other children.  
 
Because of declining oil revenues in the mid-1980s, Indonesia changed its 
economic policies. It had to abandon major public expenditures, devaluate 
the rupiah and it moved from an import substitution to an export promotion 
strategy. Although the Salim Group did start a few export businesses, such 
as shoes, they largely stuck to the domestic model, which was also repeated 
in their businesses abroad. 
 
Although in interviews Anthony Salim claims that from 1979 onward the 
Salim Group was free from government contracts, this is not entirely the 
case. In addition, respondents claim that the Salims had a fixed weekly 
meeting with Suharto, which indicates their closeness to the regime and 
their ability to influence affairs in Indonesia. By the 1990s the Salim Group 
was so large that it enjoyed considerable economic power, including the 
power to influence domestic institutions such as laws. However, Anthony 
Salim is right in the sense that the Salim Group had developed the power to 
stand on its own feet and was not any more dependent on special favours 
and credits from the government for its survival. 
 
Although the Salim Group increasingly became a multinational enterprise, 
Anthony Salim also kept a number of key success factors that many ethnic 
Chinese business groups have, such as a flexible, flat structure under strong 
family leadership, and a portfolio strategy of spreading risks across 
businesses and countries. This enabled quick decision-making. All major 
business decisions required the consent of Anthony Salim, making him the 
most central person in the group. A management information system 
allowed him to monitor his companies in detail. Anthony Salim also kept the 
opaque structure with hundreds of different companies. The network of 
companies allowed for opaque transactions, which were necessary to keep 
crony, ethnic and foreign partners happy. Since the 1990s a handful large 
Salim companies were listed on the stock exchange, although the holding 
companies remained private to retain the flexibility.  
 
Within the rapidly growing Salim Group many internal transactions 
occurred, some of which apparently benefited the family rather than the 
minority shareholders. But many internal transactions seemed to both offer 
private benefits and rationalise the business. An example of the frequent 
internal transactions can be found in Indofood, which through internal 
acquisitions achieved a large degree of vertical integration. From producing 
only noodles, it acquired almost the entire noodle value chain from wheat 
and palm oil to supermarkets. Most of the acquisitions necessary to 
accomplish this vertical integration were internal acquisitions within the 
Salim Group which were integrated into a listed Salim company.  
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Faced with such a large empire and scarce family management resources, 
the Liem Investors focused their attention on the large Indonesian 
businesses, (such as Indofood, BCA and Indocement) which also happened 
to be crony businesses in the eyes of the public. The Liem investors and 
Salim family occupied many of the board seats in these companies (Table 
8.2). The international businesses were managed by professional managers, 
such as Manuel Pangilinan in Hong Kong and Tan Kong King in Singapore, 
while other Indonesian divisions, such as chemicals were also under trusted 
professional managers. Just how strong these professional managers became 
clear after the Asian Crisis. When the Salim family wanted to sell bits and 
pieces of their foreign interests to save the Indonesian businesses, several of 
the foreign managers successfully rebelled. The Salims had hitherto 
concentrated their managerial efforts on their Indonesian companies, which 
constituted the core of the group. As a consequence, foreign manager had 
acquired over time more freedom to follow their own course. The fact that, 
even after three decades of internationalisation, the “soul” of the Salim 
Group was still in the Indonesian businesses associated with Suharto 
showed clearly that the Salim Group was resistant to change and tended to 
stick to what worked in the past.  
 
Table 8.2 “Soul” of the Group: Liem Investor Board Positions 1994-2003 
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Anthony Salim 41 x x x x   X x   
Ibrahim Risjad 29 x x   x         
Benny Santoso* 28 x x x x   X   x 
Tedy Djuhar 24 x x   x         
Andree Halim 21   x x   x X x   
Franciscus Welirang** 21 x x x           
Liem Sioe Liong 21 X x x x   X     
Sudwikatmono 21 X x x x         
Djuhar Sutanto 16   x   x         
Johny Djuhar 7   x             
*Right hand of Anthony Salim 
** Brother-in-law of Anthony Salim 
Source: Author’s board members database compiled from annual reports 
 
The real tragedy of the Salim Group is that, when the crisis struck, the Liem 
Investors were focusing on those businesses that were, in the eyes of the 
public, examples of cronyism and corruption. Faced with a regime change 
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the Salim Group was taken as a symbol for the wrongdoings of the Suharto 
regime, and some of the businesses were attacked. Unable to influence the 
new government, which now took an anti-corruption and cronyism stand, 
the Group lost many of their key businesses, such as BCA and Indocement. 
Some of the key government players were in favour of dissolving the Salim 
Group and exercised political pressure on their Western partners to abandon 
the Salim Group393. These Western partners however were satisfied with 
their cooperation and only reluctantly complied.  
 
Anthony Salim has insisted that he changed the business into a more 
professional and less crony enterprise, but the events during the crisis show 
that he was only very partially successful. The general public still saw the 
group as an element of the now despised Suharto regime, and its businesses 
and family house were physically attacked. The Salim Group strategy for 
independence may have turned out to be very partially implemented, but in 
at least one aspect it clearly paid off. First Pacific, its Hong Kong 
conglomerate, was able to save the cash cow Indofood in Indonesia. Even if 
it first had to sell most of its other businesses before it could acquire 
Indofood, this white knight role would not have been possible had the Salim 
Group not internationalised in the first place. 
 
One of the lucky coincidences of the Asian Crisis for Anthony Salim was 
that, due to the sudden retirement of his father, and the withdrawal of his 
brother, he was firmly in power (Table 8.3). He steered to Group 
competently out of trouble, tackling his debt problems and political issues 
one by one. Had succession issues arisen in this particularly critical time, or 
had the family been divided, this would have certainly negatively 
influenced the chances for survival. Other companies that faced a profound 
regime change, such as the Oei Tiong Ham group in the early Sukarno era, 
are known to have been unable to act decisively because the heirs to the 
business could not agree what strategy to take394.  
 
Another positive element of the crisis was that it suddenly set the scene for a 
more liberal market environment. IMF forced Indonesia to abolish 
protectionist economic policies favouring cronies like Salim. This new 
environment fitted better with the direction Anthony Salim envisioned for 
the Salim Group, but also forced him to fight battles with new competitors 
and accept lower profit margins. Also, investors, bankers and the new 
government admired the Group for their cooperation, and for the fact that 
                                                 
393 The idea that politically well connected business groups engaging in rent seeking 
should be dissolved has also been voiced by some researchers (Morck & Yeung, 2004, p. 
405). The reason is that rent-seeking is believed to have a negative impact on economic 
growth (Murphy et al., 1993). 
394 See Post (2006). 
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they handed over well-managed, professional companies after the crisis. 
Friends and enemies alike admit that the Salim Group was certainly the 
most cooperative and professional of all the large conglomerates that ran 
into trouble during the Asian Crisis. Given the enormous political pressure 
that was exercised on the Salim Group during the crisis, in combination with 
their debt problems, it is a miracle that Anthony Salim was able to survive 
the political and economic attacks and end up earning praise from his 
opponents.  
 
Table 8.3 : Family Board Positions 1994-2003 
Family Member 1
99
4 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2 
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 
Source:  Author’s database 
 
It is not surprising that it is exactly this dependence on Indonesia that 
Anthony Salim is now working on changing. He aims at bringing the 
relative importance of the Indonesian businesses back by investing in other 
countries. Anthony Salim has also strengthened his grip on a couple of key 
companies, both officially within the board as well as informally. But he also 
realised that relationship-building is one of the Salim Group’s strengths. 
Prior to the crisis the group made forays into the US and European markets, 
but the crisis brought a radical change in this policy. The Salim Group now 
concentrates primarily on the Asia-Pacific region, targeting countries such as 
China and India for investments. Many of the countries in this region 
display characteristics of a market economy while also having relatively 
weak economic institutions. It is in this high-growth, government-led 
economies that the Salim Group knows how to operate and can develop into 
a multinational emerging market player. 
 
 
8.3 Strategy Oscillation 
 
This study has shed light on the strategy of the Salim Group over time. It has 
shown that institutional changes (such as regime change) and generational 
changes gave rise to a new strategic direction. As the external and internal 
factors influencing strategy are not aligned, and may be sudden, irregular, 
and different in intensity, it can be expected that in reality the strategy 
development of the Salim Group did not follow a neat linear pattern. This is 
illustrated following first an interpretative method, and secondly, through 
the coding procedure described in chapter three. 
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Table 8.1 was based on an interpretative analysis of the corporate history of 
the Salim Group and its context. Based on Table 8.1, one can assign scores to 
each strategic direction, on a -5 to +5 scale, where -5 is highly market-based; 
0 represents a mixed strategy, and +5 indicates a highly relationship-based 
strategy. If one interprets the intensity of the type of strategy and expresses 
it in a figure, one can plot the scores on a time-line (x-axis). Taking a market-
based versus relationship-based continuum as the y-axis, the pattern reveals 
how the Salim Group strategy oscillates over time (Figure 8.5).  
 
Figure 8.5 Interpretative Analysis: Salim Group Strategy  
(scale: -5 = highly market based +5 is highly relationship-
based)
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
M
ar
ke
t-B
as
ed
 - 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p-
Ba
se
d 
C
on
tin
uu
m
H
ig
hl
y 
M
B 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
M
ix
ed
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
H
ig
hl
y 
R
B
1965: Suharto in 
power
1972: Anthony Salim 
Enters Family 
Business
1985: 
Government 
Bail-Out  
Indocement
2002-
2004: Re-
shuffle  
Portfolio
1997: Start 
Asian Crisis
1999: Salim Group 
hands over 
businesses to IBRA
 
Source: Interpretative Analysis 
 186 
An analysis of the business events following the coding procedure gives a 
similar oscillating figure. In fact the oscillations following this procedure are 
even more pronounced. The overall results show a less clear trend, although 
the trend-line in the figure indeed shows an overall movement towards a 
market-based strategy (Figure 8.6). 
 
Figure 8.6 Coding Procedure Results: Salim Group Strategy 
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Both interpretative methods and data coding methods have their drawbacks. 
In the interpretative method one can get stuck in anecdotes and the bias of 
the researcher can influence the interpretation. This is not the case for the 
more objective coding method, although this technique also has serious 
drawbacks, most importantly that it is a less encompassing method using 
proxies that only measure aspects of relationship-based and market-based 
model. It does not, for example, take into account the importance of the 
different business events. If one weighs the importance of all business events 
to reflect their relative importance, the accurateness would increase, but the 
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reliability of the method would decrease because the more complicated the 
measuring method, the more likely an independent coder will assess events 
in a different way. However, the fact that both these techniques show a 
similar strategic pattern strengthens the overall conclusion that the Salim 
Group strategy can be understood as moving from a relationship-based to a 
market based strategy as well as displaying an oscillatory pattern.  
 
If one assumes that the first pole, the relationship-based model, is a strategy 
built on crony connections with politicians and (often ethnic Chinese) 
business partners, and characterised by pursuit of unrelated opportunities, 
seizing anything that comes along that provides either pecuniary benefits or 
strengthens useful relationships. The second pole, the market-based model, 
adheres to the “best practices” of international business, implementing 
rational exploitation of markets and resources, professionalizing 
management and putting in place formal financial and managerial control 
systems. It also strives for internationalisation, both in the form of bringing 
to Indonesia powerful foreign business partners and developing activities 
abroad.  
 
Both poles offer opportunities for the Salim Group, both offer risks. The 
more a company moves to either one of the opposite poles, the larger will be 
the tension to move back. If one then considers the history of the Salim 
Group, especially since early 1970s when the young Anthony Salim joined 
its management, it clearly shows both a steady modernisation and a 
dynamic interplay between two opposed patterns of business strategy.  
 
Summarizing the previous line of argumentation, while the founder of the 
business, Liem Sioe Liong, laid the foundations for a successful relationship-
based model, which fitted the environmental conditions at the time the 
business was started, the son tried to move the Salim Group towards a 
modern, market-based enterprise by making the business less dependent on 
relationships. But the movement was not linear. While Anthony Salim tried 
to move away from dependency on Suharto, the opportunities and 
obligations attached to this relationship could not easily be broken or 
released. The more professional the Salim Group became, the more attractive 
it was as a partner for Suharto, as he could legitimately claim to have teamed 
up with the best business group in the country. The more the Group 
associated with Suharto, the clearer the risks attached to such an alignment 
in case of the demise of the dictator. For these reasons, the Salim Group 
swayed between the opposing poles and built competencies related to both 
the relationship and the market model. The oscillation approach applies well 
in the Salim Group case study. The strategy oscillations are clearly visible 
through interpretative and quantitative techniques, while the interpretative 
approach is able to explain why strategy displays an irregular pattern.  
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8.4 Coevolution of Salim Group and Institutions 
 
The study shows that the Salim Group not only adapted to external 
circumstances, but was also able to influence Indonesian institutions. Table 
8.4 gives an overview of mutual responses and adaptations between Salim 
and Indonesian institutions.  
 
Table 8.4 Mutual Influencing between Salim and Indonesian Institutions 
Period Salim Group Actions 
                                                    Government Actions 
1950-
1965 
 
Liem looks for partners in unstable environment 
Military officers need funding and take Liem as a partner 
Liem takes care of army supplies and builds stable income 
Military officers know Liem as a trustworthy partner 
1966-
1997 
 
Suharto government intends to build up local industries 
Liem willing to comply, but lacks funds 
Government offers cheap capital and favourable conditions 
Liem uses his connections to be successful in building basic industries 
Government offers Liem favourable conditions in other industries 
Liem is successful and incorporates partners from Suharto circle 
Government increasingly trusts Liem as it reaps the benefits 
Liem diversifies and builds his Salim Group, becomes crony of choice 
Government now intends to build capital-intensive industries 
Liem helps government by investing in new steel industry 
Government gives Liem import monopoly 
Salim Group quickly builds up market power  
Government grants Liem various monopolies 
Liem helps out Suharto’s foundations when in need 
Suharto family requests Liem to participate in ventures of children 
Salim invests abroad and reduces dependence on Suharto 
1997-
2005 
 
Government struggles with economic crisis 
Anthony Salim sits on official committees to resolve debt problems 
Suharto under pressure, eventually forced to resign 
Salim Group does not abandon Suharto 
New Government wishes to punish Salim Group 
Salim Group tries building new government connections 
Government pressurises Salim Group to dissolve 
Salim Group complies, hands over 107 companies 
Salim Group decreases dependence on Indonesia 
 
The most important external factors are regime changes in Indonesia, which 
strongly impact the strategy of the Salim Group. As most of the Salim Group 
businesses are still in Indonesia, it is this institutional context that exercises 
most influence on the Salim Group strategy. The domestic institutional 
context can be divided in three periods which coincide with the different 
regimes in Indonesia. 
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Sukarno favoured socialist and nationalist policies in which the government, 
and particularly the army, strongly influenced the economy. Liem 
responded by linking up with the army. A more favourable business 
environment existed under Suharto’s regime, which encouraged domestic 
capitalists, particularly those that were close to the regime. Liem responded 
by cherishing his contacts with Suharto and including one of his family 
members in his circle of investors. He also helped implement government 
policies of industrialisation. A policy of cronyism and a relatively open 
economy coincided.  
 
In the period of the Asian Crisis the institutional changed complete and the 
new government abolished many aspects of the crony capitalism 
environment while a simultaneous reconstruction of the crony system with 
other key players also took place. Liem responded by withdrawing and 
leaving the leadership to his son, who was identified less with Suharto and 
who could claim he was in favour of a more professional and less connected 
enterprise.  
 
Under Sukarno Liem found the right partners, a skill that also benefited him 
during the Suharto regime. Liem successfully designed a relationship-based 
strategy, which led to enormous growth. When Suharto stepped down after 
32 years, the group experienced a profound shock. It needed to help former 
political partners while had to build connections to a new government, 
which was not friendly but rather hostile to Salim. With the help of some 
businessmen from the ethnic Chinese network they were able to deal with 
the crisis by selling many of their businesses and keeping a few cash cow 
companies. The crisis forced the Salim Group to abandon its relationship 
strategy to a certain extent and focus more on businesses independent of 
crony connections. The fact that a regime change coincided with a severe 
economic crisis accelerated the strategy change. 
 
In terms of internal factors, the size of the company led to changes in its 
management and organisational structure. The leadership responded to this 
by hiring professional managers and reorganizing its structure in the 1990s. 
But it seems that the strategy was most influenced by generational changes. 
Anthony Salim joined the business in the 1970s and slowly took over the 
leadership after 20 years of guidance by his father. He made attempts to 
change the direction of the company. Even though his elder brother was also 
active in the business, at least in the 1980s it was clear to the outside world 
that the next leader would be Anthony Salim. The crisis made an abrupt end 
to the slow leadership transition and firmly put Anthony Salim in power. 
The sudden change cleared the way for difficult decisions during the Asian 
crisis, under clear and decisive leadership of the second generation. 
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The institutional environment, highly dependent on Suharto, exercised 
influence on the group by providing a changing range of opportunities and 
obligations and a favourable patron. Being part of the inner circle of Suharto, 
a mutual influencing also occurred, which provided a win-win situation for 
Salim and Suharto, and to a certain extent for the Indonesian economy. 
Table 8.4 has shown some of the interactions between Indonesian 
institutions and the Salim Group. When Salim business went sour, the 
government stepped in to pick up the bill, the other side of the coin being 
that when Suharto’s family business or foundations suffered, the Salim 
Group stepped in. Although the two parties were not equal, they certainly 
influenced each other on many occasions in Indonesian history.  
 
The embrace was such that during the Asian Crisis, Indonesian protesters 
took the Salim Group as a symbol of a corrupt Suharto regime, an event that 
showed how the Salim Group had, in the eyes of Indonesians, become itself 
a key part of the institutional environment. In the face of a radical 
institutional and regime change, the Salim Group, by virtue of its size and 
economic influence continued to influence its environment, albeit not to the 
same extent as under Suharto.  
 
Internationalisation and cut-throat competition became the focal point after 
the crisis. As the business was now smaller, and managerial attention 
divided between Indonesia and other Asian countries, the opportunities for 
shaping the Indonesian institutional context are now less pronounced than 
before. In many ways, the effects of generational changes within the Salim 
Group preceded changes in the institutional context. Anthony Salim, with 
the perspective of a new, Western-educated generation, offered a new vision 
that better fitted in a global business trend of internationalisation and free 
markets, while still incorporating the value of personal connections. 
However, the Salim heir attempted to implement a more market based 
strategy in times when crony capitalism was still strong, and the benefits of 
the old strategy high, and hence the process was very gradual. The 
successful implementation of his strategy coincided with a less fortunate 
regime change and crisis, which also firmly put him in place as the leader of 
the group. 
 
The Salim Group co-evolved with Indonesian institutions: it was influenced 
by them, but also influenced them. The coevolution rhythm was irregular, 
clearly there were periods in history where the Salim Group took a more 
passive and adaptive role, whereas in other periods it was able to capitalise 
on its relationships with Suharto and exercise influence on their 
environment proactively, resulting in favourable policies towards the 
Group. At the height of their power, the Salim Group not only benefited 
from Suharto, it also sought to build an independent, international 
professional business group. This proactive strategy provoked a counter-
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reaction after the demise of the Suharto regime. Precisely because the Salim 
Group had been in such a position of power in the Indonesian economy, the 
new government sought to eliminate the Salim Group – a symbol of the old 
corrupt regime. The Group used proactive and reactive strategies to deal 
with the post-crisis environment. Eventually, the Salims sought to diversify 
increasingly away from Indonesia to other Asian countries.  
 
 
8.5 Summary  
 
Liem Sioe Liong laid the foundations for three strategic elements that are 
present within the Salim Group till date: a domestic business model; 
opportunistic diversification, and a preference for teaming up with a wide 
variety of partners. The close connections with Suharto enabled the group to 
influence Indonesian institutions as well as being influenced by them. 
Anthony Salim’s vision was to change the group and make it more 
international and less dependent on Indonesia and on Suharto. He 
succeeded only partially and slowly while the strategy oscillated between 
relationship-oriented and market-based. The demise of Suharto, which 
coincided with an economic crisis, formed a turning point for the group. On 
the one hand it led to a near-collapse of the Salim Group while on the other 
hand it cleared away the obstacles for the more international and 
independent business strategy envisioned by the second generation.     
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Chapter 9: Conclusions  
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Whereas in the previous chapter the evolution of the Salim Group within its 
context over 50 years was described, in this last chapter the evolution of the 
Salim Group strategy is connected to the theoretical approaches presented in 
Chapter Two and the themes in Chapter Three. The case is confronted with 
the culturalist approach, the crony capitalism approach and with 
institutional theories on emerging market strategy. The chapter ends with 
conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
 
 
9.2 Flexibility and Path Dependence 
 
Some culturalist approaches suggest that ethnic Chinese firms are extremely 
flexible both in terms of adaptability to the environment395 and in terms of 
their embedding in an international network rather than in a national 
context396. Several authors therefore speak of “transnational” or “footloose” 
enterprises397. Due to the extensive ethnic network, the ethnic Chinese firm 
is thought to be “ungrounded” in their domestic context. Path dependency 
approaches on the other hand suggest that history matters, and that 
companies are restricted in their present strategic choices by past decisions, 
which may limit their flexibility398. In the case of the Salim Group one can 
observe three types of path dependency.  
 
First, the group developed a domestic business model focusing on products 
for a large consumer base and stuck to it, even if the government started to 
provide incentives to set up export industries rather than import 
substitution industries. Profiting initially from army connections and the 
pent-up demand after the economy recovered from the detrimental policies 
implemented during the Sukarno era, this model made sense in the 
historical setting in which the Salim Group emerged. In a large and fast-
growing market like Indonesia, this domestic business model offered 
excellent business opportunities in many industries. When the import-
substitution industrialisation phase ended and the government started to 
promote exports the Salim Group stayed with their local-for-local model 
                                                 
395 See for example Redding (1995) or Limlingan (1986). 
396 See for example Lever-Tracey (2001) and Backman (1999) 
397 For example Ong and Nonini (1997). 
398 See for the concept of path dependency Garud and Karnoe (2001) and for path 
dependency in ethnic Chinese firms Carney and Gedajlovic (2002, 2003) and Ahlstrom 
et al. (2004). 
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instead of adapting to new circumstances. After all much of their capital was 
fixed in their industrial enterprises, which were doing well, so the Salim 
Group leadership spent most of their money in their already successful 
businesses and in starting similar businesses producing for the local 
markets. Although the Salim Group maintained some organisational 
characteristics that made it flexible and quick to act upon to emerging 
business opportunities, the basic domestic business model stayed the same, 
both in Indonesia and abroad. 
 
Second, the Salim Group’s soul remained in their domestic businesses which 
were established in close connection with Suharto. Although they pursued 
internationalisation strategies for several decades, this has never changed 
their fundamental dependence on Indonesia. Before the Asian crisis, after 
two decades of internationalisation about 35% of the sales came from 
international operations, showing how much the Salim Group was part of 
the Indonesian economy, in which the Group played a major role. When the 
Asian Crisis occurred, the Salim Group decided to sell many of their 
international companies to save their Indonesian enterprises, showing again 
how much the group was oriented towards Indonesia. Given the political 
pressure to dissolve the Salim Group during the crisis, why did they not try 
to hold on to their foreign companies instead of their Indonesian 
enterprises? Apparently their investments in social capital, in fixed assets, 
and their market knowledge were specific to Indonesia, and it was not easy 
to leave this market behind. The Asian Crisis has shown that the Salim 
Group was unable to disentangle itself from the Indonesian domestic 
context. Contrary to a company like Philips, which closed the doors in the 
Netherlands during the Second World War and continued business by 
moving headquarters to the US, the Salim Group was not able or willing to 
do so. It appeared that rather than being transnational the company was 
strongly attached to Indonesia. Anthony Salim now wishes to change this 
dependence on a local context and now invests heavily in other Asian 
countries. But he still wishes to have 50% of the business in Indonesia.  
 
Third, a new strategy envisioned by the second generation leader was 
implemented very slowly because it ran against past experiences and against 
the institutional context. The relationship with Suharto proved to be 
extremely well chosen and profitable for the Salim Group. It gave the Salims 
access to resources and the ability to build management capacities to run a 
large corporate empire. In the years running up to the Asian Crisis, the 
environment increasingly rewarded businessmen who were close to 
Suharto. There was no immediate need to distance the Salim businesses 
from Suharto while he was still in power, yet the second generation leader 
claims that this was his goal. The extraordinarily long presidency of Suharto 
made the Salim Group the large multinational it is now, and allowed it to 
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build and sustain a successful domestic business model, but it also hindered 
the need for the Salims to stop being identified with a mortal dictator.    
 
Why would ethnic Chinese companies remain flexible and adaptable and be 
immune to the same resistance to change that all companies develop over 
time? The study of the Salim Group shows that they are not. The national 
and historical context played a central role in defining the basic business 
model of the Salim Group. It has always been a domestic player in large 
emerging market industries, deeply embedded in the Indonesian context, 
combining business acumen and relationship capabilities. Changing this 
fundamental strategic orientation is a slow process. Just like a sailboat can 
turn more quickly than a large ocean tanker, large ethnic Chinese companies 
increasingly become unable to implement rapid changes.  
 
 
9.3 The Evolution of Business Networks 
 
Culturalist theories on ethnic Chinese firms often assume that their leaders 
prefer to do business with businessmen from their ethnic network399. 
Referring to Confucius’ influence on Chinese culture, they assume that 
building trust among fellow Chinese is much easier than dealing with 
foreigners. Crony theories on the other hand focus also on relationship-
building, but not with fellow Chinese immigrants but with politicians.  The 
alliance is argued to provide a win-win between the business skills of the 
Chinese and the corrupt distributors of rents within the Indonesian 
government400. 
 
The Salim Group engages in many business ventures with one or more 
partners over time. In the very beginning of the Salim Group Liem Sioe 
Liong benefited from contacts with other ethnic Chinese immigrants and 
family members. But as soon as he had built a substantial business, he laid 
contacts with a variety of partners. On the one hand he kept the contacts 
with ethnic Chinese partners such as the Djuhar family and the Riady 
family. But soon after Sukarno assumed power he established relationships 
beyond ethnic Chinese circles, namely with local businessmen and family 
members of several Indonesian presidents. Once the Salim Group grew into 
an emerging industrial firm, it initially established contacts with the ethnic 
Chinese network abroad to fund its first factories. But soon after, it widened 
its group of partners to foreign firms that provided knowledge, technology 
and capital.  
 
                                                 
399 See for example Backman (1999). 
400 See for example Robison (1986) or Yoshihara (1989). 
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The quantitative analysis of all Salim Group business events of the last 20 
years shows clearly that the group maintained different types of 
partnerships, namely ethnic Chinese partners, political partners and foreign 
partners. Of these, the latter, foreign partners, came to be most important for 
the Salim Group, in number more important than the other two types 
together.  
 
This study clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of the culturalist as well as 
the crony approach in explaining ethnic Chinese networking styles. 
Although this research supports both because ethnic and political 
connections matter, it also demonstrates the shortcomings, because these 
theories overlook that the most frequent and most important network ties 
occur with Western or Japanese companies. If one studies network ties in an 
evolutionary perspective, it becomes clear that cultural and crony theories 
together can explain the nature of the Salim Group business network in its 
very early days, but less so when it evolves.  
 
Following the previously mentioned classification of social capital into 
bonding capital (with the own social group) and bridging capital (across 
social strata)401, we can conclude that the Salim Group consciously used both 
bonding capital with ethnic Chinese, but also bridging capital with political 
leaders as well as multinational firms. Given the hostile context the Group 
operated in, its success lay perhaps exactly in this ability to create social 
capital of various kinds.  
 
 
9.4 Diversification and Social Capital 
 
Traditional theories of diversification often make use of the term economies 
of scope to explain why it may be sensible to combine diverse businesses 
under one umbrella402. The reason is that some production inputs may be 
sharable and therefore beneficial to more than one line of business. The 
institutional context is also argued to make a difference: if institutions are 
weak there may be even more advantages to combining different economic 
activities in one firm or one business group403.  
 
While other reasons for diversification also exist, the study of the Salim 
Group shows how relationships with Suharto or with other ethnic Chinese 
firms stimulated the group to diversify, eventually resulting in a web of 
different businesses with different partners. Requests from the government 
of from partners have often stimulated the Salim Group to start ventures in 
                                                 
401 Developed by Putnam (2000) and Adler and Kwon (2002). 
402 See Panzar and Willig (1981). 
403 See Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999). 
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new industries. Therefore, next to classical economies of scope and 
institutional factors, one could argue that social capital can also stimulate 
diversification. I propose to call this economies of connectedness, which can be 
defined as ‘advantages associated with diversification resulting from 
sharable personal relationships of business owners, such as connections with 
government officials or with members of their ethnic group’. “Economies of 
connectedness” is a concept both broader and more precise than that of 
corruption and cronyism.  The latter are necessarily illegal and associated 
with private gains by bureaucrats, whereas diversification resulting from 
connections is not.   
 
The Salim Group clearly went through different phases in which both 
economies of scope and economies of connectedness played a different role.  
In the early stages, the Chinese connections allowed a poor immigrant to 
rapidly establish himself in business. Thereafter, the connections with the 
army, and particularly with Suharto and his family, are what made it 
possible for the Salim Group to emerge as the largest business empire in 
Indonesia. Sometimes the Salim Group received explicit government 
instructions to enter a new industry, such as the steel industry in the 1980s. 
The internationalisation of the Group was initially carried out with the help 
of ethnic connections, but later also through more traditional business 
contacts with foreign groups, some of them technology partners in 
Indonesian businesses.  
 
From 1985 until the Asian Crisis in 1997 diversification was increasingly 
driven by desire to achieve vertical and horizontal integration, often based 
on economies of scope factors such as shared human resources, capital or 
access to partners with technology. The weak institutional environment may 
have played a role in the vertical and horizontal integration. Transactions 
with others, such as suppliers or buyers were expensive because of the 
uncertain and corrupt environment and because of poor law enforcement. 
As a consequence of this it became cheaper to trade within the group than 
with market parties outside. In other words, as transactions costs were high 
in Indonesia, it made sense to have all services available within the group 
rather than deal with an unpredictable partner.  
 
The influence of political and Chinese connections diminishes, although it 
does not disappear.  During the crisis and its immediate aftermath the 
Group becomes less diversified, the political connections diminish 
significantly, and the Chinese network is relevant only as a source of 
potential buyers for businesses that have to be divested.  In the most recent 
period, the direction is not quite clear as yet, but it seems that classical 
economies of scope have primacy over economies of connectedness, 
although the latter have not disappeared. 
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9.5 Strategy Evolution and Generational Change 
 
Whereas institutional theories assume that the main reason for a company to 
change its strategy is to adapt to changes in the business environment404, 
family business literature points at the importance of generation change for 
explaining an emerging new direction405. Family businesses can be 
considered as an extension of the psychological interplay between members 
of a family.   
 
During the history of the Group, Liem Sioe Liong had different ideas for the 
business than his son Anthony Salim. One is a poor immigrant from the 
hinterland of China, without much education and probably limited skills for 
evolving within sophisticated internationally-oriented elite. The other is a 
well-bred international tycoon, rooted in his country of birth even if some 
cultural affinity to China remains.  One started his business career in the late 
30s in a remote provincial town of the Dutch Empire and climbed up the 
social ladder until he reached the stratosphere.  The other was born to 
wealth and privilege in a proud powerful country and received an 
international upbringing. Undoubtedly, the son lavishes on his father a well 
deserved respect, reinforced by the traditional Chinese veneration of the 
elder, but he also must long with every fibre in his body to bring the family 
business into ‘modernity’ and to acquire, if not for him then at least for his 
heirs, respectability and social acceptance, very much like the evolution of 
the Vanderbilts or the Rockefellers from the status of robber-barons to that 
of great American families. 
 
In this study it becomes clear that Anthony Salim initiated some changes 
that slowly resulted in a new strategy. In the period after he entered the 
business, it started to internationalise and professionalize. Yet this change 
was rather slow and incomplete as it ran against developments in the 
business context. Only after the crisis was this strategic direction 
implemented more fully. This study shows that not only institutional 
changes matter, but also generational changes can lead to a strategic change, 
which may in turn be slowed down by institutional factors.  
 
 
9.6 Strategy Oscillation 
 
Common sense strategy approaches implicitly assume that the strategy of a 
company evolves over time in a more or less gradual and linear way. Some 
academics for example view developing market multinationals in a stage 
perspective. They suggest that in weak institutional environments 
                                                 
404 See for example Peng (2003). 
405 See for example Chrisman et al. (2005). 
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companies may resort to strong network ties, which may be an alternative 
form of trust in the absence of strong rules and legal institutions.  
 
They consequently expect that once the institutional context moves to a 
liberal market model, these companies display less relationship-based 
strategies and move instead to a market-based orientation with weaker 
network ties406. The story of the Salim Group supports this view, but 
simultaneously shows that it is overly simplified. First because market-based 
and relationship-based strategies may not be mutually exclusive, second 
because generational changes may interfere with institutional changes, and 
third because institutional changes towards a free market model are not 
always linear, showing instead frequent set-backs to protectionism and 
cronyism in Indonesia. 
 
Liem Sioe Liong may be considered to represent the relationship-based 
model while Anthony Salim represents the market model. The second 
generation leaders do not necessarily continue the same networks their 
parents built, and may have a preference for new types of partners. Liem 
built strong ethnic Chinese and political networks, while Anthony Salim 
seems to prefer choosing partners based on business considerations. The 
results show that the generational change produced a new strategic vision, 
which was partly informed by a changing global context and a Western 
education. The new strategy, however, which preceded institutional 
changes, was implemented very gradually. It is not necessarily true that 
corporate strategy follows institutional context, but the opposite, corporate 
strategy changes anticipating institutional change, is also possible. As the 
study has also demonstrated, the Indonesian institutions did not modernize 
over time. At the end of the Suharto regime and after the crisis, crony 
networks interfered with open market approaches and provided set-backs. 
In Indonesia one cannot speak of a straight road to a liberal market economy 
– this road meanders continuously. 
 
Both Liem and Anthony Salim continue to value their relationships and 
continue to build strong networks. As Indonesia after the crisis has 
decreased its cronyism and protectionism, the Salim Group simultaneously 
has implemented a more market-based strategy. The new strategy after the 
crisis brings the Salim Group to new countries that are also characterised by 
relationship-based environments, such as India and China, both of which are 
interventionist states. It appears that rather than sequential, the Salim Group 
has simultaneously built both market and relationship-based competencies, 
and it is able to operate in both contexts. Depending on the context, the 
group seems to oscillate between the two strategic orientations, rather than 
                                                 
406 For example Peng (2003). 
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focusing on one of them. Over time however, the trend shows a propensity 
towards market-based orientation.  
 
The two strategic models – the relationship-orientation and the market-
based strategy- can be perceived as opposite poles on a continuum, 
representing pure types. Individual business-decisions are seldom pure, 
exhibiting a mixture of both modes. Indeed, the phenomenal success of the 
group – at its height the largest group in Southeast Asia - is undoubtedly 
due in large part to the “lucky coincidence” of Liem hooking up with an 
obscure army officer that eventually became for thirty years the strongman 
of a gigantic country. But without significant managerial competence, of the 
highest calibre according to widely held opinion, the Group could not have 
handled the challenges of growth and increased environmental and 
technological complexity. As the Salim Group switches between demands 
and opportunities of its network and its perception of the market, its 
managers build competences associated with the relationship-based as well 
as market-based models. The scale and available capital as a result of the 
relationship-based businesses has allowed the development of foreign, 
market-based businesses. The shift to a more market based model was built 
on accumulated resources and relationships, showing that the two models 
are intertwined.  
 
Neither the Salim Group strategy nor the institutional context in Indonesia 
fully departed from a relationship-based way of doing business completely, 
but the dependence from the domestic context was mitigated by increased 
foreign investments. The more a company moves towards one of the 
opposites, the higher the pressure to move in the opposite direction. 
Increased dependence on Suharto carries a high risk for the business should 
he loose his position. Increased market-based strategies without adaptation 
to the leadership’s personal and political wishes may similarly carry a high 
risk. Alternating between these models, at times so quickly that the 
impression is the simultaneous pursuit of both, allows the Salim Group to be 
successful.  
 
This study therefore supports the idea that emerging market companies may 
have to choose between the importance of network ties and market-based 
competition, and that over time the latter prevails. But the ‘route’ that an 
emerging market company takes is not linear. Depending on the demands of 
the environment and internal capacities, the company may shift its 
orientation continuously. The evolution of strategy appears to be irregular.  
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9.7 Strategic Choice and Institutional Environments 
 
Several studies suggest that in a more interventionist environment a 
company is more restricted in its strategic choices than in a market based 
environment with many competing players407. The study of the Salim Group 
gives rise to three important observations. First, despite a highly 
interventionist (sometimes called institutionalised) environment in 
Indonesia until the Asian Crisis, characterised by patrimonial relationships 
and centralised political power, competition among firms still took place, 
but it was competition for Suharto’s favours. In the case of the Salim Group 
we see a relatively modest firm arise as the key domestic player, a 
development that resulted from good interpersonal relations with Suharto, 
but surely also because of a high degree of competence relative to other 
ethnic Chinese cronies. Second, the inclusion in the inner circles of the 
Suharto regime opened up strategic possibilities that would have been 
extremely unlikely under conditions of market-based competition408. The 
unique access to credit and the relative protection from market forces 
allowed the Salim Group to become an industrial as well as international 
player and build up a strong managerial resource base. This set it apart from 
other ethnic Chinese firms in the region. On the other hand, we do see that 
the strategic direction of the Salim Group is simultaneously restricted as 
their crony partners directed company resources to the Indonesian economy 
and to themselves. A major economic player like Salim can exercise a 
relatively large level of strategic choice, even to the extent that it can 
advance its corporate resource base considerably and influence institutions 
such as laws and exclusive licenses. Third, by building a strong resource 
base, the profitable Suharto-alliance provided the financial freedom to 
diversify away from the domestic institutional environment into Hong 
Kong, Philippines, Singapore and other markets.  
 
Despite the continuous internationalisation of the Salim Group from 1975 
onward, we can also observe that the ‘soul’ of the company remains in the 
(semi)monopolistic Indonesian companies that were associated with 
Suharto. This focus, which is valid until today, may indicate that the Salim 
Group resources did enable them to take new strategic directions, but due to 
past or present successes of old strategies, or perhaps outside pressure, their 
internationalisation remained partial. Whereas in several respects historic 
events limited the flexibility of the Salim Group, its immersion in a variety of 
networks, in particular political, provided the Group with a high level of 
strategic choice. 
                                                 
407 See for example Oliver (1991). 
408 The Salim Group study supports propositions developed by Rodrigues and Child 
(2003) who argued that an emerging market player can increase its level of choice by 
immersing itself in political networks. 
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9.8 Corporate and Institutional Alignment  
 
Most coevolution research, as well as institutional research, implicitly 
assumes a clear division between the firm and its institutional environment. 
Research on big business in developmental states however indicates how 
corporate players may be able influence politicians by building crony roles, 
thus effectively creating a grey zone between the corporate sector and the 
government409. The case of the Salim Group also shows that the clear 
distinction between company and institutions may not be justified. The 
institutional context in Indonesia for a period of three decades was 
characterised by a strong, long-time dictator who could (and did) personally 
influence domestic policies. Indonesia was also faced with a situation where 
there was no clear distinction between Suharto’s political, economic and 
business goals, a situation often termed ‘Suharto Inc’ in newspapers and 
magazines410. In addition to this peculiar institutional context that was so 
dependent on a single person, we observe an economy with one extremely 
large domestic business player, which has its hands in many industries, 
often in monopolistic positions. The sheer size of the Salim Group, certainly 
by the 1990s, made it a systemic risk to the economy; and Suharto must have 
realised that the group was an economic power that could not be ignored.   
 
In the case of the Salim Group not only were corporate and institutional 
environment centralised and represented by two strong personalities (Liem 
and Suharto), they were also able to develop a close and long-term 
relationship, witnessed in their frequent meetings and the favourable 
policies that were implemented to stimulate the Salim Group profits. The 
alignment between Suharto and Liem played a role on many levels: 
economic, personal and business. It was characterised by a mutual 
understanding of give and take. The distinction between ‘opportunity’ and 
‘obligation’ is therefore somewhat murky. This alignment was limited by the 
potential for strong criticism, and Suharto presented the alignment as 
beneficial to the development of Indonesia. The Salim Group being ‘an 
instrument’ for national development was, considering the respective 
political and economic power of both, an argument that sounded 
convincing. The consequence of the alignment was that people started to 
perceive the Salim Group as part of the Suharto regime. In the words of 
Schwartz: ‘Liem’s empire straddles the line between private enterprise and 
government like no other Indonesian organisation’411. The Salim Group 
became a symbol of the Suharto regime.  
 
                                                 
409 See for example Kang (2002); Lee (2000) and Park (2002). 
410 For example in the South China Morning Post (1998). 
411 See Schwartz (2004, p. 112). 
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The symbol function made it harder for the Group to adapt to the post-
Suharto context. When Suharto resigned and the economy declined, mobs 
attacked Bank Central Asia, the materialisation of the alignment of the 
Suharto and Salim family. But here too, the generational change played a 
role. Liem wisely withdrew when Suharto resigned, and let his son, who 
was less associated with the long-time dictator; handle the new political and 
economic situation. This study suggests the possibility of large corporate 
entities morphing into institutions themselves under conditions of strong 
corporate and institutional alignment. 
 
 
9.9 Theoretical Implications 
 
This study strongly suggests that the culturalist approach to ethnic Chinese 
firms cannot explain the present-day development of the Salim Group. The 
Salim Group has clearly outgrown the small one-product family firm with a 
simple structure. Its history and size provides various restrictions to 
flexibility and one can observe that several aspects of corporate strategy, 
such as the domestic model and the diversification strategy remain constant, 
even if the environment changed. Rather than focusing on ethnic Chinese 
partners it has broadened its network with political connections and foreign 
partners, thus availing of bonding as well as bridging capital.  
 
The crony capitalism approach is rooted in the discipline of political 
economy, which in itself has little interest for corporate strategy. Yet the 
notion of interdependence between corporate and political actors applies 
well to the Salim Group which was influenced by Indonesian institutions as 
well as being able to influence them. It even became a symbol of the Suharto 
government, showing how intertwined the group was with Indonesian 
institutions. 
 
The institutional approach applies best to the Salim Group, as it can explain 
how strategy in weak institutional environments may evolve. However, in 
this case, this perspective should be complemented with insights from social 
capital approaches and family firm theories. Not only the institutional 
context matters for a diversified strategy, social capital increased 
diversification. In weak institutional settings, economies of connectedness 
may spur more diversification, in addition to classical economies of scope.  
 
The coevolutionary perspective led to important insights in this study. Time 
series analysis showed how strategy was not linear but oscillatory, as it was 
influenced by institutional and generational changes. The Salim Group 
became so large that it consciously influenced the Suharto government, but 
was also heavily influenced by it, giving rise to patterns of mutual responses 
between Salim Group and Indonesian institutions. 
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How Chinese are ethnic Chinesefamily business groups when it comes to 
strategy? This study shows that the Salim Group is not “very Chinese”. It is 
obvious that every company develops in a unique way, and is shaped by its 
management and environment. But having said this, there is little reason to 
assume that “being Chinese” has had a large influence on the recent Salim 
Group strategy which set it apart from family business groups in other 
emerging markets.  
 
I suspect that this is true not only for the Salim Group, but also for other 
large ethnic Chinese family business groups. However, further research is 
necessary to understand whether the outcomes of this study apply to the 
Salim Group only, or whether they represent strategy patterns that are 
common in other ethnic Chinese family business groups.  
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Annex 1. Annual Reports 
 
Annual Reports used in this study 
 
The following table gives an overview of the 69 annual reports of (former) 
Salim Group companies (i.e. companies in which the Salim family and/or 
Salim investors had a substantial interest and one or more board 
memberships) that were available to the author and used for this thesis. 
These companies represent the largest listed companies within the Salim 
Group. The private companies are not obliged to publish annual reports. 
Information on these companies in the form of annual reports was only 
available for Bank Central Asia (BCA).  
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Bank Central Asia  X X X   X X X X X 
First Pacific  X X X X X X X X X X 
Indocement X X X X X X X X X X 
Indofood  X X X X X X X X X X 
Indomobil*    X X X X X X X 
Indosiar*       X X X X 
QAF** X X X X X X X X X X 
Unggul Indah Cahaya X X X X X X X X X X 
* Annual Reports were available from the year that the company was listed on the 
stock exchange onward.  
** QAF changed its accounting cycle in 1996 towards a book year from January to 
December. Hence two annual reports appeared in 1996 and none in 1995.   
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Annex 2: Media Resources 
 
In this study media sources were an important type of information, in 
particular newspapers.  During the period 2001-2005 an archive of news on 
the Salim Group was created encompassing thousands of articles. This 
archive was built up in the following ways (in order of importance): 
• Structured searches in Lexis Nexis covering all major international 
English language newspapers. The searches were carried out using as 
keywords all company names known to be part of the Salim Group. If 
the keyword resulted in more hits than the system could handle (>1000), 
the limiters ‘salim’ and/or ‘liem’ were used. If there were still more hits 
than the system could handle, the searchers were broken down into 
shorter periods.   
• A search in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
library in Jakarta (carried out by the library staff) resulting in an archive 
of news clippings from local newspapers and business magazines, partly 
in Bahasa Indonesia. 
• Internet searches with keywords Salim, also covering articles in 
magazines and specialised press. 
• A database of articles on the Salim Group obtained from a journalist in 
Jakarta 
 
The table below gives the number of articles reviewed from the largest 
source: the lexis nexis database. 
Lexis Nexis Search Terms Articles Retrieved 
Liem Sioe Liong 404 
BCA 774 
Daria Varia 44 
First Pacific 177 
Indocement 284 
Indofood 950 
Indomobil 214 
Indomulti 191 
Indosiar 195 
QAF 318 
Unggul Indah 1038 
Names of Unlisted Firms 1760 
Total 6349 
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Annex 3: Interviews 
 
Interview Database 
For this study 56 interviews were carried out with in total 40 respondents. 
For each interview a summary was made and interviews with Anthony 
Salim were recorded and transcribed. The respondents were: Salim 
managers, academic experts (on Indonesian management, Indonesian 
economy and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia), executives of the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), cabinet members, financial analysts, 
journalists, partners, competitors, and other stakeholders which includes 
two advisors to the Salim Group, and an economic advisor to the Indonesian 
government.  
 
The table below gives a breakdown of the number respondents and 
interviews in each category.  
Category Description Respondents Interviews 
1 Salim Group managers 8 16 
2 Academic experts 6 7 
3 IBRA executives 5 9 
4 Former Ministers 3 4 
5 Financial Analysts 2 2 
6 Journalists 3 4 
7 Manager other conglomerate 5 5 
8 Foreign Partner of Salim Group 3 3 
9 Other 5 6 
Total  40 56 
 
All interviews took place in the period 2003-2006. Several respondents, in 
particular Salim managers, were interviewed more than once in order to 
obtain more in-depth information. A relatively large number of interviews 
was carried out with employees of IBRA, particularly those employees that 
handled the assets of the Salim Group after these assets were handed over to 
the government. The information that became available on the Salim Group 
through the handover of assets was perceived very valuable and a unique 
opportunity to learn more about the non-listed Salim companies. Several 
people in this category were also interviewed more than once. 
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Annex 4: Coding Protocol 
 
Development of Codes 
In order to analyse all data and integrate them, a coding system was used 
based on a combination of deductive and inductive themes and indicators 
(explained in Chapter Three). The coding protocol below gives for each code 
a title, definition, description, and examples or exclusions, altogether these 
form the codebook for this study.  
 
Business Events 
Prior to coding the data, the sources are organised into business events that 
could not be plotted on a timeline. A new business event was anything of 
importance outside continuing existing business. Examples of business 
events included the expansion of existing business; a new venture with a 
new or existing partner; a spin-off or acquisition.  Each business event was 
listed in a separate one-page document with a title, a description, a date and 
information (plus their sources) giving more details about the event.  
Sometimes a new business event did not have a clear time or evolved over a 
longer time period. In this case the researcher made a note on this and chose 
the most appropriate time keeping in mind the actual implementation of the 
business event. For example, when a new business deal was signed and 
announced, it was usually preceded by rumors in the market; lengthy 
negotiations before a deal had been signed or committed, which could take 
years. In such cases the actual announcement or signing should be taken as 
the date.  
 
Code 1:  Ethnic Chinese Relationships  
Definition:  The presence of relationships or partnerships with ethnic 
Chinese businessmen, defined as anyone of Chinese 
descent.  
Indicators:  Ethnic Chinese partner, Business venture in China.  
Examples:  The Salim Group set up a new joint venture with Robert 
Kuok, a Malaysian ethnic Chinese. Excluded are unclear 
events like: former top Salim executive becomes CEO of 
another ethnic Chinese company (since it is not clear that 
this is a Salim Group initiative, it could be a personal step 
by the executive). 
Rating:  Present (1) or Not Present (0) 
 
Code 2:  Political Connections  
Definition: Business Ventures include a component of political 
relationships, either with the Suharto family or with a 
government agency, or political connections linked to the 
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deal are reported, either in Indonesia or in other (Asian) 
countries.    
Indicators: The Salim Group has received a special license or exception 
from the general rule; media reports bribery or special 
connections; Salim Group is in business with government 
owned firms in Asia or directly with the Suharto family.  
Examples: The Salim Group enters into a new business with a member 
of the Suharto family. Indofood receives special license to 
expand production, even if this is against prevailing 
regulations; or Salim Group acquires half of Jakarta water 
utility while the other half is awarded to a Suharto family 
member in a reportedly intransparent process; First Pacific 
Co. is charged with corruption around Philippines election 
funds. Reports of connections should be in multiple sources 
to avoid relying on rumours. Excluded are one-time 
rumours of connections.  
 Rating:  Present (1) or Not Present (0) 
 
Code 3: Foreign Partners 
Definition: Salim Group business event is linked to a foreign, non- 
ethnic Chinese and non-Indonesian partner.   
Indicators: A Western partner is involved, or a Japanese firm.  If a 
company is simply sold or acquired, one cannot speak of a 
continued partnership, and those cases are not to be 
counted.   
Examples: Salim Group partners with a German cement company in 
Indonesia or set up a chemicals firm with a large Japanese 
multinational.  
Rating:  Present (-1) or Not Present (0) 
 
Code 4: Market-Based Business Environment 
Definition: Salim Group business event is linked to doing business in a 
market-economy (which includes rule-based economies: US, 
Japan, Europe, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia). 
Indicators: The event takes place in one of the above mentioned 
countries or regions. Divestments of businesses do not 
count. 
Examples: The Salim Group buys Hagemeyer in the Netherlands.  
Rating:  Present (-1) or Not Present (0) 
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Annex 5: Overview of Salim Group Companies 
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Abadi Musyawarah Perkasa PT  X X    
Abhipraya Insan Perkasa PT  X     
Adhi Dinakara PT  X X    
Adi Langgeng Kencanatex      X 
Adi Prasudi PT  X X    
Adithya Suramitra      X 
Adiwarna Busana Textile PT   X    
Agrapura PT   X    
Agung Utama Permai PT  X X    
Agung Utama PT X      
Albright & Wilson      X 
Allbest PT  X     
Almira United Timber Corp. PT   X    
Alpha Arcadia PT   X    
Alpha Morindo PT   X    
Alpha Tanjung Tanki Indonesia PT  X     
Alsthomindo PT  X X    
Altron Niagatama Nusa     X  
Aneka Gelas Elok PT  X X    
Aneka Karton Elok PT  X X    
Aneka Kreasi      X 
Anggada Perkasa PT  X     
Antelope Madju PT  X     
Anug(e)rah Primatama Agung PT  X X    
Apindo Prima Karya PT  X X    
AR Packaging (Philippines)      X 
Arcom Primantara System PT   X    
Arcom System International PT   X    
Argha Giri Perkasa PT  X     
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Argha Indah Pratama PT  X X    
Argha Karya Prima Industry PT   X    
Argha Molek Kencana PT  X     
Aribhawana Utama PT  X X    
Arimono PT X      
Ariobimo Agratama Perkasa PT  X     
Ariobimo Estate Perkasa     X  
Arta Pusara PT  X     
Arta Sinar Mas PT  X     
Artek Inti Persada     X  
Artha Nugraha Mandiri     X  
Arya Andalan Aging PT  X     
Asia Link      X 
Asia Nusantara PT X      
Asia Pacific Infrastructure      X 
Asia Perintis Contindo     X X 
Aspirasi Luhir     X X 
Astenia PT  X     
Asuransi Aioi Indonesia     X  
Asuransi Central Asia X X X  X X 
Asuransi Chiyoda Indonesia     X  
Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia Raya X  X   X 
Asuransi Marga Pusaka PT   X    
Asuransi Purwanjasa PT   X    
Australia Indonesian Milk Industries 
(Indomilk)  X X   X 
Awit Melinda Oils Inds. PT   X    
Baja Perkasa Indah PT  X X    
Bali Dynasty Resort      X 
Bank Central Asia X X X X   
Bank LTCB Central Asia    X X  
Bank Risjad Salim Internasional    X X  
Bank Umum Asia   X    
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Bank Windu Kencana X  X    
Barasentosa Lestari      X 
Barney Foods International      X 
Batamas Megah      X 
Batamindo Industrial Estate PT    X  X 
Batamindo Investment Corporation     X  
BCA Bank Europe     X  
Berdikari Flour Mills PT  X     
Berdikari Sari Utama Flour Mills      X 
Berli Jucker (Thailand) Co. Ltd.   X  X  X 
Berli Jucker Industries (The Philippines)   X     
Bersama Sejahtera Sakti      X 
Besindo Jaya Perdana PT  X     
Besindo Mulia Perkasa PT  X     
Besland Pertiwi      X 
Bhakti Bersama Sejahtera PT  X X    
Bhakti Sarana Ventura      X 
Bimoli PT  X X    
Bina Sains Corporation      X 
Bina Sumber Kurnia PT   X    
Binara Guna Meditama PT  X     
Binatara Gunameiktama PT   X    
Bintan Beach International Resort      X 
Bintan Industrial Estate    X  X 
Bintan Lagoon Resort     X  
Birina Multidaya      X 
Bogasari Flour Mills PT X X X    
Bojong Indah Permai PT  X X    
Bootindo Adikreasi PT  X     
Branta Mulia PT   X X    
Brierley      X 
Brightsun Development     X  
Buana Chemica Arta PT  X     
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Buana Distrindo      X 
Budhi Agung PT X      
Budi Agung Wibawa   X  X  
Bukit Cinere Indah PT  X X    
Bumi Sari Mulia PT   X    
Bumi Serpong Damai     X  
Bumi Shangrila Jaya PT  X     
Cahaya Aneka Kimia Perkasa PT   X    
Cahaya Inti Perkasa PT  X X    
Cahaya Tugu Kencana PT X X X    
Cakra Alam Makmur PT  X     
Camerlin      X 
Caprindo Perdana PT  X     
Caraka Indah PT   X    
Carakapangan Sejati      X 
Ce Grayvetco Indonesia PT  X     
Cellox Paper Co      X 
Cemako Mandiri Corporation      X 
Central Antar Jasa PT X X X    
Central Asia Capital Corporation Ltd.  X     
Central Dharma Motors PT  X X    
Central Investment PT  X     
Central Makmur Corporation PT  X     
Central Pacific Development PT  X X    
Central Paramerta PT   X    
Central Rejeki Corporation PT  X     
Central Salim Builders PT X      
Central Salim International Builders  X X    
Central Sari Finance      X 
Central Sari Int. Builders PT X      
Central Sari Medical Supplies PT  X X  X  
Central Sari Metropolitan Leasing Corp. PT  X X    
Central Sole Agency PT X X X  X  
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Central Sumahi Motor PT  X     
Central Sumber Makmur PT  X     
Central Super Motor Corp. PT   X    
Central Tilam Sari Makmur PT  X X    
Central Tirta PT  X X    
Cereko Reksa Corporation      X 
Chandra Mulia Permai PT  X     
Chemco Graha Sejahtera Indonesia PT  X     
Chemphil        X 
Chung Tai Home Appliance Centre PT  X     
Cibinong Center Industrial Estate      X 
Citra Caraka      X 
Citra Marga Nusapala Persada PT  X    X 
Citra Paramita Sejati PT  X     
Cold Rolling Mill Indonesia Utama PT  X X    
Colvex Jaya PT  X     
Continental Land Development     X  
Cranetama Maju PT  X     
Culindo Livestock     X  
Dai-Ichi Pacific Securities PT (HK) Ltd.  X     
Daikin Clutch Indonesia PT   X    
Danar Kencana Industry PT  X     
Darya-Varia Laboratoria PT    X   
De United Food Ltd Nigeria      X 
Dean & Deluca Brand Inc. PT  X     
Delham      X 
Delia Karsa Taruna PT  X     
Dharma Raya Kencana PT   X    
Dharmika Agung PT  X X    
Digion Mega Pratama PT  X     
Distinct Indonesia Cement Enterprise PT X      
Dono Indah PT X X     
Dono Indah Timber PT   X    
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Dragon Seed Company LTd PT  X     
Duta Rendra Mulia PT  X     
Ecogreen Oleochemicals pte ltd Singapore      X 
Elders Australia     X  
Eltra Chemical Swasembada PT  X     
Enchylaena     X  
Ever Green (Holding) Ltd.  X     
Excella Trading Limited      X 
Export Finance Company (UK) Ltd.  X     
F.P. Special Assets (Hong Kong) Ltd.  X     
F.P.C. Holding (Netherlands Antillies) NV  X     
Fajar Ansana Utama   X    
Fajarsemesta Ciptamurni      X 
Fakol Ekatama Industries PT  X     
Fastfood Indonesia     X X 
Fatex Tori PT   X    
Fertilindo Soil Pertiwi PT  X     
Filma PT  X X    
Filma Utama Soap PT   X    
Filtro Prima Industri PT  X     
Finsytex PT  X X    
First Indonesia Latex Industry PT  X     
First Pacific (UK) Trade Services  X     
First Pacific (USA) Corporation  X     
First Pacific Bank    X   
First Pacific China Trade (PR China) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Co    X X  
First Pacific Davies    X   
First Pacific Davies (Singapore) Pte Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Davies (Thailand) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Davies Property Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Enterprises (Liberia) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Finance (HK) Ltd.  X     
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First Pacific Fund Management (HK) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific International     X  
First Pacific International (HK) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Investment (Liberia) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Metro Corporation of the 
Philippines  X     
First Pacific Networks  X     
First Pacific Securities (HK) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Securities (Liberia) Ltd.  X     
First Pacific Securities (Thailand) Ltd.  X     
First Polyester Prima Industri PT  X X    
First Realty International Corp. PT   X    
Formula Pertiside Perdana PT  X     
Fosfindo      X 
Frolic Pacific Development     X  
Frolic Pacific International     X  
Futuris     X  
Galior International      X 
Gelael Supermarket     X X 
Gelora Muda Perkasa PT  X X    
Giwang Selogam PT  X X    
Gizindo Primanusantara     X  
Glutama Indorasa PT  X     
Golden Sari Commodities     X  
Graha Aspirasi Makmur PT   X    
Graha Deltracitra     X  
Gray Indonesia PT  X     
Green Island Cement Corporation (HK) Ltd.  X     
Green Land PT X      
Guangdong Jiangmen Float Glass       X 
Guaranty Bank of California      X 
Gula Polindo Makmur PT  X     
Gula Putih Mataram  X   X X 
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Gunung Salak Permai PT  X X    
Hagemeyer NV  X  X   
Hanurata PT X      
Harapan Mobil Nusantara PT X      
Hasta Buana Mandiri PT  X     
Hasta Dharma Karya     X  
Henkel Indonesia PT  X X    
Hercules Mas Indonesia PT  X     
Hibernia (USA) Corporation  X     
Himalaya Agung PT   X    
Hino Indonesia Mfg PT   X    
Holland Pacific (Netherlands Antillies) NV  X     
Holland Pacific (Netherlands) NV  X     
Holland Pacific Paper      X 
Hotel Kartika Chandra      X 
Indaco Ltd.  X      
Indah Kencana PT X      
Indara Mas PT X      
Indo Graha Pramana PT  X     
Indo Jaya Corporation PT  X     
Indo Jaya Markonrad PT  X     
Indo Kemika Jayatama     X  
Indo Mobil Niaga International PT  X X    
Indo Mobil Utama PT X X X    
Indo Sahid Perdana PT  X     
Indo VDO Instruments     X  
Indobunge Feedmill      X 
Indocement Singapore (Pte) Ltd.  X   X  
Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa PT  X X X   
Indochlor Prakarsa Industries PT  X    X 
Indocitra Buana     X  
Indofood Frito-Lay Corporation     X  
Indofood Interna Corp. PT   X    
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Indofood Interna Corporation     X  
Indofood Sukses Makmur    X X  
Indographica Ekakarsa     X  
Indogrosir      X 
Indohero Steel & Engineering X X X  X  
Indojaya Markonrad PT   X    
Indokarma Utama PT   X    
Indokemika Jayatama      X 
Indolakto     X X 
Indolampung Perkasa      X 
Indomarco Adi Prima PT    X  X 
Indomarco Perdana PT/ Indomaret  X    X 
Indomas Harapan Kreasi PT  X     
Indomatsumoto Press & Dies     X  
Indomeji Dairy Food     X  
Indomiwon Citra Inti       X 
Indomix Batam Pura PT  X     
Indomobil Investment Co    X X  
Indomobil Prima Trada     X  
Indomobil Utama     X  
Indomulti Inti Industri    X X  
Indonesia Cement PT X      
Indonesia First Synthetic Rubber PT  X     
Indonesia Mas Anggun PT  X     
Indopen Perdana PT   X    
Indopoly Swakarsa Industry PT    X X X 
Indopropertama Nusapersada      X 
Indosahid Perdana      X 
Indosepamas Anggun     X  
Indosiar Visual Mandiri    X   
Indosurance Brokers Ltd. PT   X    
Indo-Suzuki Manufacturing PT  X     
Indo-Swedish Motor Assembly  Co. PT  X     
 218 
Company Name/ Source R
ob
is
on
 (1
98
6)
 
C
IS
I (
19
89
) 
So
et
ri
yo
no
 (1
98
9)
 
So
cG
en
 (1
99
7)
 
D
N
B 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(2
00
6)
 
A
nn
ua
l R
ep
or
ts
/N
ew
s 
Indoswiss PT  X     
Indotirta Suaka      X 
Indotracosakti Sempurna     X X 
Indotruba Tengah      X 
Indotruck Utama PT  X   X  
Intercallin PT   X    
International Good Housekeeping Inc.  X     
Intersuisse (Australia) Ltd.   X     
Inti Ganda Perdana PT  X     
Inti Indorayon Utama PT  X     
Inti Indosawit Corporation      X 
Inti Indosawit Subur      X 
Inti Jaram Pura PT  X X    
Inti Prebon Moneybrokers     X X 
Inti Salim Corpora  X   X X 
Inti Same PT  X X    
Inti Sawit Andhika PT  X     
Inti Sawit Semerlang PT  X     
Intiboga Sejahtera      X 
Intikom Berlian Mustika     X X 
Intindo Wahana Gemilang PT  X     
Ismac PT   X    
Ismac Volvo     X  
Istana Mutiara Mas PT  X X    
Ivo Mas Tunggal PT  X X    
Jakarta Land PT X X X    
Jangkar Sakti PT   X    
Jaya Bali PT X      
Jaya Mandarin Agung PT X X     
Jaya Sumpiles PT  X     
Kabale Indonesia PT  X X    
Kabele Asia Nusantara PT X      
Kalamur Group      X 
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Kalticon Jaya PT   X    
Kaolin Indah Utama PT  X X   X 
Karimun Granite      X 
Kartika Inti Mas PT  X     
Karya Teguh Sari PT   X    
Kayu Lapis Asli Murni X  X  X  
Kemakmuran Taniterna Indonesia PT  X     
Kentucky Fried Chicken (Indonesia)      X 
Keris Mas Sukses PT  X X    
Keris Mas Witikco Makmur     X  
KerisMas Witikco Makmur    X X X 
Kerta Anugerah Utama PT  X X    
Kerta Wijaksana PT  X X    
Kimpaper Indonesia PT  X     
Kimsari Paper Indonesia   X    
Kirana Golden Manufacturing PT  X X    
Kitadin      X 
KMP     X  
Koplindo Citra Nusantara PT  X     
Kosmo Poultry      X 
Kota Bukit Indah Industrial Estate      X 
Krakatau Baja Permata PT  X     
Krakatau Cold Rolling Mill PT X      
Krida Sarana Tunggal PT  X     
Kunci Mas Wijaya PT  X X    
Langgeng Muara Makmur      X 
Leamaat Omikron      X 
Lentera Inti Mas PT  X X    
Lion Superindo      X 
Majapahit Agro Industrial / Industri      X 
Mandara Medika Utama      X 
Mandara Permai  X X  X  
Mandiri Dipta Makmur      X 
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Manggada Nusantara Lines PT  X     
Marga PT  X     
Marga Tulus Enterprises PT   X    
Marison Nusantara Agencies  X X  X  
Marya Dunia Makmur PT Perusahaan 
Bongkar Muat  X     
Mazda Indonesia Manufacturing PT  X     
Mega Perkasa PT   X    
Mega Pratama Citra PT  X X    
Mega PT X X X    
Megah Utama Motor PT  X     
Mekar Perkasa PT  X     
Melapi Timber  X   X  
Menara Kaloka      X 
Methylindo Usaha Mitra PT  X     
Metro Bottled Water Corporation      X 
Metro Drug Corporation of the Philippines   X     
Metro Drug Distribution      X 
Metro Marketing      X 
Metro Pacific    X   
Metro Pacific Pharma      X 
Metrolab Industries      X 
Metropolitan Development PT X X    X 
Metropolitan Inter Asia PT  X     
Metropolitan Kencana PT X X X  X  
Metropolitan Leasing X      
Metrovet      X 
Minamas Eramustika      X 
Mitra Kreasidharma     X  
Mitra Rajasa PT  X     
Mulia Baruna Perkasa PT  X     
Mulia Primatama Agung PT  X X    
Muljotex PT  X     
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Multi Guna Agung PT  X X    
Multi Kimia Sejahtera Abadi PT  X     
Multi National Finance Coroporation PT  X     
Multi Nugraha Sejahtera PT  X     
Multi Raya Ekatama PT  X     
Multi Trade (Netherlands) NV  X     
Multicor PT   X X   
Multicor Securities      X 
Multifinance Corporation PT X      
Mulyatex X  X  X  
Mulyoredjo PT  X     
Musyawara Cipta Suara PT  X X    
Mutiara Bianglala      X 
Nalco Perkasa PT  X X    
National Assemblers PT  X X    
National Motor PT X X X   X 
Nawa Panduta PT  X X    
Nayaka Wiarwan PT  X     
New Green Land PT  X X    
Niagatama Tunggal Abadi PT  X X    
Nikko Securities Indonesia      X 
Nongsa Indah Golf and Country Club PT  X     
Nugraha Kencana Jaya PT X X X    
Nuruda Lines PT  X     
Nusantara Jaua Santosa PT  X     
Nutricia Indonesia Sejahtera      X 
Oceanic(s) Timber Products PT  X X    
Oetomo Kencana PT   X    
Oigicon Mega Pratama PT   X    
Okta Patria      X 
Ola Rotan Perdana PT  X     
Opak Daya PT  X X    
Overseas Timber Products Corporation PT X      
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Pabapan PT   X    
Pabrik Obat Dupa      X 
Pacific Cad-Cam  X     
Pacific Flour & Food    X   
Pacific Indomas Plastic Indonesia PT  X  X  X 
Pacific Link    X  X 
Pakuwon Utama Real Estate PT   X    
Pama Indo Kodeko / Pama Indo Mining      X 
Pan Asia Express Line PT  X     
Panca Mita Bahana PT  X     
Pancatex PT Patal  X     
Pangan Sari Utama PT X      
Patal Pancatex PT   X    
Peaktop International Holding     X  
Pebapan PT  X    X 
Pelita Asia Permai   X    
Peng Indonesia Perkasa PT  X     
Pepsicola Indobeverages PT      X 
Perkasa Ansana Abadi Indonesia Cement 
Enterprise PT  X X    
Perkasa Branta Mulia PT   X    
Perkasa Cement PT X      
Perkasa Indah Cement Putih PT X      
Perkasa Inti Abadi Cement PT X      
Perkasa Krida Harta Indonesia Cement 
Enterprise PT  X X    
Perkasa Sembada Karya Indonesia Cement 
Enterprise  X X    
Perkembangan Ekonomi Indonesia PT  X     
Permanent X    X  
Perniagaan Indonesia PT  X     
Persada Murni PT  X X    
Pertiwi Agung Prawira PT Asuransi   X     
Perwick Agung PT X      
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Pestisindo Ampuh PT  X     
Petra Nada Kencana PT  X     
Petrokimia Gresik      X 
Pinehill Arabia Food      X 
Pipa Perkasa Indonesia PT  X X    
PIPI  Dow Chemical      X 
Plaza Surabaya      X 
Polymax International      X 
Pondok Indah Estate    X   
Pondok Indah Kapuk    X   
Pondok Indah Mall      X 
Pondok Indah Padang Golf PT  X     
Pradja Farma Hoslab      X 
Praja Puri Indah Industrial & Real Estate PT  X     
Prima Aneka Berjaya     X X 
Prima Inti Perkasa     X  
Prima Latex Widitama PT  X     
Primacom Interbuana     X X 
Private Dvt Finance Co. of Indonesia PT  X     
Puncak Kreasi Makmur PT  X     
Puri Indah Mall      X 
Purna Ansana Motor PT  X     
Putera Paramarta PT   X    
Putramas Prima Perkasa PT  X     
Putri Daya Usahatama      X 
QAF    X   
R.S. Resources International        X 
Rabana Wahana Consorindo PT  X     
Radisson Hotels      X 
Reksa Artha Mustika PT  X     
Rexford Pratama  X   X  
RFM Indofood Philippines      X 
Rimba Kencana PT X      
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Rimba Tunggal Perkasa PT  X     
Rintis Sejahtera      X 
Roda Maju Utama      X 
Roga Megah Cement PT   X    
Rosco     X  
Rubber Refineries X      
Sajang Heulang      X 
Saks International (US) Inc.  X     
Salim Chemicals Corpora      X 
Salim Djaja Motor Co. PT   X    
Salim Economic Development PT  X X    
Salim Indoplantations      X 
Salim Jaya PT X      
Salim Rengo Containers      X 
Sangkala Persada Sakti PT  X     
Sanmaru Food Manufacturer Co. Ltd. PT  X X  X  
Sarana Adiniagatama PT  X     
Sarana Besindo Sejati PT  X X    
Sarana Petrogip Perkakas PT   X    
Sarana Sul(m)sel Ventura      X 
Sari Arcadia Food Service PT   X    
Sari Dual Offshore PT  X X    
Sarida Oil PT  X X    
Sarida Perkasa PT  X X    
Sarida Utama PT  X X    
Sarimi Asli Jaya PT   X    
Sarotama Prima Perkasa PT  X     
Sarpindo Soybean Industry PT  X X  X X 
Satya Yudha Graha PT  X     
Sawit Bintan Perkasa PT  X     
Sawit Malinda PT  X    X 
Sayang Heulang PT  X X    
Sayap Mas Utama      X 
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Scott Paper Phlippines (Philippines) Inc.  X     
Sedona International Hotel Manado      X 
Segarindo Gizi PT  X     
Segaten Jaya PT   X    
Semarang Makmur     X  
Sembada Kriya Prima PT  X     
Semen Tiga Roda Prasetya PT  X X   X 
Semesta Rasa Foods      X 
Sempurna Caturguna       X 
Serasi Niaga Sakti PT   X    
Serasi Tunggal Karya PT  X X    
Serikat Putra PT  X     
Serting Mewah Berhad      X 
Shangri-La Hotel (Hong Kong) Corporation  X     
Sibatex Abadi      X 
Sinar Culindo Perkasa PT   X    
Sinar Fajar Mardika PT  X     
Sinar Kencana Inti Perkasa PT  X     
Sinar Kencana Tata Mandiri      X 
Sinar Kilat Buana PT  X X    
Sinar Mas Inti Perkasa PT  X   X  
Sinar Mas Wijaya PT   X    
Sinar Plataco PT    X  X 
Sinaro Obor Mas PT  X X    
Singapore Pacific Mgt     X  
Smart Communications      X 
Southlinks Country Club      X 
Sriwijaya Pakuan Sejati PT  X     
Stainless Steel Rolling Mill Indonesia PT  X X    
Standard Toto Polymer PT    X  X 
Stearindo Upaya Perdana PT  X     
Steniel Manufacturing Corporation 
(Philippines)      X 
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Stillwater Shipping Co.      X 
Storek Bima Raya PT  X     
Subentra PT  X X    
Sulfindo Adi Usaha PT  X  X  X 
Sumber Inti Batumas PT  X     
Sumber Polindo PT   X    
Sumiden Serasi Wire PT    X  X 
Sumisari Manufacturing PT  X X    
Suryapangan Indonusa      X 
Suzjindo Sehat Sempurna PT  X     
Suzuki Engine Industries PT   X    
Suzuki Engine Indonesia PT  X     
Suzuki Indonesia Manufacturing PT  X X    
Swadaya Bhakti Negara PT  X X    
Swadharma Indotama PT  X    X 
Swasthi Parama Mulya PT  X     
Sweet Indolampung      X 
Swensen Ice Cream      X 
Tamaco Graha Krida      X 
Tanduai Distrillery Inc. The Philippines   X     
Tangki Sawit Terminal Jasatama PT  X     
Tapian Nadenggan PT  X     
Tarumatex PT X X X   X 
Tasik Madu Shipping PT  X X    
Tatajabar Sejahtera      X 
Telelink      X 
Teratai Soedono PT  X     
Thai Glass Industries      X 
Tiengchu Indah Ve-Trin (HK) Indonesia  X     
Tirta Ansana Raya PT  X     
Tokyu Supermarkets     X  
Total Bangun Persada PT  X X  X  
Total Daya Cipta PT   X    
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Tri Dharma Karya PT   X    
Tri Dharma Sakti Indah PT  X     
Tri Manggada Nusantara L. PT   X    
Tri Polyta Indonesia PT  X     
Tridaya Manunggal Cement Indonesia 
Enterprise PT X X X    
Trinungraha Muda PT  X     
Trubaindo Coal Mining       X 
Tsunami Technologies Corporation  X     
Tunas Bekasi Motor Corp. PT   X    
Tunas Bintang Motor Corp. PT  X     
Tunas Graha Rejeki      X 
Tunggal Mitra Plantation      X 
Tunggal Perkasa Plantations      X 
Ubindo Aneka Biskuit      X 
Ukanik PT  X X    
Ultramos Jaya       X 
Unggul Indah Chemical PT  X  X   
Unibox PT  X     
Unicor Kallista Motor PT   X    
Unicor Prima Motor PT  X X  X  
Unicor Prima PT X      
Unitama Adiusaha PT  X     
United Savings Bank of California  X    X 
Unity Sakti C. & B. Making  PT   X    
Usaha Manggar PT  X X    
Wahana Inti Central Mobilindo PT  X   X  
Wahana Wirawan     X  
Waringin X    X  
Waringin Holding Pte Ltd  X     
Waringin Kencana PT X X X    
Waringin Kencana PT Bank  X     
Wastu Nidya Utama PT  X X    
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Watson Bogasari Co     X  
West Singapore Ind'l Park    X   
Westkolk Holding BV     X  
Williton Orchids     X  
Windu Kencana PT Bank  X     
Wira Dedana PT   X    
Wisma BCA    X   
Wisma Metropolitan PT X      
Witikco PT  X X    
Xiang Lu Industries     X  
Yunnan Kunlene Film Industri     X  
Zeta Aneka Kimia PT  X     
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Annex 6: Business Events 
 
  
Year Short title 
1984 In cooperation with UIC Liem plans meat business in Bulan 
1984 First Pacific, a Liem company, moves into oil drilling rights 
1984 Liem invests in palm oil 
1984 Indomobil becomes sole agent for Volvo 
  
1985 BCA opens office in the US 
1985 Salim buys Hino Indonesia 
1985 Indomobil acquires sole agency for Mazda 
1985 First Pacific forms alliance with US trading firm 
1985 Andree Halim buys shares in US Worthen Bank 
1985 Government buys out Indocement for USD 385 million 
1985 Long Term Credit Bank (Japan) invests in Salim leasing firm 
1985 Taiwanese banking software for Lippo, BCA 
  
1986 First Pacific moves into property 
1986 Statomer expands caustic soda capacity by 50% 
1986 Salim Group sets up Singapore property investment vehicle 
  
1987 BCA trading unit to set up export oriented garment plants 
1987 First Pacific buys into Thai securities firm 
1987 Indomobil becomes sole agent for Nissan 
1987 BCA and Indomobil team up to market Suzuki cars 
1987 First Pacific buys Hong Nin Bank 
1987 Salim Group enters steel industry in partnership with government 
  
1988 First Pacific buys into Philippines cardboard boxes manufacturer 
1988 First Pacific is listed on stock exchange 
1988 First Pacific sells US based Hibernia bank 
1988 First Pacific buys Hong Kong telecom company AsiaLink 
1988 First Pacific sells retail chain to Japanese firm 
1988 Salim Group into polystyrene with Dow Chemicals and local group 
  
1989 Out of a merger, First Pacific Bank is established 
1989 Indocement listed on stock exchange despite not meeting criteria 
1989 Liem trading unit to get nutmeg export monopoly 
1989 Government bails out Salim in loss making steel project 
1989 UIC, alkyl benzene producer partly owned by Salim, expands 
1989 First Pacific buys Australian soft- and hardware distributor 
1989 Liem increases shareholding in UIC 
1989 Government links up with Salim Group in timber and logging 
1989 First Pacific sells interest in Thai securities firm 
1989 Salim forms joint venture with Yakult (Japan) 
 
1990 Salim Group bails out Bank Duta 
1990 Salim Group into chlor alkaly joint venture in Philippines 
 230 
1990 Hagemeyer acquires Australian firm 
1990 Indomobil becomes agent for Volkswagen 
1990 Salim joint venture with Japanese Long Term Credit Bank 
1990 Salim Group in joint venture with Singaporean orchid grower  
1990 Sumitomo and Salim build PC strand & wire plant in Indonesia  
1990 Liem invests in Uzbekistan 
1990 Salim starts Batam industrial park with Singapore government 
1990 Salim Group in cleanset cement with 3 Japanese partners 
1990 Salim Group established Indofood 
1990 Liem buys UIC Singapore from ethnic Chinese 
1990 Salim Group partners with Nikko Securities (Japan) 
1990 Salim Group into palm oil in Moscow 
1990 Salim Group in styrene plant with Japanese partner and Bimantara  
1990 Liem invests in tourism industry & hotels in Vietnam 
  
1991 Salim Group buys 50% of Albright & Wilson Australia 
1991 Liem invests in Bintan with Singapore consortium 
1991 Hagemeyer strengthens presence in the US with JV and acquisition. 
1991 Salim Group in MSG plant with Korean partner & Bimantara 
1991 First Pacific buys out Millicom in telecom joint venture in Hong Kong 
1991 Salim Group buys German Deutsche Hydrierwerke 
1991 Liem sells shares in Singapore Mandarin Oriental Hotel 
1991 First Pacific buys United Savings Bank of California 
1991 First Pacific Bank, part of Salim Group, bids for a Hong Kong Bank 
1991 Indocement issues bonds to finance internal cement acquisition 
1991 Indocement expands product line and terminal in Surabaya 
1991 First Pacific buys into Internatio to merge it with Hagemeyer 
1991 Salim Group exits steel by selling shares to government 
1991 Salim Group and Taisei (Japan) to build industrial park in west Java. 
  
1992 Anthony Salim President & CEO of Salim Group 
1992 Salim and Dow Chemical build latex plant 
1992 Liem is heavily investing in his area of birth around Fuzhou 
1992 Indocement acquires Indofood, Bogasari and Wisma Indocement 
1992 Pacific Link, part of First Pacific, launches network Hong Kong 
1992 First Pacific sells Australian software company 
1992 First Pacific buys Thai Property 
1992 UIC Indonesia expands to Vietnam 
1992 First Pacific invests in Vietnam property 
1992 First Pacific buys security firm in Hong Kong, Guardforce 
1992 Salim Group invests in oleo chemicals on Batam island 
1992 UIC Indonesia acquires Petrocentral chemical plant 
1992 Liem acquires concession for logging in Moluccas 
  
1993 15% of FP Bank sold to Chinese ministry 
1993 Salim Group buys into Astra, automotive company in Indonesia 
1993 First Pacific supplier to Moscow Telecom Business 
1993 Liem and Bank of China set up bank in Fujian 
1993 Indofood & United Biscuits (UK) form joint venture in Indonesia 
1993 Salim Group part of a consortium Java power plant with Enron 
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1993 Salim Group in consortium to bid for Indonesian telecom project. 
1993 Metro Pacific, part of First Pacific, acquires Philippine packaging firm 
1993 First Pacific links up with Chinese Ministry in banking 
1993 First Pacific teams up with mainland Chinese partner in property 
1993 Hagemeyer buys British distributor 
1993 Salim Group invests in Philippines power plant 
1993 Salim Group links up with Radisson to build hotels in Indonesia 
1993 Jakarta Water JV with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (France) 
  
1994 Salim Group invests in aerospace industry Batam 
1994 Salim Group sets up pig farming with US agribusiness group Bunge 
1994 Salim Group in oil refining and polypropylene Philippines 
1994 First Pacific sells company to Salim Group 
1994 Darya-Varia acquires 100% of Wigo, its distribution company 
1994 Salim Group sets up noodle company in Nigeria 
1994 First Pacific China established 
1994 First Pacific sells interest in Internatio-Muller 
1994 Salim, Mazda, Tomen, local firm in vehicle manufacturing in Fuzhou 
1994 Indofood goes public 
1994 Liem buys stake of Malaysian flour mill 
1994 Salim Group invest in paging in JV with Indonesian Ministry 
1994 Salim Group builds noodle plant in Saudi Arabia 
1994 Salim bids for telecom project with Japanese partners 
1994 Bank Central Asia takes over Continental Bank with Bank Danamon 
1994 Indocement plans cement plant Kalimantan with partners 
1994 Hagemeyer forms JV with Cosa Liebermann 
1994 Darya Varia, a unit of First Pacific, listed on Jakarta stock exchange. 
1994 Darya Varia buys stakes in two Indonesian Salim companies 
1994 Property unit of First Pacific sells interest in Aigburth Hall 
1994 First Pacific Davies acquires stake in Sportathlon Holdings 
1994 Companies under Indofood Group merge  
1994 Salim Group starts TV Channel Indonesia 
1994 Liem Sioe Liong and Robert Kuok form sugar empire  
1994 Indofood sets up noodle production in China 
1994 First Pacific acquires Philippines Cocoa Corporation. 
1994 Indocement acquires property interests 
1994 Salim sets up fatty alcohol plant Batam 
1994 Salim Group sets up biscuit plant with United Biscuits (UK) 
1994 First Pacific sells United Savings to Salim family 
  
1995 Salim and Albright & Wilson to build new plant in Australia 
1995 Salim Group buys into Bambang’s TV venture 
1995 Hagemeyer acquires Dutch trading firm Borsumij 
1995 Camerlin Group buys stake in Australian Food Co. 
1995 Delham buys 20% stake in Brierley Investments 
1995 FP leads consortium property Philippines called Fort Bonifacio 
1995 FP buys 45% of Landco with property interests in the Philippines. 
1995 FP sells part of Philippines telecom to Japanese NTT 
1995 Liem supports government export initiative 
1995 Indomobil becomes agent for Audi 
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1995 Indomobil invests in Vietnam 
1995 Liem buys 20% stake in Singapore cement company 
1995 Indomobil to build new plant with Nissan, Marubeni (Japan) 
1995 Liem teams up with Pepsi-Cola 
1995 Indomobil to assemble Korean cars 
1995 Indomobil and Sumitomo of Japan build Dunlop tire plant 
1995 First Pacific establishes joint venture with India’s Godrej Group. 
1995 Salim Group invests in Kalimantan port 
1995 Indocement sells Bogasari to Indofood 
1995 Camerlin Group bids for Pacific Foods, Liem shareholder 
1995 First Pacific’s Darya-Varia buys Indonesian pharmaceutical company 
1995 Liem and other businessmen donate to Indonesian poor 
1995 First Pacific moves into Australian real estate 
1995 First Pacific sells of property and stakes in subsidiaries 
1995 First Pacific Group will establish glass manufacturing in Vietnam 
1995 Hagemeyer acquires German distribution company 
1995 Marubeni (Japan) partners with Salim buying Indomobil bonds 
1995 Indofood expands noodle production despite regulations 
1995 Salim Group expands in chemicals producing plastics ingredients 
1995 Liem and Sutanto buy First Pacific’s Indonesian telecom operations 
1995 Property and infrastructure project Suzhou, Liem part of consortium 
1995 Consortium incl. Anthony Salim buys Singapore engineering firm 
  
1996 Salim and Bambang partner in Asia Pacific Infrastructure 
1996 BCA acquires outstanding shares of BCA Finance Limited HK 
1996 Salim group expands caustic soda capacity 
1996 First Pacific acquires stake in Indonesian telecom co. 
1996 FP signs contract for telecom in India 
1996 Salim Group, with First Pacific, invests in Fujian telecom 
1996 Indomobil links up with Fuji, Marubeni (Japan) 
1996 Salim Group plans olefin cracker with partners 
1996 Power projects China, Indonesia, Salim group one of the partners 
1996 Salim Group buys into QAF, a Singapore listed company 
1996 UIC, a Salim controlled chemicals company diversified into property  
1996 First Pacific teamed up with China United Telecom (Unicom) 
1996 Salim group starts commercial operation of polypropylene film  
1996 Backdoor listing Camerlin Group (Salim among shareholders) 
1996 First Pacific into telecom venture in Shenzhen 
1996 Pacific Link, with Vodaphone among winners of telecom bid in HK 
1996 Indomobil sets up company in cooperation with EDS Corporation 
1996 Nissin (Japan) partners with Salim in noodles  
1996 Indomobil and Porsche join forces in Indonesia 
1996 QAF enters Indian market 
1996 Salim Group forms consortium for telecom bids  
1996 Salims part of consortia to control Astra 
1996 UIC awards Hyundai a contract for alkylbenzene plant 
  
1997 Salims help Bambang to a new bank 
1997 BCA buys biometric identification devices from US company 
1997 Camerlin sells its stake in Australian National Foods 
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1997 Liem family members invest in fashion café Singapore 
1997 First Pacific sells Australia-based Tech Pacific 
1997 Salim Group attempts to take control of Jurong Cement, Singapore 
1997 Salim Group sells Indofood to QAF, with Japanese firm 
1997 Indomobil listed on Jakarta stock exchange (backdoor listing) 
1997 Salim Group insurance firm establishes JV with Japanese firm 
1997 Anthony Salim signs MOU for reclamation project Jakarta Bay 
1997 Liems helps out Suharto’s son in chemical business 
1997 First Pacific divests Pacific Link, a Hong Kong telecom company 
1997 QAF starts Gardenia-brand bread bakeries in Philippines 
1997 Salim Group part of consortium to invest in Fuzhou Port 
1997 Salim Group acquires a stake in San Miguel 
1997 Salim Group invests in property Shanghai 
1997 Monostyrene plant to triple production capacity 
1997 Salim Group submits bid for super-express train worth 8.4 bln USD 
1997 Salim Group’s UIC plans to tie up with Albright & Wilson 
1997 BCA takes 25% of Bank Yama 
1997 BCA joins VISA network 
1997 Salim Group wants strategic stake in Danamon Bank 
1997 First Pacific part of a consortium awarded telecom license in Taiwan. 
1997 Salim Group partner in Hanoi hotel 
1997 Indofood acquires various companies from the Salim Group 
1997 Indomobil expands production 
1997 Indomobil will manufacture Timor Car 
1997 Liem investor in KG Investments of Koo Family 
1997 Salim Group major partner in petrochemical complex Java 
1997 Salim cooperates in liquid carrier businesses with Raja Garuda Mas 
1997 Singapore Telecom and First Pacific sign agreement in Philippines 
1997 Liem said to bail out ailing banks of Suharto relatives 
1997 Salim Group and Delhaize partner in Super Indo 
1997 UIC inaugurated a new plant producing detergent ingredients 
  
1998 Salim Group pledges assets to government 
1998 Salim Group accused of bribing post-Suharto governments 
1998 First Pacific sells Holland Pacific Paper 
1998 First Pacific affiliate injects funds into Metro Pacific, a subsidiary 
1998 First Pacific sells Hagemeyer 
1998 Indo Hanshin International swaps owners 
1998 First Pacific buys Philippines shipping company  
1998 Salim Group enters milk distribution Philippines 
1998 United Savings Bank divested 
1998 Salims agree to hand over BCA to government 
1998 Liem Sioe Liong distributes food to the poor 
1998 First Pacific buys PLDT, the leading Philippines telecom company 
1998 First Pacific and Nissin to buy Indofood 
1998 Salim Group forms deal with Heidelberg Cement Group 
1998 Indocement triples asset values 
1998 Salim and Bambang in Pay TV with Murdoch as partner 
1998 Indocement to divest stakes in power plants 
1998 Salim Group exits joint venture in water with French company 
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1999 Indofood plans spin-off Bogasari 
1999 Indomobil issues bonds to the Salim family 
1999 Salim Group divests stake in Philippines food firm         
1999 Tuntex, the First Pacific Taiwan telecom company, is divested 
1999 First Pacific divests security firm 
1999 Liem agrees to repatriate money to Indonesia after talks with Wahid 
1999 Salim Group sells off part of QAF to Belgium partner firm 
1999 Salim Group sells UIC stake to Philippines firm 
  
2000 Salim Group buys out US partner Bunge in meat operations in Asia. 
2000 First Pacific divests First Pacific Bank in Hong Kong 
2000 Indocement merges with Indo Kodeco, an affiliated company 
2000 QAF into animal feeds, China 
2000 Indomobil starts to export to Bangladesh 
2000 First Pacific divests Sportathlon, a leasure service provider in HK 
2000 QAF acquires competitor in bread in Singapore, Bonjour Bakery 
2000 QAF announces acquisition of China palm oil plants from Salims  
  
2001 First Pacific sells Berli Jucker 
2001 First Pacific divests Darya Varia, Indonesian pharmaceutical firm 
2001 Indofood plans acquisition of Singapore food company 
2001 Malaysian Food group Bernas forms alliance with QAF 
2001 First Pacific divests Savills PLC 
  
2002 Salim buys 45% of China property firm forming Cosco Salim Group. 
2002 Salim partners buy back Indomobil spurring protests 
2002 First Pacific announces PLDT sale to Gokongwei, CEO blocks deal 
2002 First Pacific sells its majority interest in Bonifacio Land  
2002 Salim Group rumored to have bought back Indosiar  
2002 QAF buys Bunge Meats, a former Salim company  
  
2003 Salim Group forms alliance with Futuris Corp.; buys 5% stake 
2003 CoscoSalim sells part of Chinese construction company 
2003 QAF sells Gardenia operations in Thailand 
2003 Salim Group and Delhaize sell ShopNSave to a Singapore firm 
2003 Salim invests in China property project through CoscoSalim 
2003 Liem sells Fujian Bank 
2003 Andree Halim bids to take majority share in QAF 
2003 UIC, a Salim chemicals company, expands alkyl benzene production 
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Annex 7: Overview of Salim Group Activities 
 
 
Agribusiness 
• 240,000 hectares of palm plantations in Sumatra, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi and Riau, producing 450,000 tons of crude palm oil and 
100,000 tons of palm kernel oil; 
• 50,000 hectares of sugar plantation in Lampung province producing 
700,000 tons a year; 
• pig farms on Bulan island, producing 250,000 heads a year for 
export to Singapore; 
• Large scale chicken and crocodile farms on Bulan island; 
• Orchid nurseries producing 2,000,000 sticks a month for export. 
 
Automotive and shipping 
• Annual turnover of 260,000 motorcycles and 75,000 four-wheel 
vehicles; 
• Joint Venture with Sumitomo Rubber producing 2.5 million tires 
annually; 
• Leasing and Financing company with Ford Credit International; 
• Car rental and used-car business; 
• Car dealership in California; 
• Shipping fleet with capacity of 150,000 dead weight tons. 
 
Chemicals 
• 96,000 tons of caustic soda production annually (inorganic/ 
petrobased); 
• 90,000 tons of ethylene dichloride (EDC) annually (inorganic/ 
petrobased); 
• Joint Venture with Mitsui produces 82,000 tons of poly vinyl 
chloride (PVC) a year (inorganic/ petrobased); 
• Joint Venture with Tosoh, production of vinyl chloride monomer 
and PVC targeted to start in 1997 (inorganic/ petrobased); 
• 150,000 tons alkylbenzene annually (inorganic/ petrobased); new 
plant built in Vietnam; 
• Joint Venture with Dow Chemicals produces 30,000 tons of 
polystyrene annually; 
• 90,000 capacity for production of organic/oleochemicals (natural 
fatty-based alcohol); 
• 50% holding in Albright & Wilson for production of sodium tripoly 
phosphate and surfactants; 
• Joint Venture to produce ethoxylate with Albright & Wilson; 
• Paper-sizing chemical manufacturing with American Hercules; 
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• Industrial and fresh water supply Joint Venture with Lyonnaise des 
Eaux; 
• Fabrication of steel storage drums; 
• Tank and jetty facilities for chemical plants. 
 
Computers & Communications 
• TV station; 
• Telecommunication Systems; 
• Distribution and reselling of computers software and peripherals. 
 
Construction Materials 
• Cement manufacturing holding around 42% market share; 
• Galvanised iron sheet manufacturing with capacity of 90,000 tons. 
 
Food & Consumer Products 
• Noodles (including a Joint Venture with Myojo Food); market share 
90%; 
• Snack and baby food in Joint Venture with Pepsico Foods, market 
share 60%; 
• Sweetened condensed milk (45% market share) and pasteurised 
liquid milk (market share 56%); 
• Bottling and distribution of Pepsi Cola and other drinks; 
• Partnership with Yakult for yoghurt drinks, sales 175 million bottles; 
• Flour milling with 3 million tons annual capacity, market share 89%; 
• Edible oil production with a capacity of 400,000 tons annually, 
market share 55%; 
• Production of 100,000 tons of margarine annually; 
• Joint Venture with Miwon for MSG production, 65% of this is 
exported. 
 
International (First Pacific Group) 
• Trade and distribution of electrotechnical materials (Hagemeyer, 
Netherlands); 
• Manufacturing of veterinary products, food, consumer goods and 
packaging materials, investments in telecom and real estate (Metro 
Pacific, Philippines); 
• Manufacturing of corrugated fiberboard boxes (Steniel 
Manufacturing, Philippines); 
• Manufacturing of consumer and technical products (Berli Jucker, 
Thailand); 
• Glass container production (Thai Glass Industries, Thailand); 
• Distribution of computer hardware, software and related products 
(Tech Pacific, Australia); 
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• Telecommunication Networks (Pacific Link, Hong Kong, and Smart 
Communications, a Joint Venture with NTT Japan); 
• Banking (First Pacific Bank, Hong Kong); 
• Over 50 million square feet of property in Asia (First Pacific Davies, 
Hong Kong). 
 
International (KMP Group) 
• Food and retail businesses (QAF, Singapore); 
• Cement (Indocement Singapore); 
• Poultry (Kosmo Poultry, Singapore); 
• Flour milling (Pacific Flour and Food, China); 
• Guangdong Jiangmen Float Glass, Joint Venture with Nippon Sheet 
glass and a China state-owned company; 
• Equity investment in IUC managing 2.6 million square feet of office 
space and other property holdings; 
• Real estate project in Fuzhou, China and Suzhou; 
• Part of consortium in developing industrial parks/ infrastructure 
projects in India and Myanmar. 
 
Multi-industry 
• Textile factories with combined annual capacity of 80,000 bales of 
yarn and 130 million meters of grey fabric; 
• Production capacity of 9.2 million pairs of branded sports shoes 
annually; 
• 10,000 tons production capacity of polypropylene film for 
packaging; 
• Joint Venture with Rengo (Japan) for packaging; 
• World largest producer of mosquito coils with capacity of 9 million 
Baygon coils annually and a market share of 90%; 
• Pharmaceutical products (Darya Varia Laboratoria, Indonesia); 
• Joint Venture with Sumitomo in manufacturing of pre-stressed 
concrete wires, with annual capacity of 46,000 tons. 
 
Natural Resources 
• Coal mining in Kalimantan, 800,000 tons of raw coal annually; 
• 25,000 hectare concession for coal mining, production of 3.5 tons 
annually planned; 200,000 hectare in exploration stage; 
• 4,100 hectare concession mining 3 million tons of granite; 
• Storage, transport of oil and gas products, exploration and 
production planned in Kalimantan; 
• Participation in development of petroleum processing project on 
Karimun island; 
• 500,000 hectare concession for timber, producing 300,000 cubic 
meters of wood products annually, mostly for export. 
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Property & Leisure 
• Operation of hotels with 1,600 rooms combined; 
• Development of a resort in Manado; 
• Resort development on Batam and Bintan islands; 
• Golf clubs; 
• New developments include hospital and housing; 
• Operates office space of 75,000 square meters in Jakarta; 
• Owns and operates malls and shopping complexes; 
• Three industrial estates (East Jakarta, Citeureup, Batam), two under 
construction. 
 
Trading & Distribution 
• Retail: 20 Gelael supermarkets, 129 KFCs, 64 Swensen’s ice cream 
parlors and 130 Indomaret mini marts; 
• Indogrosi wholesale outlets, Super Indomaret supermarkets; 
• Indonesia’s largest distribution company. 
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Division Subdivisions Turnover USD mln 
Plantations 
Livestock 
Agribusiness Floriculture 
250 
Automotive Automotive & 
Shipping Shipping 
370 
Bank Central Asia (BCA 
International Banking Banking and 
Financial Services Insurance, leasing, securities 
11,000 
Inorganic/ Petrobased 
Organic/Oleochemicals 
Chemicals Specialty Chemicals & others 
1,000 
Computers Computers & 
Communications Communications (TV) 
Unknown 
Cement Construction 
Materials Galvanised Iron Sheets 
1,100 
Processed Food 
Flour 
Edible Oil Food & Consumer 
Products Consumer Products 
2,100 
First Pacific Group  
International KMP Group  
6,000 
Textile 
Footwear 
Packaging 
Mosquito Coils 
Pharmaceuticals 
Multi-Industry Steel 
720 
Coals 
Granite 
Oil and Gas 
Natural Resources Forestry 
Unknown 
Hotels 
Resorts & Golf Courses 
Real Estates 
Commercial Buildings 
Shopping Centers Property & Leisure 
Industry Industrial Estates 
Unknown 
Trading & Retailing Trading & 
Distribution Distribution 
700 
Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996. 
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Annex 8: Salim Group Turnover  
 
 
In this annex the figures on the turnover of the Salim Group are presented 
from different sources. First the estimates of the overall turnover of the 
group according to different sources, and secondly the turnover of listed 
Salim Group companies calculated using annual reports. All figures are 
converted into USD using annual average currency rates.  
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1986 1 1283 0.8 Sato (1994) pp. 119 nb >1 billion 
1992 20 2035 9.8 Sato (1993) pp. 409 
1993 18 2083 8.6 Sato (2003) pp. 25 
1996 53 2326 22.8 Sato (2003) pp. 27 
1995   2249 20 Salim Brochure (1996) p.7 
1987 7.9 1644 4.8 CISI Raya Utama (1989) 
1988 8.1 1686 4.8 CISI Raya Utama (1989) 
1993  2087 9 Financial Times, April 20, 1994 
1993  2087 10 Australian Financial Review, November 30, 1994 
1994  2161 9 The Australian, 16 August, 1995 
1995  2249 9-10 The Australian, 26 January 1996 
1995  2249 11 The Australian, 30 April 1996 
1997   2909 8 Sydney Morning Herald, May 16, 1998 
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Salim Group Turnover 1985-1996
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Turnover of Listed Salim Group Companies in USD million. 
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1994 622 1568 3804 206 1049 0 131 7380 
1995 930 1753 5249 231 1335 0 141 9639 
1996 1207 1824 7025 265 1361 53 157 11891 
1997 1715 540 8308 224 1557 65 156 12565 
1998 882 159 2894 243 172 15 125 4490 
1999 1470 254 1671 276 253 40 160 4124 
2000 1508 291 2299 284 598 71 167 5218 
2001 1408 332 1851 326 137 82 181 4316 
2002 1842 442 1892 477 194 110 172 5128 
2003 2115 491 2161 476 320 119 251 5932 
* Salim Group shareholding substantially reduced after the Asian Crisis 
Calculated into USD with historic annual average currency rates; rounded figures. 
N.B.: not corrected for cross-ownership or pyramid structures.   
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Annex 9: Salim Group Executives 
 
 
The Salim Family 
• Liem Sioe Liong (Soedono Salim): Chairman and founder of the Salim Group. 
Born in Fuqing, China. Is currently retired and lives in Singapore. 
• Anthony Salim: President and CEO of the Salim Group; director in various 
Salim Group companies. Son of Liem Sioe Liong. Born in Indonesia. 
Received a bachelor degree from the UK.   
• Andree Halim: In charge of the Singapore/China activities of the Salim 
Group. Son of Liem Sioe Liong. Bachelor Degree from the UK. Holds 
board positions in QAF and Peaktop International Holdings. 
• Franciscus Welirang: Responsible for Bogasari Flour Mills; Board Member 
in various Salim companies like Indofood and Indocement; son-in-law of 
Liem Sioe Liong. Bachelor degree from the UK. 
 
Other Liem Investors 
• Ibrahim Risjad: Born in Aceh, Indonesia. Active board member in First 
Pacific, Indofood and Indocement. Also board member of the Risjad Salim 
International Bank.  
• Sudwikatmono: Born in Indonesia; cousin of Suharto. Board member of 
various Salim companies such as Indocement, Indofood, First Pacific, 
Indomobil. Currently retired from all board positions. 
• Sutanto Djuhar: Born in Indonesia. Long time partner of Liem, from the 
same clan, but also has own interests, for example in property. Active in 
several Salim companies such as Indocement, Indofood and First Pacific.  
Father of Tedy Djuhar. 
• Tedy Djuhar: Son of Sutanto Djuhar, and a board member in various Salim 
companies such as Indocement and First Pacific.  
 
Key Professional Managers 
• Eva Riyanti Hutapea: Public account and has been a director of several 
Indofood companies prior to the merger in 1994. Was CEO of Indofood 
but resigned in December 2003.  
• Manuel Pangilinan: Born in the Philippines. Became the CEO of First Pacific 
and later of PLDT in the Philippines. Successfully rebelled against the 
Salim family when they planned on selling PLDT.  
• Tan Kong King: Group Managing Director of QAF in Singapore and board 
member of numerous privately held companies in Singapore. 
• Hartono Gunawan: Manages the chemicals division of the Salim Group, and 
is a Salim Manager since 1982. 
• Angky Camaro: Key figure in Indomobil, left the Group and is currently 
CEO of Sampoerna.  
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Glossary  
 
 
Ali-Baba Alliance between Chinese (Baba) and Indonesian 
(Ali) 
Bang   Dialect group 
Benteng  Fortress 
Cendana Jakarta street in which the Indonesian Presidential 
Palace is located 
Chaebol   Korean business group 
Cukong Indonesian businessman linking up with an official 
Danbangke  Trader with bicycle 
Guanxi   Connections 
Hengua Language group from Fujian (sometimes spelled 
Xinghua) 
Hokchia  Language group from Fujian 
Hoki   Luck 
Kretek   Clove cigarette 
Masalah Cina  Chinese problem 
Qiaoxiang  Ties with one’s place of birth 
Sinkeh New Chinese migrant in Indonesia 
Totok Newly arrived Chinese in Indonesia  
Om   Uncle 
Peranakan Assimilated Indonesian-Chinese 
Xinghua Language group from Fujian (sometimes spelled 
Hengua) 
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Abbreviations 
 
 
 
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
BCA   Bank Central Asia 
BPPN Badan Penyahatan Perbankan Nasional (See IBRA) 
CAR   Capital Adequacy Ratio 
CEO   Chief Executive Officer 
CPO   Crude Palm Oil 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
IBRA   Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
IPO   Initial Public Offering 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
KKN   Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme 
MSAA Master of Settlement and Acquisition Agreement 
NPL   Non Performing Loans 
PLDT Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
UIC   Unggul Indah Cahaya 
USD   US Dollar 
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Samenvatting 
 
Het doel van deze studie is om de lange termijn strategie van de Salim 
Groep te analyseren. De Salim Groep is een van de grootste familiebedrijven 
in Zuidoost Azië. De groep bedrijven die later de naam Salim Groep zou 
krijgen werd in Indonesië opgericht door  ondernemer Liem Sioe Liong, een 
migrant uit China. Liem Sioe Liong bouwde een indrukwekkend imperium 
op en ontwikkelde een nauwe band met de vroegere president van 
Indonesië, President Soeharto. Dit onderzoek maakte gebruik van 
verschillende bronnen, zoals persoonlijke interviews, jaarverslagen, 
informatie uit de media en al bestaande studies. Door deze te combineren 
werd een lange termijn analyse van de strategie van dit bedrijf gemaakt. 
 
De literatuur over dergelijke familiebedrijven van Chinese afkomst kan 
worden onderverdeeld in drie perspectieven. Het culturele perspectief 
benadrukt dat Chinese normen en waarden het ondernemersgedrag 
beïnvloeden. Het migrantenperspectief benadrukt enerzijds de nauwe 
banden tussen leden van de Chinese diaspora en anderzijds de politieke 
netwerken die migranten opbouwen om te overleven. Het institutionele 
perspectief legt de nadruk op omgevingsfactoren als verklaring voor de 
strategie van etnisch Chinese bedrijven in Zuidoost Azië.  Het is mogelijk 
om deze perspectieven te combineren als men onderscheid maakt tussen 
kleine, middelgrote en grote bedrijven. Afhankelijk van de fase van 
ontwikkeling van het bedrijf kunnen de verschillende perspectieven 
verklaringen voor het strategisch gedrag aanreiken. Om de strategie van de 
Salim Groep te bestuderen in haar context maakt deze studie gebruik van 
het “coevolutie” concept, dat ervan uitgaat dat de ontwikkeling van 
bedrijven en hun omgeving een interactief proces is.    
 
Deze studie draagt op verschillende manieren bij aan kennis over dergelijke 
familiebedrijven. Dit boek is een rijke bron van origineel materiaal over de 
Salim Groep, een belangrijke speler was in de recente geschiedenis van 
Indonesië. De studie levert ook een bijdrage aan wetenschappelijke kennis. 
Ten eerste wordt beargumenteerd dat de Salim Groep een relatief consistent 
model volgde waarin zij producten en diensten leverden aan de locale 
markt. Dit is in tegenstelling tot bestaande theoriëen die ethnisch Chinese 
familiebedrijven kenmerken als zeer flexibel. Ten tweede laat deze studie 
zien dat de ondernemersnetwerken van de Salim Groep substantieel 
veranderden in de laatste tien jaar. Alhoewel Chinese en politieke netwerken 
in een eerdere periode van groot belang waren, zijn Westerse en Japanse 
multinationals recent een van de belangrijkste partners van de Salim Groep. 
Ook dit gaat in tegen gangbare opvattingen dat dergelijke familiebedrijven 
vooral gebruik zouden maken van etnische netwerken. Ten derde wordt 
geconcludeerd dat naast gangbare redenen voor diversificatie de Salim 
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Groep vaak nieuwe bedrijven begon als resultaat van hun connecties. Het 
concept “economies of connectedness” wordt geïntroduceerd om dit nader 
uit te werken. Ten vierde laat dit onderzoek zien dat niet alleen externe 
factoren van invloed waren op de strategie. Ook interne factoren, zoals een 
generatiewisseling, zijn bepalend. Ten vijfde laat deze studie zien hoe de 
strategie van de Salim Groep verandert. Waar eerst vooral connecties 
leidend waren wordt langzaam toegewerkt naar een model waarin de markt 
het leidende principe is. De manier waarop deze verandering plaatsvindt is 
echter niet gelijkmatig. Hiervoor wordt in de studie het concept “oscillatie” 
gebruikt. De strategie van een bedrijf is steeds onderhavig aan invloeden 
van buitenaf en van binnenuit, en de resulterende richting die het bedrijf 
neemt zal dan ook geen lineair verloop laten zien. De studie laat rijk 
gedocumenteerd zien op welke wijze dit proces plaatsvindt. Als laatste 
maakt deze studie duidelijk dat het onderscheid dat vaak wordt gemaakt 
tussen bedrijven en nationale instituties in de praktijk niet altijd zo duidelijk 
is. De machtige positie van de Salim Groep in Indonesië, gecombineerd met 
de nauwe banden tussen Liem Sioe Liong en Soeharto maakte dat vele 
mensen de Salim Groep zagen als een verlengstuk van het Indonesische 
regime, of een symbool daarvan.  
 
Dit onderzoek wijst op de zwakte van het culturele en het netwerk-
perspectief. Alhoewel deze van waarde waren in het bestuderen van de 
Salim Groep in een eerdere periode kunnen deze perspectieven de huidige 
ontwikkeling van de strategie van het bedrijf niet verklaren. Het 
institutionele perspectief is hiervoor meer geschikt, zeker waar het de kennis 
betreft over de strategiëen van bedrijven in een omgeving met zwakke 
instituties. Dit perspectief moet echter worden aangevuld met kennis over 
familiebedrijven, namelijk dat generatiewisselingen van groot belang zijn 
voor de strategie van een bedrijf. Alles bij elkaar genomen concludeert de 
auteur dat er weinig “Chinees” is aan de strategie van de Salim Groep, en 
dat, als men dit familiebedrijf vergelijkt met groepen in andere 
ontwikkelende landen, het wellicht in haar strategie niet uniek is.   
 280 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
Maria Helena Dieleman was born on April 6, 1974 in Vlissingen, The 
Netherlands. She holds a Master degree in business administration from the 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University in The Netherlands, 
obtained in 1997. After receiving her degree she worked subsequently as a 
consultant for Fource Consultancy and as a project manager for the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2000 she was employed by Leiden University 
in The Netherlands in order to help set up Leiden University School of 
Management (LUSM). At LUSM she had different roles including Assistant 
Dean, Assistant Professor and Director of the MBA programme in 
International Management. From 2003-2007 she worked on her PhD at 
Leiden University.  
 
  
